Written in Blood: Colombia and its history of conflict

Civil conflict, especially those that escalate to the level of open military confrontation, tend to be prolonged and have a devastating effect on the country’s economic, environmental, and socio-political stability. These effects often cause a vicious cycle the state attempting to restore full control by targeting opposing groups, who in response increase their level of hostility, which then causes the state to further intensify its pressure. To solve present civil conflicts, and to prevent those which could potentially occur, one must first understand the factors that led to the conflict's origin and escalation. The civil war in Colombia is one such conflict, which, despite duration, brutality, and impact on civilians, is not well known to most of the general public.

The conflict has been referred to as the “Colombian Conflict,” suggesting a singular, unified, and continuous event, which, as we will see further, was not the case. In actuality, it was a series of conflicts between various parties with differing motivations that shifted over the six decades the conflict has lasted. There are several dimensions to the Colombian case study which make it unique. Firstly, the number, mutual relations, and the ever-changing structure of all sides make it, as Churchill might say, “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”. Second, the variation political ideologies between guerilla, government, criminal, and quasi-military groups make Colombia a powder keg of far-left and far-right politics of the early twentieth century, long after these views were abandoned by their European originators. Finally, conflicts of this magnitude are very much the exception rather than the rule in South America, which is known to be a relatively peaceful region in spite of diverse political regimes and elevated levels of economic inequality throughout the continent.

Before examining the current state of the conflict and the ways in which it developed, we must first look at its historical origins: a period of deep unrest in Colombia known as “La Violencia”-The Violence - lasting from 1948 to 1964 during the height of the Cold War tensions. The origin point, however, can be traced further into the nineteenth century, when the country’s political landscape was formed through constant fighting of two opposing political groups - the Conservatives, who advocated for a centralized state and a powerful Church, and Liberals, championed a decentralized and secular state (Steele, 2017). The unique features of the political landscape of the country caused intermittent, but frequent outbursts of violence between the two political parties. The electoral system in Colombia was described by some as winner-take-all due to the extensive powers of the victor, such as the right to appoint governors and mayors. The resulting “patronage and clientelism” (Steele, 2018), which in turn led to generational continuity of political violence as these party identities became more ingrained. However, political tensions were just one of the dimensions of a larger and fundamental tension underlying Colombian society – large social and economic inequality. Much of the other dimensions of civil unrest in Colombia such as tensions between the wealthy property owners and peasants, the capital and the rural countryside, the liberals and conservatives seem to flow from the fundamental socio-economic inequality which has permeated the society. These tensions reached a new height in 1948 when a Liberal politician named Jorge Gaitan was assassinated in Bogota.

Gaitan positioned himself as a different kind of a Liberal politician, favouring left-wing policies of redistribution, referencing the problems of land ownership and making him a favourite amongst rural communities. However, his position put his faction in opposition to both the Conservatives and his own Liberal party. This caused the Liberal vote to be split in 1946 elections, which gave the Conservative candidate Ospina and his party the full power of the state despite receiving only 41% of the vote (Steele, 2018). After taking power, Conservatives used the full extent of state power to crack down on peasant organizations and sought to roll back portions of land reforms that were not in the interest of large landowners. Finally, the 1948 assassination of Gaitan in the capital ignited a violent backlash resulting in rioting and looting across Bogota for several days. This caused an even greater assertion of power by the Conservative government who controlled both the army and the police as well as the “death squads” (Steele, 2018). In reaction to this, the Liberals developed armed guerilla groups to fight against the Conservatives. The conservative rule would come to an end in 1953 when a military junta led by General Gustavo Rojas overthrew the administration and established its rule. Despite making progress in demilitarizing some of the armed groups, a 1955 government offensive against a peasant settlement in Sumapaz caused a large displacement of residents who were then marched to safety by the guerilla groups who welcomed the refugees into their encampments.

These refugees were the foundation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) which would become the biggest paramilitary group in the country and one of the main actors in the Colombian Conflict (Steele, 2018). The Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) was another armed guerilla group which would become prominent in the conflict. This group arose in an insurgency and following Cuba’s example declared itself an enclave (Steele, 2018). Armed rebel groups like FARC and ELN made the rural countryside of Colombia their base of operations, in part due to the inaccessibility of remote jungle terrain which made it perfect for hiding from government agents and rival guerilla groups. Their choice of location is also explained by the connections of many of these guerilla groups to rural Colombians, both those displaced by government anti-guerilla operations and those that joined their local guerillas out of economic desperation and duty towards these quasi-state territories controlled by the guerillas. The continuous armed conflict between various state and rebel groups caused mass displacement in rural areas, which resulted in various new settlements emerging from the continuous flow of refugees. These new villages and their inhabitants sought order and protection, however, since the state was responsible for their plight, the rebel groups began to serve this function. Hence, these guerilla groups derived their legitimacy as protectors of poor rural areas and their inhabitants who were displaced by government action and threatened by other organized crime and paramilitary groups, large landowners, and international corporations (Steele, 2018).

The character of the conflict in Colombia has shifted from political partisan struggle for control during “La Violencia” to a conflict in which the legitimacy and systemic structure was challenged by leftist armed groups fighting against the government and each other (Steele, 2018). This was the beginning of civil conflict referred to as the Colombian Conflict. The dynamic between militia groups and the rural communities over whom they controlled has been written about at length by Ana Arjona, who highlighted the Colombian experience in “rebelocracy (Arjona, 2016) and the unique features of social order in times of civil conflict. Despite widespread belief that the armed groups established control over civilians without consent, the population was not as deprived of agency as is often presented - in fact the community played a key role in deciding what type of social order “the rebelocracy” would establish and maintain. After all, the civilians allowed the rebels to hide amongst the population, provided them with information, and helped them in their guerilla operations; without their cooperation the power of the armed groups would not have endured (Arjona, 2016). The strategy and success of the insurgents depended heavily on the support of the locals and this is a crucial point that must be kept in mind when analyzing the factors which led to the civil war. Support manifested in the form of obedience before the armed rebel force, but also in their voluntary support, and both were equally crucial if a rebel group was to be successful in retaining control over a territory and its population (Arjona, 2016).

Both FARC and ELN presented themselves as defenders of non-elites against the oppression of elites. This goal is in line with variations of communist ideology espoused by these groups and their backers. FARC had ties with the Communist Party of Columbia which was backed by the USSR. ELN was arguably created through direct influence of Cuba, as many of its leaders were trained and later supported by the Castro regime (Arjona, 2016). Overall, the role of foreign military and financial support in the Colombian conflict was substantial before the end of Cold War, but after the collapse of the USSR criminal enterprise became the main source of income for the guerilla groups. However, the initial involvement of the USSR and Cuba highlights the ideological nature of these groups. The fight of peasants for land rights fit well into the Cold War narrative, and inhabitants of rural Colombia and the leftist guerrillas were clear allies in their fight against common adversaries. As the conflict continued with intermittent intensity, these groups continued to grow and gain power until they reached quasi-state status, keen on conquest and control over territories.

Guerilla groups like ELN and FARC obtained financing through a host of means. Outside of foreign support, guerilla groups used drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping as revenue streams. The advent of international drug trafficking and the resulting War on Drugs by the Reagan administration emerged during the height of Colombian Conflict and the unprecedented sums of money obtained via drug trade transformed the nature of the conflict. Both leftist guerillas as well as the nascent drug cartels used the vast financial flows generated by the drug trade to finance not only their war effort but also to persuade government officials which could threaten their highly profitable operations. (US DOJ, 2002)

Extortion or protection rackets were another source of both income and political authority. Various forms of taxation imposed by the guerillas on those they governed helped them finance their operations and provided them further legitimacy. This illustrates once more the desire of the guerilla groups to imitate the structure of the state by providing core services, albeit in a perverted form. One source of income is open to guerilla groups unlike legitimate states – kidnapping and ransom. The reasoning behind kidnappings in civil war context is not only economic but political also. Daniel Gilbert writes, “kidnapping ransoms are intricately connected to their main source of income, protection rackets or “taxes,” as it “…is both the most lucrative way to punish tax evasion and an effective means of deterring future shirking” (Gilbert, 2022). For many of these guerilla groups, kidnappings have a political goal of intimidation and control.

The Colombian Conflict is complicated by the multitude of competing ideologies and motivations. The role of the state, arguably the key aggressor in the conflict, is yet to be assessed. The fault has been the weakness of the state institutions - the inability, or unwillingness, of the state apparatus to alleviate the problems of inequality and perform a fundamental function of the state – providing security and rule of law for citizens. The inability to exercise control over large areas of the country under insurgent control delegitimized the state and left a vacuum to be filled by other actors who “tend to take on the functions and forms of states” (McDougall, 2009). It has been found that rural territories with poor accessibility and lack of government control are not only at more of a risk of falling under guerilla control, but also under a greater risk of suffering from the legacy of such rule (Pabon, 2018).

The Colombian Conflict is one of the most complex and enduring civil conflicts - albeit to a much lesser extent in recent years with the bulk of guerilla forces agreeing to lay down their weapons in 2017. Multiple aggressors - all of whom have complex historical origins, motivations, modes of operation - make the Colombian Conflict a perfect case study for military historians interested in studying modern guerilla warfare and how guerilla groups can gain and retain control over large territories and timeframes. The conflict presents a complex system with many moving parts, made only more complex by the simultaneous interconnectedness and hostility between the main aggressors and their civilian supporters, as well as the historical context of extreme partisan divides, ineffective government, and economic inequality.

References and Consulted Sources

Arjona, Ana. 2016. Rebelocracy : Social Order in the Colombian Civil War. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón. 2018. Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia : Transitioning from Violence. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Ny: Routledge.

Gilbert, Danielle A., Alexander Downes, Cynthia McClintock, and Eugene Finkel. 2020. The Logic of Coercive Kidnapping. American Political Science Review.

McDougall, Alex. 2009. “State Power and Its Implications for War and Peace in Colombia.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32 (4).

Steele, Abbey. 2018. Democracy and Displacement in Colombia’s Civil War. Cornell University Press.

Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón. (2018). Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia : Transitioning from Violence. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Ny: Routledge.

“#03-14-02: Attorney General Ashcroft Announces Indictment in the Daniel Pearl Kidnapping and Murder Case.” 2002. Www.justice.gov. March 18, 2002. https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/031802newsconferencefarc.htm.