Operation Rolling Thunder: The Bombing of North Vietnam

Over the course of the Vietnam War, no operation better sums up the scale and the tactical acumen of the American war effort than Operation Rolling Thunder. Spanning from February 24, 1965, until October 1968 (Air Force Historical Support Division, n.d.), the operation would see the dropping of approximately 643,000 tons of bombs over Vietnam (“Lyndon Johnson Approves Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2009). This article will cover the history of the operation, its impact on Vietnam, and its legacy.

Greenlit in 1965, Operation Rolling Thunder began in the wake of increased air involvement in Vietnam from 1964 onward (“Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2010). Focusing specifically on American bombing campaigns in the region, U.S. bombing runs would not take shape in any real systematic form until the Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964 (“Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2010). The Gulf of Tonkin incident would occur on August 4, 1964, in waters off the eastern coast of South Vietnam that are now commonly referred to as the East Vietnam Sea (“Gulf of Tonkin Resolution”, 2009). The incident occurred when boats from the North Vietnamese military engaged two U.S naval vessels—the U.S.S. Maddox and the U.S.S. Turner Joy—in sporadic and quick engagements . Although the veracity of these incidents would be quickly questioned in the days following the attack, any news of the questionable circumstances of what happened would not be relayed back to Washington in time before President Lyndon B. Johnson was scheduled to go live to the American people with news regarding the attack. However, even with an updated intelligence briefing on the questionable veracity of the incident in the Gulf, the news gave President Johnson the impetus to push through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of August 7, 1964 (“Gulf of Tonkin Resolution”, 2009), which saw bipartisan support for increased and direct engagement against North Vietnam. These increased engagements eventually led to the deployment of American ground troops in Vietnam, and the beginning of Operation Rolling Thunder just six months after the passing of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in February 1964 (“Gulf of Tonkin Resolution”, 2009).

Operation Rolling Thunder began in earnest in March of 1965 when bombing missions over North Vietnam took on a more systematic methodology (Cox 2019). The goal of Operation Rolling Thunder, although applied in arguably more blanket approaches, initially sought to strike targets sufficiently valuable to pressure the North Vietnamese into concessions, albeit in a limited manner that would not result in too many civilian deaths, the destruction of the North Vietnamese regime, or a Soviet or Chinese intervention (Cox 2019).

This structured and tight-rope based approach meant that the manner in which the U.S could strike the North Vietnamese in the air was limited both geographically and strategically to regions that propped up the North Vietnamese’s capacity to wage war against the South. This meant that critical points of the North Vietnamese’s capacity for war like industry, oil, or storage rich regions became prime and repeated targets for the operation (Cox 2019). As a broader systematic operation, Operation Rolling Thunder took on a five-phased approach over the course of its three-year tenure (Cox 2019). The first took place from March 1965, until June of the same year, and its approach fell under the same doctrine that the mission as a whole was governed by: Its targets consisted mostly of “ammunition depots, radar sites, and barracks” (Cox 2019). The goal of phase one was to target North Vietnamese military infrastructure in a manner that made waging war against the South and its backing American forces an unwinnable task, in hopes that the continuous bombing raids would force the North Vietnamese leaders to the negotiating table and discourage a protracted conflict. The goals of phase one would ultimately fail, with its only success coming in the form of “hardening the resolve of the Communist regime and spurring on the [North Vietnamese’s] creation of one of the world’s most sophisticated air defence networks” (Cox 2019). The failings of phase one meant that as phase two began in July 1965, the American strategy shifted away from targeted runs on North Vietnamese military infrastructure, towards more general infrastructure that were of consistent use by the North Vietnamese as they streamed southbound into South Vietnam. This saw the bombing shift away from ammunition depots and barracks, and towards “roads, bridges, boats and railroads” (Cox 2019). This strategy would come to an end by January 1966 (Cox 2019), but with each passing phase came the U.S’s expansion in their target selection away from the southern portion of North Vietnam, to a full scale bombing campaign ranging from the south to near the northern Chinese–North Vietnamese border (“Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2010). However, this expansion was only seen geographically, with targets still centred on North Vietnam’s industry, military, and more general infrastructure (“Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2010). This shift began phase three of the campaign, lasting from January 1966 until October of that year, and into phase four which would last from October 1966 until May 1967 (Cox 2019). What was significant about the transition to nationwide targets seen after phase two was that by phase four targets that were originally deemed off limits by U.S forces, like Hanoi (“Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2010), eventually became new and prime targets of the operation, with the first bombing raid over Hanoi coming within phase four of the operation (Cox 2019). Although this increase in the scope and intensity of bombing raids was intended to bring North Vietnamese to the negotiating table, it proved the opposite, as it did not produce “much of an impact on the North Vietnamese leadership or its forces in South Vietnam” (Cox 2019). This pattern would continue throughout the final phase of Operation Rolling Thunder which took place from May 1967 to October 1968. The only thing that changed was the scale at which the U.S took losses, both monetarily and materially, in planes and in lives (Cox 2019). Additionally, increased political pressures domestically led to Johnson announcing during a live TV broadcast that there was to be “a halt to bombing operations north of the 19th parallel, another offer to negotiate a cease-fire agreement with Hanoi, and his decision not to seek a second term in office” (Cox 2019). Other factors that led to the termination of Operation Rolling Thunder included a mounting loss of aircraft—to the tune of around 900 pieces (Vassar College, n.d.)— and a refocusing of air related combat and logistical support missions in South Vietnam due to renewed North Vietnamese pressure down south (Cox 2019).

When looking at the impact that Operation Rolling Thunder had on North Vietnam, it is important to look at it both militarily and humanitarianly to gauge a more comprehensive perspective. Militarily, the impact Operation Rolling Thunder had on North Vietnam was quite small. Morale and resolve amongst the North Vietnamese not only remained steady throughout the campaign, with the resolve of the North Vietnamese flourishing into a full-scale network of surface to air defense that became a world-class installation (Cox 2019). Even if damage from U.S. missions were effective, the North Vietnamese proved quite capable to account for and remedy any damage incurred as well. With dedicated teams of reconstruction-focused troops deployed during the night to repair damage to crucial infrastructure, and systems of bomb-proof tunnels that were set up became key to protect troops, civilians, and infrastructure from the raids. When put together it allowed the North Vietnamese to repel any air attack that came their way but prove resistant to the operation as it grew in scale and intensity (“Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2010). However, when looking at the impacts of Operation Rolling Thunder on North Vietnam humanitarianly, we can see how the effects of the operation proved to be far less favourable for the North Vietnamese than it was militarily. As, even though initial impacts of the operation were weatherable, the long term impact of the bombing of Vietnam were severe. With many of the rural towns and villages destroyed (“Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2010) and over 150,000 Vietnamese people having died by the end of the operation (Vassar College, n.d.). Which, when looked at comparatively with how the North Vietnamese’s military fared under the bombing, paints a more complicated picture of North Vietnamese success that came at a heavy cost. They may have won the fight, but they took a beating in the process. Which makes Operation Rolling Thunder a failure in many ways, but one that came with a heavy cost, and one that still lingers in many ways today.

When reflecting on the legacy of Operation Rolling Thunder and its later iterations, it is important to further emphasize how these campaigns irreparably destroyed much of North Vietnam, and to recognize the toll the operation had on the American service members who were sent out to carry out the mission. The toll of the operation on the American side was sizable, with “over 900 American aircraft and 818 pilots, either dead or missing” (Vassar College, n.d.), and over 100 having been taken prisoner (Cox 2019). The effects of the campaign on the American side was also highly criticized, with the operation growing to become regarded as a blunder of disorganization and overly restrictive for its stringent guidelines of engagement that saw the heavy and repeated bombing of inconsequential North Vietnamese targets (“Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2010). As a broader representation of the war in Vietnam, it is important to recognize the human cost on both sides of the conflict. With high lethality and little measurable value, the operation did little to dispel growing feelings of discouragement and unrest regarding the war. The campaign’s little value would be seemingly disregarded by American strategists as the operation ended, with the strategy of Operation Rolling Thunder enduring through later operations. With the repeated use of the Operation Rolling Thunder playbook coming at a huge humanitarian cost in Vietnam. With the dropping of “4.6 million tons of bombs on Vietnam [during the war] destroying a large percentage of the nation’s towns and villages and killing an estimated 2 million Vietnamese people '' (“Operation Rolling Thunder”, 2010).

Bibliography

Air Force Historical Support Division. “1965 - Operation Rolling Thunder.” n.d. Airforce Historical Support Division. Accessed April 24, 2023. https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458992/1965-operation-rolling-thunder/.

Cox, Samuel J.. 2019. “H-017-2: Operation Rolling Thunder Overview.” Naval History and Heritage Command.. https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-017/h-017-2.html.

A&E Television Networks. 2010. “Operation Rolling Thunder - Definition, Vietnam War & Timeline.” A&E Television Networks. February 24, 2010. https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/operation-rolling-thunder.

A&E Television Networks. 2009. “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance.” A&E Television Networks. October 29, 2009. https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/gulf-of-tonkin-resolution-1.

A&E Television Networks. 2009. “Johnson Approves Operation Rolling Thunder.” A&E Television Networks. November 16, 2009. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/johnson-approves-operation-rolling-thunder.

Vassar College. “Vassar Chronology.” n.d. A Documentary Chronology of Vassar College. Accessed April 26, 2023. https://www.vassar.edu/chronology/records/1966/1966-03-02-operation-rolling-thunder.html#:~:text=March%202%2C%201966&text=A%20limited%20but%20protracted%20bombing,pilots%2C%20either%20dead%20or%20missing.