The Origins of the Battle of Bowmanville: Playing Chicken with the Nazis

On Oct. 10th, 1942, Canadian prison guards began to shackle German prisoners of war (POWs). Anticipated to be a logistical nightmare, the Ontario POW camps had difficulties completing their orders due to a general lack of manpower and resources in combination with high prisoner hostility. The most severe, however, occurred at the Bowmanville camp when German prisoners rioted against the new shackling policies (The Atlantic Constitution, Oct. 23, 1942). The riot was leaked to the press when American reporter, Edward J. Rohrbough, wrote an article in Time, breaching Canadian censorship rules and causing an international scandal between the Allies in the process (Chicago Daily Tribune, 1942). Rohrbough was charged with violation of the Defense of Canada Regulations – part of the War Measures Act – and was given a two-year suspended sentence (New York Times, 1942). The Bowmanville episode was an embarrassing result of a tumultuous period of foreign policy between Canada, the US, and Britain. Canada became caught in a web of diplomatic complexities, ethical dilemmas, and domestic backlash.

During the Second World War, there were four major German POW camps in Ontario: Gravenhurst, Espanola, Monteith, and Bowmanville (Vance 1994, 136). The Bowmanville POW camp – also called Camp 30 – housed nearly 900 German POWs, including famed U-boat commander Otto Kretschmer (“Historians in Canada Are Fighting to Preserve One of the Only Intact German Prisoner-of-War Camps from World War II. (Camp 30)”, 9) and Wehrmacht General Johann “Hans” von Ravenstein (Strobel 2014). In 1942, the political relationship between Canada and Britain could be precarious and Prime Minister Mackenzie King faced a significant diplomatic challenge as he sought to maintain stable ties with the British Commonwealth without simultaneously agreeing to large-scale military commitments (Granatstein 2020, 115). This caused strain between Canada and Britain leading up to the war. At the May 1937 Imperial Conference, in response to Britain’s question of Canadians’ intent to the “setting up [of] common defence facilities”, Canadian Minister of National Defence Ian Mackenzie explained that “Canadian public opinion was definitely opposed to extraneous commitments” and urged the conference not to broach the subject further lest they “weaken the links of empire” (Granatstein 2020, 117). This was largely due to widespread reluctance, especially in Quebec, to join another worldwide conflict. Prime Minister King was diplomatically cornered between the historical memory of the 1917 conscription crisis, and trying to maintain political unity between Canada and the British Empire.

Foreign relations had been strained before the outbreak of war, with Sir Maurice Hankey remarking in December 1934 that “all our efforts at the conference failed to obtain from Canada any really satisfactory assurance that we should be able to count with certainty on obtaining supplies from her in time of war” (Granatstein 2020, 118). Part of King’s hesitancy over making such commitments came from his struggles on the domestic front. In April 1942, the Canadian government asked the country to release it from its pledge against compulsory conscription. The response was sharp, especially from Quebec (Granatstein 2020, 96). In postwar politics, the conscription crisis of 1917 had left a bitter taste in Canadians’ mouths. Historian J.L. Granatstein explained that “[c]onscription became the shibboleth phrase, never to be uttered except to frighten voters at election time” (Granatstein 2020, 92). Canadians felt like they were being used as a resource reservoir, while Britain felt that Canada was being unnecessarily difficult and, in a way, disloyal. The strained, oscillating climate of foreign policy led to what is now known as the Battle of Bowmanville, but at the time it was referred to simply as the “shackling incident” (The Globe and Mail Oct. 24, 1942).

The conditions that led to the event began with an operation order on the Raid of Dieppe. In August 1942, 2nd Division GOC Major-General J.H. Roberts received orders to bind German POWs in an effort to prevent the destruction of documents (Vance 1994, 134). The German government found out and became outraged, labelling the orders as “wild west methods” (Vance 1994, 134) and threatened to chain their own Dieppe POWs unless the order was rescinded. Months passed and neither Britain nor Germany revoked their ultimatums . On October 7th 1942, Germany escalated their position in a telegram which threatened to bind 1300 POWs by the next day (Vance 1994, 134). When Britain did not respond, the Germans followed through on their threat and began shackling their prisoners (Vance 1994, 134-5). Consequently, the British War Cabinet and Canadian Minister of Defence J.L. Ralston sent word to Germany stating that if Germany did not unchain their POWs, then the entire Dominion would retaliate through similar means (Vance 1994, 135). An easy task for Britain, though more difficult for Canada as the nation housed an estimated 16 000 German POWs on its own soil at the time – a large number in comparison to Britain, who housed approximately 500 (Vance 1994, 282). The Dominion Office detailed that the order would include chaining 200 German POWs in Great Britain, and that Canada would follow suit by chaining up to 2000 (Vance 1994, 135).

The Canadian government was frustrated over the escalation of the issue, largely owing to the fact that they had not been a part of negotiations or discussions concerning the action. The External Affairs Department of Canada expressed their concern over this decision, with the Minister for Naval Services, Angus L. Macdonald, emphasizing in a Cabinet War Committee meeting that Canada had not been consulted over Britain’s decision (Vance 1994, 135-36; 282 n. 32). Despite protests, Canada would have to comply as Ottawa remained committed, much to the dismay of many military officials (Vance 1994, 136). King himself made sure the record showed that Canada was performing the action “reluctantly” (Vance 1994, 136).

Despite the logistical difficulties and diplomatic uncertainty, it seems that ordinary Canadian citizens were not as opposed to a reciprocity policy as their government was. Historian Jonathan F. Vance catalogued Canadian opinion, basing the treatment foreign POWs on the treatment of their Canadian counterparts. His research concluded that public opinion generally leaned towards support for the policy. The popular sentiment in Canada was that German POWs should be receiving the same treatment as Canadian POWs overseas. Vance examined several complaints and letters which described a widespread impression that German POWs were being taken care of too well by comparison. These letters included rumors about large deliveries of food being delivered to the camps, the construction of swimming pools, and even the ability to order any food desired from Eaton’s catalogue (Vance 1994, 132). The view was also expressed in the press, with a newspaper article titled, “Nazi Prisoners Fare Better Than Canadians in Germany, Says Three-Time Escapee” (The Globe and Mail May 16, 1942). The Canadian public’s imagination was exaggerated, but not drastically different from the reality of the experiences of POWs in Canada. Author of the book, POW: Behind Canadian Barbed Wire, David J. Carter stated in an interview that “ [the German POWs] know how well treated they were […] they were quite certain that they were well treated.” (CBC Archives 2003). While domestic opinion was muted in the beginning, internationally the situation escalated when the German government threatened to chain up to three times the earlier number of prisoners (Vance 1994, 136). Britain responded in kind, again without Canadian consultation, stating that Canada would increase their number to the chaining of up to 3888 prisoners (Vance 1994, 136).

Bowmanville was characterised by a lack of manpower and resources. During its operation, it was a common occurrence for newspaper readers to see that a Bowmanville prisoner had escaped from Camp 30. Most notably were escapees Frederick Oeser & Everhardt Wildermutch, Jergen von Krause, Reinhardt Pfundter & Ernst Wagner, and, most notably, Peter Krug who made it as far as San Antonio, Texas before he was apprehended by the FBI (The Globe and Mail, May 15, 1942; The Globe and Mail, 1941; The Globe and Mail, May 7, 1942; The Globe and Mail, Apr. 22, 1942). Out of the many escapes, only one – Baron Franz von Werra – managed to make it back to the Fatherland (The Globe and Mail, May 15, 1942). The prisoner demographic consisted mostly of high-ranking Nazis, such as Luftwaffe pilots and soldiers from the Afrika Korps.

The Battle of Bowmanville itself is an interesting episode of Canadian history. On the morning of Oct. 10, 1942, guards from the 2nd Company of the Veterans Guard of Canada announced that some prisoners were to be shackled (Robertson 1960). The German prisoners refused to obey orders, however, and proceeded to barricade themselves in their barracks (The Globe and Mail, Oct. 23, 1942). The famed U-boat commander, Otto Kretschmer, led the rebellion and set up a makeshift headquarters in the building’s mess hall. Kretschmer was the unnamed camp spokesman, owing to his enormous influence over the German prisoners (Robertson 1960). During the riot – which lasted approximately fifty hours over three days – the prisoners used whatever they could get their hands on to craft makeshift weapons (Vance 1994, 137). As a result, guards were beaten with “hockey sticks, table legs, and a hail of bricks, rocks and canned goods” (Strobel, Toronto Sun). In response, it was reported that camp commander, Lieutenant Colonel James Mason Taylor, armed his troops with unloaded rifles with bayonets (Bourrie 2012, 163). Eventually, the three-day riot ended when reinforcements from a neighbouring camp were brought in, and a high-pressure hose was used to subdue prisoners through a makeshift hole in the roof. Shortly after the event, the camp resumed normal function and never experienced another riot (The Evening Citizen, Oct. 23, 1942).

The ordeal, however, did not end in Bowmanville but continued to Barrie, Ontario where Edward J. Rohrbough, an American journalist stationed in Canada, received information from an unknown source that claimed to be an eyewitness to the riot. The subsequent article detailed disturbing events and disinformation, and, because of the sensitive content, Rohrbough took care to air-mail the piece to the United States in order to circumvent Canadian wartime censorship policies. The article, published in Time, outlined how tear gas and machine guns were used against the prisoners, and that they were denied food for two days (The Evening Citizen, 1942). The Canadian government was distressed over the publication of the exaggerated claims and were concerned that Germany would use this information to justify more severe treatment of Allied POWs. As a result, the Canadian government censored the story “with the aim of preventing any possibility that garbled reports might reach Germany which could be used as an excuse for reprisals against Canadian soldiers and airmen held in German custody” (The Leader-Post, Oct. 23, 1942). The next day, the Canadian government’s Legation released a statement through the newspapers: “The style and choice of expressions throughout the Time article are such as to color and distort the facts. Such phrases as ‘bursts of machinegun fire’ and ‘commando tactics’ convey an impression of the use of military force, which is untrue and unwarranted” (The Atlanta Constitution, Oct. 24, 1942). Minister of Defence Colonel Ralston also released a statement that outlined the events, specifically addressing each of the four major falsehoods from the Time report: gas was utilized against the prisoners, machine guns were used to quell the riot, prisoners were denied rations for two days, and 126 prisoners were moved from Bowmanville to another camp (The Globe and Mail, Oct. 24, 1942).

The aftermath of the battle had a great effect on the general opinion on the policies of reciprocity. The public quickly realized the futility of engaging in a reciprocity battle with the Nazis. The Manchester Guardian reported Canadians as “wondering whether the chainings will lead to an ‘atrocity race’…many Canadians are beginning to feel that it might be better to lose the race now before Allied prisoners are more than manacled” (The Manchester Guardian, 1942). Vance explains that “the press began to receive a tide of letters sharing a common theme: the Allies could not win a competition of reprisals and to enter into such a contest was merely descending to the level of the Nazis” (Vance 1994, 137). The Manchester Guardian called this censorship scandal “[a]n unhappy sequel to an unhappy riot” (The Manchester Guardian, 1942).

The Battle of Bowmanville was a result of a political power struggle between Canada and Britain. In addition, tensions over the collective memory of World War I’s conscription crisis played a role in complicating diplomacy between the nations. Throughout the war, Canada had established 40 camps and housed approximately 33 000 prisoners (CBC Archives, 2003). This episode of Canadian history revealed the complexities of Canada’s relationship with Great Britain and the shifting political culture surrounding Canada’s imperial connections. As a result, the Nazi government seized the opportunity presented by this diplomatic confusion to create greater strain and distance between the Allies. The Camp 30 leader, Commander Taylor, later said that “he felt then, and still feels, that the decision to shackle prisoners was unwise and achieved nothing” (Robertson 1960). On December 11, 1942, it was reported in The Atlanta Constitution that the British and Canadians decided to release the prisoners from their manacles and “wait and see what Germany would do,” which stood as the anticlimactic finale to the events in Bowmanville.

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