Murphy’s Law or Macron’s Dilemma: What We know about AUKUS and What Remains to be Seen

A modern diplomatic crisis has plagued relations between the United States and France since last month’s deal between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS). Washington announced a strategic partnership with the UK and Australia to provide Canberra with a fleet of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines; the subliminal object behind this deal is to establish a naval parapet against China in the Indo-Pacific sea. Although many technical aspects of the deal-including Australia’s ability to adhere to global nonproliferation commitments while assisting in the construction and piloting of nuclear submarines- remain under development, the diplomatic backlash of AUKUS has been historic.

In 2016, France struck a $66 billion deal to provide Australia with a dozen conventional attack submarines; this 50-year contract is regarded as the foundation of a European strategy aimed at counterbalancingChina’s rise in the Pacific. As the only European power with territories and a military presence in the region, France has positioned itself as Europe’s leading voice for a China strategy less-muscular than that of the United States and some of its Asian allies. Despite high hopes, the French-Australian submarine deal remained behind schedule and over-budget, sparking fears in Canberra that the conventionally powered French submarines would be obsolete before completion. The French submarines were based on propulsion technology that is limited in range and easily detected by Chinese forces. Moreover, several delays in the construction process had bloated the completion date into the 2030s.

On September 15, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison joined President Biden in a virtual press conference to announce the AUKUS partnership. Prime Minister Morrison was keen to emphasize the importance of AUKUS, heralding the deal as a partnership that would enhance the Australian contribution to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Quad, and Five Eyes countries. Immediately, the AUKUS announcement sparked international backlash, chiefly from Paris. Phillippe Etienne, the French Ambassador to the United States, was withdrawn from the French embassy on September 17 – the first withdrawal in French-American diplomatic history. Jean-Pierre Thebault, the French Ambassador to Australia, was also withdrawn by French President Emmanuel Macron.

Though withdrawing an ambassador is a rare diplomatic step among allies, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian was clear that the abandonment of the 2016 submarine deal between France and Australia was “unacceptable behavior between allies and partners.” As the dust has settled and details of the AUKUS negotiations have emerged, it is clear that the Biden Administration was intent to shroud the proceedings in secrecy. The Australians never made clear to the French that they were preparing to cancel the deal, one of the largest defense contracts in France’s history. Despite several meetings between presidents Biden and Macron, Biden chose not to address AUKUS until the deal was near final. As the Biden Administration attempts to mend relations with Paris, the shadow of AUKUS looms large. This unprecedented move may prove a catalyst to rewrite global nuclear norms and fundamentally alter U.S. credibility as an advocate of nuclear nonproliferation.

American naval propulsion technologies are a closely guarded secret; should the United States fulfill its commitments under AUKUS, this would mark only the second time in American history that these systems have been shared with an ally. In 1958, the United States and the UK signed the Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement which supplied British naval forces with American nuclear submarines. Expanding the “special relationship” between the United States and United Kingdom, the agreement opened the door for further exports of American nuclear technologies into Britain and forged a cross-Atlantic scientific exchange that is ongoing. The UK Royal Navy maintains three nuclear-powered submarine systems to-date: the Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarine and the Astute- and Trafalgar-class attack submarines.

Prime Minister Morrison has maintained that Australia will not equip its submarines with nuclear weapons and has emphasized that a civil nuclear power capability will not be necessary in Australia to fuel the ships. Despite this, logistical questions about fueling and maintaining the nuclear systems remain. Biden Administration officials have been cautious to acknowledge whether the Australian subs will be powered with highly-enriched uranium (as is the case with their American and British counterparts) or if a new, low-enriched uranium system will propel the ships. It also remains unclear who will supply either form of fuel to Australia.

While fueling may seem trivial, the decision to power Australian subs with either highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) will have profound implications. HEU is the key component in nuclear weapons and its dissemination is closely monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Should the United States provide HEU to Australia, it risks violating its commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968) and will side-step the 2010 U.S.-Australian Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation which outlined exclusive technical exchanges of civil nuclear material. Washington has reached multiple nuclear cooperation agreements for the transfer and exchange of civil nuclear materials, equipment, and technology with non-nuclear weapons states, but military naval nuclear technology transfers are largely untested. AUKUS would establish a new precedent, dismantling 60 years of U.S. policy centered on minimizing HEU use and implying that states with “clean” nuclear records could appeal to the U.S. for HEU under the auspices of great power competition.

Presuming the United States chooses to develop an LEU propulsion system for Australian subs, it will face pressure to adopt these systems in its own submarines. American nuclear submarines are powered exclusively with HEU. If a viable alternative is developed, the Biden Administration will struggle to convince a weary global community that American HEU-powered ships should remain in service, despite the United State’s reluctance to supply them to allies and partners. Supplying either system also risks undermining American posture toward the Russian Federation.

The Russian state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, has streamlined its export of civil nuclear technologies through its “Build-Own-Operate” (BOO) model. Through BOO transactions, Rosatom offers potential clients state-backed financing of civil nuclear power plants, completing the nuclear reactor construction in the host-country using Russian and local experts. Upon completion, Rosatom sells the energy produced from the power plant to the client-state to recover its costs, transferring ownership once the initial construction costs have been recovered. The U.S. has remained critical of the BOO system, arguing that it fails to establish the regulatory regimes necessary to safely oversee nuclear activities in the client country after Rosatom’s departure. American and European sanctions have targeted Rosatom and its officials to curb the expansion of BOO projects.

In brokering the AUKUS deal, the Biden Administration has engaged the U.S., Australia, and the U.K. in a build-own-operate deal of their own. The U.S. and U.K. will provide technical assistance and financing to Australia, developing Australian submarines while training Australian sailors to maintain and operate the ships. This pivot in U.S. policy poses practical obstacles in enforcing U.S. and European sanctions on Rosatom. If the United States can engage in a similar BOO scheme with military technologies, it loses its credibility to apply pressure to the Russian nuclear corporation for engaging in similar practices.

As the ink dries on the AUKUS deal, many questions remain about the future of U.S. relations with France, the strength of the global nonproliferation regime, and how the deal will impact American nuclear policy broadly. Murphy’s law dictates that anything that can go wrong will go wrong, and in the case of AUKUS this remains true. In attempting to counter Chinese military expansion, the Biden Administration has alienated an historic ally, upped the risks of nuclear proliferation in the Indo-Pacific, and opened the United States for accusations of nuclear hypocrisy. Indeed, Macron’s dilemma – the sudden cancellation of a vital defense contract for France – has inserted a lethal dose of Murphy’s Law into U.S., U.K. and Australian foreign policy.

Works Cited

Norimitsu Onishi, “An Uncomfortable Question in France: Are We Still a Great Power?,” New York Times (New York, NY), September 23, 2021.

“Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS,” The White House, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/15/remarks-by-president-biden-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-johnson-of-the-united-kingdom-announcing-the-creation-of-aukus/.

Elise Labott, “French Ambassador on AUKUS: ‘Every Crisis Is an Opportunity’,” Q&A, Foreign Policy, October 14, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/14/aukus-french-ambassador-philippe-etienne-us-australia-sub-deal/.

Joseph Choi, “French ambassador back in the US,” The Hill, September 30, 2021, https://thehill.com/policy/international/574752-french-ambassador-back-in-the-us.

John Baylis, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdependence,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 3 (2008): 447

Julia Masterson, “U.S., UK Pledge Nuclear Submarines for Australia,” Arms Control Today, October 7, 2021, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-10/news/us-uk-pledge-nuclear-submarines-australia.

Emma Lecavalier, “Russian nuclear power: Convenience at what cost?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 16, 2015, https://thebulletin.org/2015/10/russian-nuclear-power-convenience-at-what-cost/.

Kyle Sallee is a graduate student at American University studying U.S Foreign Policy and International Security. He also holds a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and History from Portland State University, and has worked for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Journal of International Service, and the Center for Security, Innovation, and NewTechnology.