Reunification Derailed: An Overview of Chinese Amphibious Capabilities Against Taiwan

On 4 February 2022, Russia and China issued a joint statement at the Beijing Winter Olympics. The statement touched on world issues ranging from COVID-19, climate change, and great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. Regarding Taiwan, both parties stated: “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and opposes any forms of independence of Taiwan” (People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation 2022). If Chinese leadership decides that unification with Taiwan can only be achieved through force, then one question is paramount: would a Chinese amphibious invasion succeed? An amphibious invasion would be the only way for China to reliably establish control over Taiwan by force. Chinese forces would need to assault numerous beachheads along Taiwan’s coastline in conjunction with special forces and airborne troops operating in Taiwan’s rear areas. If Taiwanese forces were to fall, the numbers of Chinese military personnel required to establish a long-term occupation and annexation of the island could only be supplied by ship across the Taiwan Strait. Analytical endeavours relating to the implications of China-Taiwan unification should begin by asking if Chinese forces would even prevail in an attempt to seize Taiwan. This article proposes that while China’s military is highly advanced and capable, it would likely fail in an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

The odds of Chinese success against Taiwan would be diminished from the outset. The United States is China’s strategic competitor, and it is probable that the United States would actively involve itself in combat operations to defend Taiwan. While Taiwan is not a formal U.S. ally to the same degree as Japan or South Korea, the United States has made security guarantees to Taiwan, has supported its armed forces through lethal aid, and taken direct action to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty in the past, including putting U.S. service members in harm’s way (Clough 1992, 821-827).

The significant amount of military aid that the United States has given to Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression also suggests that the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a Chinese invasion. In terms of American strategic interests, the United States views Taiwan as an integral part of the First Island Chain and a key bastion of its security interests in the Western Pacific. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently reaffirmed that the United States is an “Indo-Pacific nation,” suggesting that President Barack Obama’s strategic “pivot” to Asia is still in effect, and the United States is willing to make sacrifices to maintain its strategic position in the Western Pacific (U.S. Department of State 2022).

The historical record demonstrates that surprise is a key component of any amphibious invasion; Chinese forces would be unable to mask their military buildup before a cross-strait invasion. Chinese forces would be betrayed by the geographic realities of the Taiwan Strait, including the weather (Easton 2017, 145). Having appropriate and favourable weather conditions is paramount to any successful amphibious invasion. If the seas are too choppy, then amphibious landing craft are unable to depart from larger vessels while laden with soldiers and equipment. This also affects the approach towards the landing beaches, as choppy seas obscure the landing craft pilot’s vision and could result in amphibious troops being landed on the wrong beaches. These issues are compounded by the delays that rough seas would cause for larger vessels to even approach the landing beaches, before troops would depart. Keeping this in mind, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be meticulously planned according to well known weather patterns, thus making it easier to predict. Due to local weather conditions, there are only two periods throughout the year when a cross-strait invasion would even be possible: early April, or early October (Easton 2017, 151-152). Not only does this narrow down potential invasion dates and make it easier for Taiwanese and American planners to prepare for an invasion, it means that if China were to launch an attack on Taiwan outside of either early April or early October, its forces would face enormous difficulties from the weather, in addition to Taiwanese or American defences, thus heightening the chances of failure.

Total domination of the airspace over an amphibious landing zone is necessary for its success, and it is doubtful that Chinese air assets could maintain air superiority over Taiwan for an extended period. The air forces that the Chinese would utilise against Taiwan are formidable. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Theatre Headquarters, located across the Strait from northern Taiwan, would field numerous divisions and brigades of some of the most advanced jet fighter aircraft in the world (Easton 2017, 281-282). In addition, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would likely deploy an aircraft carrier to support the amphibious landing (Easton 2017, 281). While strong, the PLAAF and PLAN air forces are not invincible. With U.S. support and guidance, Taiwan has invested in anti-air capabilities, including dozens of surface-to-air missile batteries located along its coast and in its interior regions (Easton 2017, 303-305). Being well hidden, these batteries would take a large toll on Chinese aircraft flying over and around Taiwan.

The Taiwanese are also able to field modern jet aircraft, including American-built F-16 fighter jets, in addition to modern surveillance aircraft and other weapons systems (Easton 2017, 297-300). Combined Taiwanese and American air power would pose a credible and serious threat to a Chinese amphibious force. Not only would the PLAAF and PLAN air forces take heavy casualties from surface-to-air missile attacks and dogfighting in the air, but the landing itself would be disrupted due to bombed landing craft and transport vessels. The inherent complexity of an amphibious attack means that total command of the air is necessary, and Taiwanese airspace is likely to be contested in the event of war.

A Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan is not unlikely. If it does occur, it is unlikely that Chinese forces will succeed. Amphibious invasions are extremely complex operations. They require intense and detailed coordination between different military branches, take place in dynamic and fluctuating environments, and are more prone to unforeseen problems than military operations conducted solely on land or at sea.

Since 24 February 2022, the international community has witnessed the unprecedented levels of military support that the United States has given to Ukraine. The United States arguably has a larger stake in preventing a forceful Chinese occupation of Taiwan, and its military intervention in a cross-strait war would be significant. As well, given modern surveillance technology, it would be very difficult for China to conceal an amphibious military buildup. It would be relatively easy to predict when an invasion would be launched, considering that the weather conditions in the Taiwan Strait are predictable.

Last, Chinese forces would struggle to maintain air superiority over Taiwan, without which Chinese amphibious forces would flounder. Taiwanese surface-to-air missile attacks on Chinese jets combined with Taiwanese and American air assets attacking landing craft and transport vessels would be a significant hindrance to Chinese landing efforts.

As long as current levels of military spending, technological development, and strategic commitment remain stable, it is unlikely that a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan would succeed. It would be prudent for Chinese, Taiwanese, and American policymakers to recognize this reality and engage in dialogue, foster goodwill, and agree on basic norms of strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

Bibliography

People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation. 2022. Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering A New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. Beijing, People’s Republic of China.

U.S. Department of State. 2022. Secretary Blinken’s Remarks on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Issued December 13th, 2021. https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-secretary-blinkens-remarks-on-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/.

Clough, Ralph. Roger D. 1992. “Taiwan Under Nationalist Rule, 1949-1982.” In The Cambridge History of China: Volume 15, Part Two, edited by John K. Fairbank and Denis Twitchett. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Easton, Ian. 2017. The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia. United Kingdom: Eastbridge Books.