Peace without Victory: Nationalist China’s use of Political Warfare for Survival

Sun Tzu wrote in his magnum opus, The Art of War, that the “supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Throughout the Cold War, a conflict almost exclusively consisting of proxy battles, political warfare became an instrumental tool in achieving strategic objectives without the use of conventional military forces. Thus, in order to project soft power and bolster overall military strength, political considerations assumed a central role in military strategy for all three levels of military planning (strategic, operational, tactical) in Nationalist China. This strategy was especially significant as they navigated through the turbulent conclusion of the "Century of Humiliation", World War II, and their subsequent confrontation with the new Communist regime in Beijing (Heinlein 1974, 3-6).

After overthrowing the Beiyang government that failed to unify China in the wake of Emperor Puyi’s abdication, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek of the Kuomintang party sought to restore order by assembling an alliance consisting of various factions, warlords, and cliques. However, the ideological, cultural, and political differences between the parties that made up the coalition led to clashes between different wings, fragmenting the new Nanjing regime ( Shattuck 2017). Elements of the Kuomintang leftists splintered off to form their Nationalist government in Wuhan, meanwhile, anti-communist purges in Shanghai ended the KMT-CCP alliance and led to the subsequent Chinese Civil War (Zhao 2004).

Thus, in pursuit of creating a loyal armed force to bring stability and unity in Nationalist China, political warfare was heavily integrated into the military planning cycle and the Order of Battle (ORBAT) of the National Revolutionary Army. It became instrumental in maintaining allegiance to the Nationalist government, as well as planning and execution on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to achieve political and military objectives (Heinlein 1974, 349). The best example of the integration of political warfare into the three levels of military planning can be found during the Sino-Japanese War, in which the National Revolutionary Army, despite a numerical advantage, faced a technologically superior and more experienced Imperial Japan.

On the strategic level, there were three main goals: defeat the Japanese onslaught while subverting communism, rally international support for the Nationalist cause, and instil troop discipline and loyalty (ibid, 360364). These goals were then completed in specific objectives on an operational and tactical level. Propaganda leaflets were disseminated to boost the morale of the people as well as frighten and scare the enemy. Furthermore, captured Japanese soldiers would be set free back to their units so they could describe the ferocity of the Nationalist army to their comrades. The Political Warfare Bureau commenced an extensive overseas public affairs campaign to boost support for the Nationalist government abroad, specifically in America. Chiang Kai-Shek's American educated wife Soong Meiling embarked on multiple publicity tours across America to rally support for the Kuomintang (Wulf). Her brother, wealthy Shanghainese banker and Harvard and Columbia graduate T.V Soong negotiated directly with President Roosevelt to provide American aid in the form of loans, war materiel, and the famous American volunteer fighter squadron, “The Flying Tigers (Davis 2015, 266).”

Desertion and morale was a major problem for the Nationalist Army beginning in the Nanjing decade and throughout the war. The ROC’s elite trained German Divisions suffered inoperable casualties during the Battle of Shanghai, losing hundreds of thousands of the country’s best soldiers (Worthing 2007, 199). A draft ensued and the ranks were soon filled with troops with minimal training and low morale. To maintain discipline and esprit-de-corps, Chiang Ching-Kuo, the eldest son of the Generalissimo, created a cadre of political officers based on the commissar system he observed as a student in the Soviet Union (Heinlein 1974, 61-64). These officers would operate at the operational and tactical level, assisting with intelligence gathering, civil-military cooperation, and psychological operations to achieve mission objectives, as well as boost troop discipline and loyalty to the party (Ibid, 582-587). They held lessons to educate troops on Kuomintang party ideology and issued them individual copies of Sun-Yat-Sen’s famous “Three Principles” pocketbooks (Ibid).

Political Officers were also responsible for creating welfare services for platoons such as healthcare, housing, entertainment, and communication with families back home (Ibid).

However, the political officer system ultimately became costly for the Kuomintang and contributed significantly to their subsequent defeat. Chiang Kai-Shek gradually prioritized loyalty above all else as he became a prime victim of groupthink. American diplomat Edmund Clubb remarked that “personal loyalty was counted by the Nationalist regime as being more important than competence (Clubb).”For example, during the Manchuria campaign in 1946, American educated General Sun Li-Jen, known as the “Rommel of the East” for his tactical brilliance and a hero of the Burma campaign in World War II, was reassigned to a training command due to accusations of “insubordination” by General Du Yuming, an ardent supporter of the Generalissimo. The alienation of brilliant military commanders in favour of those loyal to Chiang Kai-Shek subsequently led to scores of losses on the battlefield against the PLA and eventually defeat in the Chinese Civil War.

After the retreat to Formosa, the longest martial law period in history, “White Terror”, was enacted, and the Political Warfare Bureau of the army was reformed to better accommodate new mission objectives by further “Sovietizing” the officer corps (Political Warfare Bureau). For 38 years, tens of thousands of “dissidents” were arrested, executed, and jailed (Shattuck 2017). The burgeoning autocracy of the Nationalist regime also led the United States to lower their support for Taipei, as they contradicted America’s mission of promoting liberal democratic values worldwide. Without Washington’s unwavering support, the prospect of retaking the mainland became a pipedream as Chiang Kai-Shek lacked the manpower or funds for such a colossal undertaking (Liao 2019).

Although the commissar system ultimately doomed the Nationalist war effort, the integration of political warfare did foster unity within the army and garner support from abroad to successfully repel the Japanese invasion. Many of the same political warfare strategies would continue into the Cold War, as the Republic of China prepared for a cross-straight confrontation with Communist China. Due to America’s commitment to combat communism with the adamant of the doctrine outlined in NSC-68, the Nationalists continued their public relations campaign as a bulwark against “Red China” to keep the west in their corner. A US joint command overseeing 30,000 was set up in Taipei to protect Formosa in the event of hostilities (Don 2014).

After Beijing was recognized by the international community as the legitimate government of China in the 1970s, “Taiwanization” was implemented to promote a new brand of nationalism to strengthen Formosa’s political legitimacy and deter a possible mainland invasion (Horowitz 2005, 87). The Taiwanese identity created by this strategy improved relations with Japan and the United States, leading to increased arms sales and staunch allies in the event of a cross-straight invasion (Horowitz 2005, 90).

Despite the successful results of Taiwanization, mainland China has nevertheless gotten the upper hand due to its unprecedented economic growth. Although relations between Taiwan and the United States remain warm, the economic benefits of befriending Beijing has led the ROC to lose allies, partnerships, and legitimacy on the international stage, as it is often a zero-sum game when it comes to the official “China” states opt to recognize (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2020). Militarily, Taiwan no longer enjoys the technological prowess it once had when Red China's military capabilities were severely primitive during the Cold War. The People's Liberation Army has developed a robust expeditionary warfare capability with fifth-generation fighters, long-range bombers, and stealth missile destroyers that can wage a prolonged campaign against the island (Council on Foreign Relations). The ROC Armed Forces also currently face recruitment and retention problems, as the younger generation are less interested in military service and do not feel the patriotic fervour to defend Formosa from their mainland adversaries (Taipei Times 2018). With these looming threats, prominent voices in Taipei, ironically from the former staunchly anti-communist Kuomintang party, have even called for the normalization of relations with Beijing with some hopes of possible reunification to avoid a political or military confrontation (Evans 2019).

As Taiwan struggles to protect its sovereignty and political legitimacy in the face of Beijing’s oft-stated ambitions to reunite China, perhaps the ROC should revisit its original playbook to prevent a hostile takeover. With limited resources to project hard power, Taiwan must revitalize its political warfare strategies to preserve its freedom and security from the grips of authoritarianism. Consideration should be given to the reinforcement of esprit-de-corps and patriotism in the armed forces, while political operations could win hearts and minds abroad to once again support their cause. The walls are closing in on Formosa, and the instrument of political warfare may be their best hope for their survival.

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Steven is a second-year International Relations Student at Victoria College, the University of Toronto. His main area of interests are American politics, Chinese history, and cross-strait relations.