Triumph of the Houthis

In Yemen, the Houthi movement has achieved broadstrategic victory over government forces, despite heavy material losses.

Ma’rib is a small, obscure city in the north of Yemen that has been recently elevated to the equivalent of Stalingrad in the county’s civil war. The internationally recognized interim government has been embroiled in a brutal fight with the rebel Houthis for the city, and both sides have absorbed casualties in the number of thousands. The intensity in which both sides are currently fighting raises the question as to why this provincial city of 15,000 is held in such importance? This can be found by analysing the conflict at large.

Ansar Allah (The Partisans of God), colloquially known as the Houthis, are a militant revolutionary organization that has been in armed conflict with the government of Yemen in 2004. The group sprung out of the northeastern Sa’ada Governorate, the epicenter of Zayidi Islam, which serves as the group’s ideological basis. Zaidism, the oldest branch of Shi’ism, and centered almost entirely in Yemen, emphasizes that the leadership of the Muslim World should reside in the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatimah- of which the Houthi Tribe is a part of. This is not to say that the Houthis seeks a central role in the leadership of the Muslim World, but more that its adherents are of the belief that the Houthi Tribe holds a special theological status, and therefore should lead Yemen in some capacity. Though the Houthis make it a point to keep their actual political positions vague, and often switch talking points depending on certain audiences- so it remains unclear as to whether or not they seek to actually restore the old Zayidi Imamate (which was abolished in 1956), or occupy a position in Yemen similar to that of Hezbollah: exerting a high degree of power, while allowing the state to exist as a separate entity. Nonetheless, the Houthis have managed to secure a broad following beyond their minority sect in mimicking the political rhetoric of Hezbollah- particularly in championing the Palestinian cause, social justice, and big-tent populism.

From 2004 to 2011, the Houthis waged a low-intensity insurgency against the central government from its power base in the Sa’ada Governorate, with the end result being the withdrawal of government forces from the area, and Houthi consolidation of its power base. The 2011 Arab Spring catalyzed the eventual Houthi takeover, as following the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in favour of Mansur Hadi, the transitional government was shaky and wracked by factional infighting- not to mention the emergence of a sizable Al-Qaeda presence (known as AQAP or Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). Hoping to take advantage of the deteriorating citation, Saleh, once a staunch enemy of the Houthis- and being responsible for the murder of their founder- allied with the group to launch a military coup in 2014 against the Hadi-led government. The Houthi-Saleh alliance seized Sana’a, the capital, along with most of Western Yemen. Further Houthi military advances led to the near capture of Aden, the country’s second-largest city, as the central government was effectively reduced to a rump state.

Saudi Arabia was particularly alarmed at the developments in Yemen, having fought the Houthis on multiple occasions during the Sa’ada insurgency, and viewing the Houthis as an extension of Iran’s network of regional proxy militias. This assessment is not wholly accurate, as though the Houthis have adopted many of the ‘anti-imperialist’ talking points from the ‘Axis of Resistance’, they are a distinctly local movement focused on seizing power, rather than exporting revolution across the region. Iranian Proxy or not, the presence of the Houthis in Yemen still posed a strategic threat to Saudi Arabia- as both have fought during the Sa’ada Insurgency on multiple occasions- with the Houthis at one point even seizing a small tract of land in the Kingdom- while in general, Riyadh could not tolerate an Iranian-friendly Yemen displacing an otherwise pro-GCC government. Therefore, Riyadh gathered a coalition of several Arab countries, including: Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Sudan, along with over 150,000 ground troops, and launched what it termed ‘Operation Decisive Storm’.

In the beginning, the operation seemed to be relatively successful. The Hadi Government retook the entirety of Aden, while also pushing deep along the coast of the Red Sea, setting back the Houthis significantly. Riyadh also imposed a twin-strategy of utilizing siege tactics and airpower- blockading all Houthi-controlled air and seaports, while also levelling strategic targets with airstrikes and missiles. This twin strategy is what initially brought international attention towards the Yemen Crisis, as tens of thousands of civilians have succumbed to famine as a result of the Saudi blockade, while thousands of civilians have perished in Saudi aerial attacks.

Despite the colossal weight of Decisive Storm shouldering the Houthis, the movement has not only managed to outlast the campaign but also be on the cusp of strategic victory. The United Arab Emirates withdrew from the coalition in 2018, and shifted its support from the Hadi government towards Southern Separatists- who as of writing are in control of Aden. Saudi Arabia has recently been making overtures towards a future peace deal, potentially signalling a withdrawal later into the future. Meanwhile, the withering Hadi government, having lost Aden and failing to make inroads into Houthi-controlled Yemen, holds its last card in the form of Ma’rib.

There are several reasons for why Mar’ib is important. It sits on a critical road juncture that connects the North with the South, contains a sizable deposit of crude oil, and headquarters the Yemeni Ministry of Defense. Most importantly, it is the last major government stronghold in the north of the country, and its collapse could spell doom for Hadi’s government. For these reasons, both sides have been engaged in fierce clashes since February 6th of this year. The Houthis have so far lost 3,000 fighters, while the government claims to have lost 1,800- of those include the Director of the Officers’ Affairs Department, the Chief of the Military Judiciary, the Attorney General, the Sixth District Commander, and three senior officers from the special forces. Saudi airstrikes have so far kept the Houthis at the north gates of the city, though they do not serve as a permanent solution. The status quo is untenable for Riyadh, and if it were to depart, the government may not be able to hold out on its own.

The fall of Mar’ib would satisfy the Houthi objective for stronger concessions in a future diplomatic resolution, and would likely attempt to engage with the GCC and perhaps what would be left of the Hadi government in a political settlement. In the aftermath, Yemen would potentially resemble her pre-unification self, with a Houthi-led government in the North, and the Southern Transitional Council remaining in power in Aden. What is certain, however, is that Saudi Arabia, the self-proclaimed hegemon of the Arab World, has failed to subjugate its poorest country, and thus is subject to a humiliation of great degree.

Works Cited:

Hetari, Nabil."The Battle of Marib: the Challenge of Ending a Stalemate." Washington Institute, 09 July 2021.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/16886/en

"Omani Mediation: A Chance for Yemen?" Royal United Services Institute. September 07, 2021. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/omani-mediation-chance-yemen.

"Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering." Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis.

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Hamza Al-Muhaisen is a sophomore at Wesleyan University, double majoring in English and History