U.S. Space-Based Military Assistance to Ukraine

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States has been the largest contributor of military aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), having contributed over $18.5 billion USD in weapons and equipment as of November 20, 2022 (Antezza et al. 2022). While American conventional weapons have been an important element of military assistance to Ukraine, American space-based assets including satellite communications (SATCOM) and satellite-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) have greatly contributed to UAF battlefield victories.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine fought a hybrid enemy of disguised Russian regular forces and pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas, its eastern region bordering Russia. Kremlin-backed forces were armed with Russian-made equipment including electronic warfare (EW) systems that hindered the UAF’s ability to liberate its occupied territory (Shelest, 2022). Ukraine possesses a modern army that relies on effective communication to achieve success on the battlefield. Successful use of weapons systems like drones, missiles, and artillery rely on rapid communication between commanders and their subordinate forces. Ukraine’s lack of national SATCOM capabilities prior to 2022 put Ukrainian forces at a disadvantage when their terrestrial communication methods, including high-frequency radios, were disrupted by Russian EW countermeasures like the R-330B jamming system.

The R-330B emits enough counter-radio frequencies to jam advanced military radios, rendering them temporarily useless. As well, the R-330B is well-integrated into Russian ground units and formations; as of 2017, each Russian mobile brigade has an integrated EW company, which provides insight into the importance that the Russian military places on EW capabilities (Boyd 2017).

Before the 2022 invasion, Ukrainian officials noted the debilitating impact that Russian EW systems used in the Donbas had on UAF combat operations (Prokopchuk 2018). Due to Russian superiority in EW systems, Ukrainian forces often relied on archaic communication methods like ground-based telephone cables. Compared to terrestrial radio and telephone cables, SATCOM provides reliable and secure communications. SATCOM transmits higher data loads at longer ranges than terrestrial radios, and is less vulnerable to enemy EW capabilities. For example, the R-330B emits radio frequencies from the ground in a horizontal fashion to locate and disrupt Ukrainian radios (Boyd 2017). By using ground-based terminals that aim skyward to relay data through orbiting satellites, SATCOM provides the UAF an effective way to negate Russian EW capabilities.

Since February 2022, the UAF have gained considerable levels of access to American SATCOM infrastructure. As recently as October 2022, the United States sent Ukraine four SATCOM antennas to improve their existing capabilities (Department of Defence 2022). The U.S. military has not been the only source of American SATCOM aid; commercial SATCOM providers like SpaceX have also provided help to Ukraine. SpaceX’s Starlink constellation – made up of three-thousand communications satellites occupying Low-Earth Orbit – provide reliable internet access throughout Ukraine.

Starlink internet access has been vital to Ukrainian communications at all command levels, especially for tactical-level UAF units on the frontline. Over eleven thousand mobile, backpack-sized Starlink satellite terminals are currently used by the UAF on the battlefield. They are used for a variety of purposes, including receiving critical news updates, coordinating offensives, and launching effective artillery strikes in remote areas (Miller, Scott et al. 2022).

Like its lack of SATCOM assets, Ukraine had no national space-based ISR capability before 2022. Ten months before Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Ukrainian officials publicly announced that the Russian military was concentrating its forces on the Ukrainian border (Bielieskov 2021). Tensions eventually simmered, but in November 2021 an American satellite imagery company, Maxar Technologies, provided Ukraine with new images that the Russian buildup was growing (McLeary, Swan 2021). Maxar Technologies gave Ukraine and the international community detailed images of gathering Russian forces – analysts were even able to identify specific models of armoured vehicles and deduce specific Russian formations that were being mobilised.

These images made it clear that the Russian military was preparing to escalate its eight-year conflict with Ukraine. Confirmation from satellite images gave Ukraine the opportunity to prepare its defences against the impending Russian offensive. While detailed information on Ukrainian troop movements and government preparations from late 2021 to 2022 is unavailable to the public, Ukraine’s victory over Russian forces near Kyiv in the first month of the full-scale Russian invasion suggests that Ukraine was well-prepared for the Russian offensive. Additionally, clear evidence of mounting Russian military preparations allowed Ukrainian officials to demonstrate that Russia was the aggressor in the crisis. Ukraine’s public relations campaign to obtain and solidify international support was bolstered by images of Russian forces preparing their attack.

Immediately after the February 24 invasion, Ukrainian officials pleaded for increased satellite ISR support from their Western partners. On March 1, 2022, Mykhailo Fedorov, Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine, relayed a call to international governments and companies to provide Ukraine with real-time satellite ISR data. In his statement, Fedorov highlighted how important real-time, accurate images of Russian troop movements were, mentioning how existing Ukrainian capabilities were inadequate: “We badly need the opportunity to watch the movement of Russian troops, especially at night when our technologies are blind in fact! SAR satellite data is important to understanding Russian troop and vehicle movement at night considering that clouds cover about 80 percent of Ukraine during the day.” (Mykhailo Fedorov 2022).

Companies like Maxar Technologies fulfilled Ukraine’s request for increased satellite ISR data, and the UAF has used this data to a great extent. On March 24, 2022, a UAF attack on Russian naval vessels stationed in Berdiansk Port on the Sea of Azov took place. Maxar satellite images confirmed that one Russian vessel, the Saratov, was destroyed, while two others were damaged (Sutton 2022). Although speculative, it is possible that Western satellite images helped the UAF track the Russian naval vessels to Berdiansk Port. Regardless, with the help of Maxar’s satellite images, the UAF gained confirmation that its strike was successful.

U.S. military aid to Ukraine since February 2022 has taken many forms. The United States has contributed different types of weapons and equipment, ranging from bulletproof vests and helmets to advanced artillery systems and most recently, American tanks and armoured vehicles. While conventional military equipment like vests, helmets, and tanks are easy to quantify, American SATCOM and satellite ISR aid has facilitated Ukrainian success in the past and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Space-based military assistance to Ukraine should be factored into any debate about the efficacy and future of American military aid.

Bibliography

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