The USSR and Clausewitz: What can be Learned?

The Impetus for the Creation of Russian Doctrine Concerning Urban Warfare

The Battle of Stalingrad remains one of the most pivotal battles, not only for Russian cultural history, but for the development of a cohesive military doctrine concerning urban warfare. Before the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Germans, it was noted by military historian David R. Stone that pre-war Soviet field manuals did not discuss the challenges of undertaking urban combat at length (Stone, 2009a). He also notes that pre-war Soviet military doctrine was predominantly of an offensive character, which placed a lesser emphasis upon defensive tactics. While seeking a quick offensive victory through tactical breakthrough is congruent with the preferred outcome of any military – as well as fitting within the ideas of Clausewitz – there were many possible reasons that drove the Bolsheviks to such a strategy. Among the most salient events which could have shaped early Soviet military doctrine was Imperial Russia’s experience during the First World War. Unlike the static nature of war in the expansive trench networks of the Western Front, the Eastern Front was a far more fluid theater that favored large tactical breakthroughs, such as the 1916 Brusilov Offensive (1914-1918-online, 2014; Golovin 1935). Moreover, the failure of the Russians to materialize strategic victories had severely weakened the moral focus of their military which in turn had weakened the legitimacy of the Romanov dynasty to a point where the Tsar had abdicated (Black, 2017). The USSR did not have the luxury of planning a strategic doctrine around defense, as not producing momentum in campaigns left the opportunity for insubordination among the ranks. This was especially fresh in the mind of Soviet leadership as the instability following World War I not only provided the environment for their ascent to power, but also led to the rise of their opposition in the Russian Civil War, with warlords like Baron Roman von Urgen Shternberg (Pelz, 2016; Sanborn 2010).

Given the circumstances surrounding the lack of development of defensive Soviet military strategy coupled with the sudden nature of Operation Barbarossa, it was clear that the Russians were not prepared to effectively conduct urban warfare before Stalingrad – the primary concern was slowing the German advance through conventional tactics, such as employing a scorched-earth policy as they had done during the time of Clausewitz (Stolfi, 1982; Gompert, Binnendijk, and Lin 2014, 161–74). For the Germans, the decision to attempt to conquer the USSR was not made in a vacuum, but based on their ideology and their interpretation of Clausewitz’s writings. As the writings were considered unfinished even by the author, the framework that he bequeathed to future generations was not meant to be followed to minute detail, but rather a critical lens through which they could apply experience and meet individual circumstances (Baldwin, 1981). For the leadership of the Third Reich, Clausewitz represented a figure within the pantheon of Prussian militarism which they hoped to emulate through conquest and lend credibility to their ideology. Furthermore, as many of the leadership were veterans of the First World War, they were fighting in the campaigns designed by military commanders who were students of Clausewitz seeking a vernichtungsschlacht (decisive battle) (Langston and Flanagan, 1963). The Germans also may have interpreted the Clausewitzian dictum – war is a continuation of politics through violence – as justification for their aggressive foreign policy, which viewed an eastward expansion into the USSR as a zero-sum civilizational conflict between the nation and those perceived to be in the path of the fulfillment of their ideology (Stoakes, 1983). However, their interpretation of his writings favored offensive campaigns at the expense of defense.

Further exacerbating this issue was the German military leadership’s subscription to the “stab in the back theory” (German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), n.d.), which detracted from the ability to critically analyze the pitfalls of over-relying on such a strategy. When German ideology was infused with their flawed interpretations of Clausewitz, it led to a situation where the logical conclusion was a decisive battle in Stalingrad in which victory could be the only acceptable outcome regardless of the operational capabilities. A Soviet victory in Stalingrad was the result of a culmination of several factors demonstrating the paradoxical trinity of war described by Clausewitz: primordial violence, chance and its element of subordination, grounded in reason to pursue interests through force (Cole, 2020; Waldman 2009). The first of the trinity – primordial violence – was set in motion by the wanton violence used against civilians by the Germans, which the leadership of the USSR then framed as the basis of the Great Patriotic War (Moine and Angell, 2011; Domańska 2019). The second – chance – can be seen in how Soviet Marshal Chuikov reformed his tactical doctrine to exhaust the Germans in close-quarters combat, owing to the air superiority commanded by the Luftwaffe (Stone, 2009b). The last section of the trinity can be observed in the directives employed by Soviet leadership to ensure the cohesion of their forces in order to continue their war for the survival of the state (Reiman, 2016).

Soviet Leaders on Clausewitz

The early leadership of the Soviet Union were also students of Clausewitz and familiar with his theories. Against the backdrop of the “universal war” (Kipp, 1985a) – which Engels predicted would bring about the uprising of the working class due to societal stressors of the conflict – Lenin witnessed the failure of the continent’s working class to prevent the First World War and the collapse of the Second International (Joll, 1981). Thus, he sought a way to bring about the uprising of the working class as the conventional theory had failed to produce what was supposed to occur, specifically when the material conditions of the continental working class worsened under war (Cox, 2015). Lenin believed there needed to be theoretical innovation to achieve this aim and turned to Clausewitz. In his interpretation of the work, Lenin applied a classist lens of his assessment that war is a continuation of politics using violence (Kipp, 1985b). His analysis included the assessment that war was a continuation of the vested interests of the bourgeois, whether for economic gain or prestige. Lenin brought his class warfare interpretation of On War within his essay “Socialism and War,” in which he delineated interpretations of Marxism and Socialism on the subject of war. While socialists were averse to war, Lenin believed Marxists understood civil wars as progressive in nature due to the ability to bring about social change in the face of oppressive institutions, and that the imperative should be to seize the opportunity presented by the Great War to turn the conflict into a civil war (Lenin, 1930). While trying to ascertain Stalin’s thoughts on Clausewitz may seem onerous given studies into Clausewitz’s works have been confined to staff colleges, it is not as difficult a task as one might think.

Insight into the matter can be gathered from correspondence between Stalin and Colonel Evgeny Razin – a professor at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy – on the subject of whether Lenin’s writings concerning Clausewitz were outdated, as well as what attitude should one have to the theories in the age of machine warfare (The Office of the Historian, n.d). Stalin asserted that Lenin only concerned himself with the application of his works in the political realm – notably, the relation between war and politics along with retreat as a viable policy – and that Clausewitz was indeed outdated, as evidenced by the proponents of his facing defeat in both world wars (Marxists Internet Archive, 2009). Further in the response, Stalin claims to be a superior tactician to Clausewitz in that he considered the importance of a counter-offensive while the Prussian general did not. The overall response should be taken with a grain of salt. Stalin sought to “reinforce his personality cult” (Tucker, 1979) and ignored a multitude of conditions that allowed him to win against the Germans, namely the “competence of his marshals” (Legvold, 2012), the overextension of the Germans, and the effect which the Russian winter had on the operation (Kowalski, 2019; Peck 2021). He also omitted the fact that Clausewitz had died before a final formulation of his work could be completed, in which the topic of a counter-offensive could have been pondered upon. Therefore, it is up to modern military strategists to study the doctrines and generals who achieved great counter-offensives of history to draw inspiration and fill in the gaps left by the premature death of Clausewitz (Vlakancic, 1992; The Ohio State University, 2019). When taking the views of early Soviet leaders on Clausewitz in account, the inference can be made that his theories held little importance to the military planning of the fledgling USSR.

This sentiment is further supported when the musings of Trotsky on military science are examined. Trotsky played an important role in the foundation of the USSR and served as the People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. When he wrote on the subject of strategic thought, the continent had undergone a radical departure from its pre-Great War political order and bore witness to the most rapid transformation of warfare due to industrialization. In addition, Trotsky had been a participant in a revolution that conventional Marxist thought believed would occur in more developed states (Marxists Internet Archive, 2006). He noted that such a rapid change in warfare had rendered the long-standing military doctrines no longer viable. Among the great powers, he illustrated the striking gap between the war plans and the reality faced on the battlefields of Europe. His attention devoted to Britain demonstrated that even the quintessential great power – that maintained naval hegemony and a non-compulsory military service – had to rethink its strategic precepts due to the turmoil brought by industrialized warfare.

Although the analysis of British military doctrine by Trotsky provided a descriptive representation of his thoughts on the state of military science in post-Great War Europe, the discussion of Imperial Germany would impart better insight into his thoughts on Clausewitz. In his assessment of German military doctrine, he states that the German officer class had been propelled to the heights of power of Germany and they had succumbed to overly offensive strategic thought (Marxists Internet Archive, 2007). The offensive character of German Supreme Army Command (OHL) can be traced to the limited interpretations of Clausewitz that fed their convictions in the superiority of offensive maneuvering (Strachan, 2010). Trotsky’s assessment of German shortcomings differed from Stalin, who had perceived them as his inferiors strategically – he viewed their doctrine as endemic of “the cult of the offensive”(Evera, 1984) which permeated the general staffs of Europe. Such strategic precepts were but one of many contradictions between the evolution of the productive forces of capitalism and the class systems that were perpetuated by elites for their enrichment. Although Trotsky and Stalin had given their thoughts on two different German states, both eras of German militarism had built their strategic planning around their interpretation of Clausewitzian precepts, and taking these into account helps to develop a greater insight into the Soviet view of Clausewitz and the evolution of his work’s interpretation.

To understand the lessons that can be drawn from the study of the burgeoning Soviet Union and Clausewitz, one must examine the concepts associated with the Prussian general and how they have been formulated by the Germans and the Soviets through a historical lens. An informative framework that can be utilized in this regard is the Summersian Trinity of the people, the army, and the government (Summers, 1983). Prior to Lenin, borrowing Clausewitz was primarily confined to the sphere of military affairs. This specific interpretation was best shown through the sentiments of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who remained influential in how generations of Germans formulated military strategy.

The Summersian Trinity and the Subject of Friction

The primary Clausewitzian concept that Von Moltke internalized was the idea of absolute war, and to bridge the gap between this concept with reality he believed in the primacy of the military over the government (Roth, 1992). Von Moltke’s interpretation can be viewed as attempting to limit the friction between the government and the army to achieve the desired goal. This view is constructed from a point where the Summersian trinity had been made whole, as the state which he served was unified and established. For the USSR, Lenin had organized the people to overthrow the old triad of the Tsarist government. Trotsky viewed the question of the formulation of military doctrine through the context of instability within the people’s relation to the army and the state. This unique perspective allowed him to see the flaws of German militarism, but his assessment reveals an incomplete understanding of the primary trinity and the role that friction plays in their operation.

Clausewitz defined friction as “the effect of reality on the ideas and intentions in war” (Watts, 1996), but friction is a force that is not solely confined to the realm of military affairs but extends to political affairs as well. Trotsky had implied that the Great War and ensuing instability had been the downfall of steady military doctrine within the continent. He also further insinuated that the cult of the offensive inspired by Clausewitz had been at fault for the character of the First World War. Clausewitz, no doubt, was inspired by the advances of Napoleonic Warfare – such as reforms in infantry organization – as he was present at Napoleon’s campaign in Russia (Franck, 2004). However, the armies of the great powers of Europe selectively chose concepts from Clausewitz and ignored the flaws of Napoleonic tactics. Napoleon faced difficulty against the irregular warfare present during his campaign in the Peninsular War and in Russia in 1812 that shattered his notion of invincibility (Witt, 2019; Schlauch 1942). The great powers, however, would not employ the same strategy used by the Spanish and Russians, as it would be viewed as tactics of last resort and not congruent with the behaviour of a major power. Within a conflict, resistance to an actor’s intentions will, in theory, produces a limited friction in which the primary trinity operates. The intersection of the implementation of the latest advances in military technology and the implementation of the Napoleonic military strategy compounded to produce a maximum friction that limited the intentions of all parties. Furthermore, it is important to comprehend that the individual parts of the Summersian trinity have a finite ability to produce friction due to the ever-changing nature of their morale and physical forces. Friction can occur within statecraft as well as it reflects the impact of reality on the pursuit of policy. Diplomatic friction can arise from a number of issues, but for the early USSR it was the difference in ideology between itself and capitalist states (friction between opposing governments within a Summersian context). The Soviets faced internal as well as external friction and attempted to relieve themselves of the external through the negotiation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Wheeler-Bennett, 1940). The Soviets were able to accomplish their aim because they had not had a Summersian trinity dominated by the army as the Germans had. Otto von Bismarck recognized the importance of diplomacy as war narrowed his ability to pursue German interests. While the article uses the Germans and the Soviets to illustrate the concepts Clausewitz presented, the universality of friction is revealed through his description of the trinity. He states, “any theory of war must behave like an object suspended between three magnets” (Gardner, 2021). Without an animating force – meaning a state or non-state actor – the trinity remains static and without interaction. The character of the force drives the trinity’s interactions that give rise to its friction.

Though some view academic scholarship pertaining to the Soviet Union as less relevant following its dissolution, Chinese scholars have looked for lessons to be drawn from a former superpower regarding their own increasing influence (Li, 2022). Modern warfare, as in the time of Clausewitz, is undergoing rapid changes and effective strategists must understand the constants of war. For years, the evolution of warfare has been cited by individuals believing his precepts to be obsolete. Furthermore, those who claimed to be his most avid students have been vanquished by their foes, casting additional doubt upon the ideas. However, Clausewitz’s trinity and a more complete definition of friction are a reflection of the complexity of war itself, something noted within On War where he considered war to be a “continuous interaction of opposites.” Due to this, it is clear that aspects of his thoughts on war are not only fundamental within military theory, but fundamental within its practice as well.

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