Morocco's Silent War

Located at the bottom of an archaic Swiss embassy page, I found the email address of the little-known liberation group. The POLISARIO Front recently re-initiated their armed cause in the West Sahara, both in reaction to Moroccan aggression and to garner international support. I wanted to hear what they had to say. To my surprise, within a few hours I was in contact with a representative.

Less than a week later, I sat down over Zoom with Omeima Abdeslam, whose office coordinates with parliamentarians, solidarity movements, and United Nations adjuncts both in Switzerland and around the world for the liberation of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Tensions between Rabat and the Front reached a boiling point on November 13th, 2020, with the Moroccan security services accused of firing at peaceful protestors they charge with “harassing” and “banditry” (Dahir, 2020). The operation, conducted with Mauritanian support at the Guerguerat crossing, sought to re-establish the flow of goods and people in the region. The crossing has become an increased source of trade and profits for Morocco and her exports (WSRW, 2021). This act of aggression resulted in the end of the 29-year cease fire, and a legal declaration of war by the POLISARIO Front. The Front seeks to end the now 45-year conflict, reassert sovereignty over the 266,000 km2 of the Western Sahara, and fulfill the UN mandate to hold a referendum for the 173,600 Sahrawi citizens on the subject of independence. Such are the terms of the ceasefire signed in 1991. Yet to this day, a lack of political will is all that stands between Omeima and her home.

Born in 1973, Omeima’s story is not uncommon amongst refugees. “I opened my eyes running all the time, with fear” she says to me, talking about her years before the refugee camp. With a relative active in the Front, her family was prevented from settling safely in the region. Facing constant discrimination, torture, imprisonment, and threats of violence, she and at least 90,000 other refugees found themselves in the camps at Tindouf, expelled from their homeland. In the two generations since the war began, the independently administered camps have established international ties, which have permitted for the travel and education of refugees, foreign aid, as well as the development of the SADR’s fledgling institutions. Omeima herself was educated in Cuba as an engineer. “We are not in the media because we are not begging,” Omeima said, informing me of the POLISARIO-administered camps. “We do not have pictures of people starving. We have created a [functioning] state-in-exile.” The camps reside in the Algerian desert east of El Aaiún, the capital of Western Sahara, and are largely reliant on foreign aid. Despite accusations of human rights abuses early in the war, the camps have grown remarkably, and are organised around community needs. Slavery has been abolished, a step given the longevity of the tradition, and the presence of women in visible positions of power in society are commonplace – a new generation flourishing under hardship. However, they continue to struggle against harsh living conditions, lack of supplies & aid, and political repression.

In the days since hostilities have resumed, much has changed. The POLISARIO Front has conducted a series of operations against Moroccan checkpoints and outposts. As Omeima tells me, shelling against the Berm – a 2,700 km sand wall reinforced with fortifications, landmines, and some 120,000 troops – has commenced, and not relented since the declaration of war. Using equipment seized from the Moroccans, as well as arms provided by the Soviet Union & Algeria, the POLISARIO Front has waged a largely long-range campaign as of late. Over 7 million mines and other devices litter the Berm, just 250 km shy of the length of the US-Mexico border. The 100,000 km2 of unexploded ordinances comprise the longest uninterrupted minefield in the world. Neither Morocco nor the United States is party to the Ottawa Treaty which forbids the production, stockpiling, and use of landmines, and seeks to decontaminate regions (ICBL, 2019). Further complications arose with the recognition of the region by the United States as a legitimate territory of Morocco.

Until this point in time, the US had remained in support of the UN declaration in 1965, and the subsequent ICJ ruling reaffirming SADRs right to independence. The advisory opinion, issued following the UN resolution to decolonise the Sahara, asserted that there existed no territorial or sovereign link between the area, Mauretania, or Morocco (ICJ, 1975). However, the reason for this shift is strangely simple.

Part of President Donald J Trump’s legacy will be his efforts to restore peace and stability to the Middle East and resolve tensions between the Arab world and Israel. The US has always held a vested interest in Israel as a military base for foreign interests. They are the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign aid since World War Two and received $3.8 b USD this past year (CRS, 2020). In exchange for the US’s recognition of the annexation of Western Sahara as legitimate, Morocco agreed to normalize relations with Israel officially, and allow for the US to open a consulate in Dahkla (Zunes, 2021). This comes on the heels of the United Arab Emirates normalisation agreement, who coincidentally opened a consulate in El Aaiún, with Bahrain and Jordan signalling they will do the same (Kestler-D’Amours, 2020). This harmonisation of interests around US foreign policy is not necessarily bad prima facie, but it comes at the cost of legitimizing the illegal occupation of two territories (Western Sahara and Palestine) and their human rights abuses for the sake of peace. However, the importance of Morocco extends beyond US investment in Israel.

Morocco’s is a dual purpose. As a source of Western influence on other Middle East/North African (MENA) countries, it provides a stable government with which Western nations can conduct profitable business and protect their domestic and foreign interests. Given that Morocco has recently re-entered the African Union, many look to the industrialised nation as a potential source of development in the region. Morocco’s exit, 33 years prior, was over the African Unions (AU) decision to recognize the SADR as a country. Omeima attributes their re-entry to desire to remove the SADR from the AU. As a military power, Morocco is one of the sources of robust counter-terrorism policy, though some have been critical as to its necessity in recent years. Their contributions against radicalisation and jihadism in the region has been invaluable. In addition, as Europe grows increasingly concerned with the threat of migration from MENA countries, they will turn to those who have historically been key allies, like Morocco and Libya. However, much of the policies themselves fail to address the leading cause of radicalisation in the region (i.e., poverty & inequality, repression, foreign political and economic interference, lack of opportunity/education). The perverse incentives which currently allow for the exploitation of the Western Sahara are plain to see.

Following the breaking down of Brexit talks on fishing rights, Morocco was quick to capitalise on the underused coastlines and forge new agreements with Europe – a decision that was judged by the EU Court of Justice to be in contravention with international agreements and thus null (AFP, 2021). However, this is not simply a matter of fish. The Western Sahara is also home to numerous mineral deposits, and possible untapped oil reserves, and the stability of the region assists in greater tourism. OCP, the state-owned Moroccan mining corporation, continues to produce lucrative contracts with transnational corporations like Sinofert, Paradip, and Ravensdown. OCP controls a 49% market share on phosphoric acid, and their fertilizer exports in 2020 exceeded 9 million tonnes (Xie, 2020). In 2019, Morocco exported $516 m USD worth of fish, tomatoes and melons from Western Sahara to Europe, though phosphate figures are difficult to ascertain (AFP, 2021). Other foreign-based corporations who have divested aren’t innocent either, as the SADR claims Canadian-based Agrium PotashCorp has stolen some $400 m USD worth of goods and has intended in the past to pursue legal action (York, 2017). As Omeima tells me, the Sahrawis see none of the profits, actions that are tantamount to “piracy” by states and multinationals.

“We did not decide to end this peace process. Violence is a last resort; a legal right.” Omeima coughs into a tissue, explaining the psychological effects of the war on her people. For Morocco, this is a piece of land to be profited from. For Sahrawis, this is their livelihood. Freedom House ranks it amongst the world’s least free countries and territories and has reported hundreds of disappearances since the conflict began (2020). To Omeima, the systematic abuse received from birth, the cultural erasure, and the beatings of those outspoken on the Western Sahara have steeled her resolve. But for others, it silences their voice and breaks their will to fight. “This is annihilation… cultural assimilation,” she tells me, referencing the genocidal acts of both the Moroccan and French governments, a fact reaffirmed by Spanish courts who accused Moroccan officials of acts tantamount to such in their militant campaign to control the Sahara. (Gall, 2015).

Unfortunately, as Omeima tells me, “The independence of the Western Sahara will mean the collapse of the Kingdom [the monarchy] of Morocco.” Morocco is numbered amongst a growing list of countries whose Arab Spring reforms are demonstrating little tangible benefit for the citizens. In 2019, the Arab Barometer found that 70% of Moroccans aged 18 to 29 had thought about emigrating, while an additional 49% desired rapid domestic political change: the highest of any country in the region. With the coming of the COVID-19 pandemic and staggering droughts, Morocco’s GDP shrank by 13.8%, and is expected to contract an additional 6.3% (World Bank, 2020). Years of political repression, quelled uprisings, and forestalled coup d’états have generated a hostile and increasingly unstable political environment conducive to revolution. Omeima smiles, telling me that “the Sahrawis will liberate the Moroccan people, because they are not free.” But so long as Western interests pervade and both France and the US obstruct resolutions on the security council, the question of the Western Sahara will remain unanswered.

As our time drew to a close, I asked Omeima about perceptions of the POLISARIO Front. She told me that Morocco controls the dominant media narratives: “In the Cold War, we were Socialists. In the war on Islamic [terror] we were ISIS, al Qaeda. But not one of us is a terrorist.” She went on to elaborate that “we fight in an army exclusively for the liberation of our people. Nothing else.”

When I pressed her on questions of radicalisation, she responded that “it happens when people lose hope. I have no confidence in the UN, or the International Red Cross, or the Office of the High commissioner, I only have hope in my people, and I hope they don’t fail me.” What struck me most about my conversation was her resilience in spite of every hardship she, and by extension her people, have faced. This is an issue that can be resolved given enough political will. Someone must simply make the difference. Having been let down time and again, Omeima was stoic yet cheerful as we said our goodbyes: “we Sahrawi people will make the difference, or we will die trying.”

References

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Nicholas Donaldson is a 3rd Year undergraduate at Queen's University majoring in Political Studies (specializing in Political Economy) and minoring in history. His research interests include the global political economy, migration politics, the Western Sahara conflict and crises of capitalism.