Notes on a lecture by Sir Lawrence Freedman at the 2022 Ottawa Conference

The Ottawa Conference, an international defence convention, kicked off on the ninth of March 2022. This annual conference is organized by the Conference of Defence Institute and brings together Canadian government leaders, foreign guests, academia, and the business community to reflect on making Canada, and the world, safer. The Conference opened with a speech from former Vice-Chief of Defence Staff Lieutenant-general Guy Thibault. Thibault mentioned the Ukrainian conflict, stating that Canada and NATO do not want the conflict to escalate any further. However, this was counterbalanced by Thibault stating now is not the time to reduce our engagements or interests abroad. Canada should engage in multilateral actions with partners to secure and continue its engagements abroad and interests, respectively.

The first guest speaker was former professor of War Studies at King's College London, Sir Lawrence Freedman who was the official appointed historian of the Falklands War. After the introduction, Freedman spoke on the Russo-Ukrainian War, highlighting the Russian leadership’s lack of logistical preparation in the conflict. Freedman was highly critical of the Russian political leadership saying, "even with the best military strategy in the world, there was no political means to being able to install a puppet government in Kyiv and that he (Putin) could maintain an occupation. Delusional because the Ukraine that existed in the Russian mind is not the Ukraine of today". He points to Putin's assumed belief that the Ukrainians would not offer any resistance and the Russian army would be able to speed through main service roads, take Kyiv, and force a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Freedman noted how the "Ineptitude of the Russian military was surprising, especially after months of planning. They did not respect their opponent. Bold, audacious moves to boost the egos of respective branches were not thoroughly planned. The Russian failure to ground the Ukrainian Airforce and destroy their IADS has caused a massive military humiliation”. After his speech, Freedman began a question period, here are some of its main takeaways:

When asked about Russia's previous military interventions in Chechnya, Georgia, and Syria, Freedman said: "Chechnya had a relatively small population and was battered both times that Russia chose to invade”. Freedman noted that the actions of Russia in the current Ukrainian invasion has not reached the ferocity with which Russia conducted the second Chechen war. Concerning Syria, Freedman pointed out that Russia’s only conventional force was its airpower. On the ground, the Russians used proxy forces (Wagner), and employed the same depopulation tactics used in the Chechnya conflict. On lessons learned from Georgia, Freedman pointed to how the initial Russian invasion was a debacle and on a much smaller scale compared to the buildup of the Ukrainian invasion. Freedman noted that the lack of significant failure by the Russian military under Putin has emboldened his regime to take more risks. However, Ukraine “is an entirely different kettle of fish”, as Ukraine is a well mobilized, large country, which possesses a professional army with recent conventional warfare experience. Although it is early in the conflict, Freedman stated that Russia may experience incredible difficulty with its invasion since he believes the Kremlin to have underestimated the cost.

When asked "what the playbook of the Russians is, and what is next for the conflict," Freedman expressed a cautionary view. He reminded the audience that most of our news is coming through Ukrainian channels and is likely propaganda. However, Freedman noted that the Russian thrust towards Kyiv and Kharkiv had stalled, and the Russian army is facing a crisis of "motivation and conservation of mass, if they wish to continue their offensives". Next, Freedman stated that the Russians have made notable successes, especially in the south of Ukraine. He believed that the Russian position in the South could be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations. Freedman endorsed the possibility of Russia using the southern flank to cross the Dnieper and cut off the main body of the Ukrainian army in the east.

Next, Freedman was asked whether western nations should be concerned about the Russians placing their nuclear forces on alert. Freedman viewed the risk of nuclear escalation as unlikely and was not concerned. On the other hand, Freedman was concerned by a prospect of a no-fly zone over Ukraine. To Freedman, a no-fly zone was essentially a declaration of war against Russia. "You would have to attack Russian air defences situated in the territory of Russia and Belarus proper." As well, Freedman mentioned that a no-fly zone "does not deal with artillery and missile threat. Zelensky may be misguided in his view of how effective that would be". This view is supported by how the Russian air force has been relatively absent from the campaign so far and the emphasis of artillery within the Russian military doctrine. Due to these factors, Freedman declared that NATO's contribution of anti-tank and anti-air weapons and intelligence sharing is far more valuable than a no-fly zone.

Freedman was asked about the propaganda war fought on social media and noted that Putin was losing. However, Freedman noted how Putin was already incredibly unpopular within western circles. Shifting to Ukraine, Freedman believed that Zelensky's tactic of shaming the West and his message of impending danger for the global order, has been highly successful in corralling favour. Though Freedman theorized that Poroshenko would have had a similar message, Zelensky's youth, openness, and engagement with the media have allowed him to be far more prominent in acquiring international attention.

A crucial question was posed to Freedman regarding the future of the conflict. The questioner wondered whether things would get worse rather than better and if there would be an overcompensation by the Russian side. Freedman responded by immediately stating that Russia has already been overcompensating and had done so almost immediately. Pointing to the massive artillery barrages fired into Kharkiv and Mariupol, Freedman believes that the worst is still to come. However, he contextualizes this by mentioning that this overreaction has embarrassed Russia, with many countries sympathetic to their cause. Notably, both normal enablers of typical Russian foreign policy actions, the Chinese, and the Kazakhs, have been very hesitant and somewhat cold to Russia's justification. Freedman believed that the Russians would attempt to keep going for as long as it takes but mentioned that "logistics are the devil" and that one "cannot keep going if they cannot keep their forces supplied". On the Russo-Ukrainian war's internal dynamics within Russian society, Freedman made an incredibly bold statement: "The Z symbol has become the Russian swastika". Freedman said that mothers who are already complaining that their sons have been sent off to fight and being used as cannon fodder are indicators that Russian society may not be as stable as we thought and that these complainants are symptoms of larger fissures developing. This will not singlehandedly bring down Putin's regime but they ought not to be ignored, especially with Putin's paranoia of "colour revolutions" that toppled former Warsaw pact (a formative moment in the life of the ex-KGB agent) and Yanukovych's government in 2014's Orange Revolution.

The next question posed was how much the Russian invasion of Ukraine will affect the international rules-based order. Freedman urged caution when referring to the concept, pointing towards many western interventions that have gone against the concept and elaborating that the rules-based order is mainly economic. If Putin fails, there will be a significant perspective shift with how armed forces will challenge the rules-based order.

On China, Freedman made sure to mention that China is not impressed. Not only was the Russian principle of invading hard to defend, but also that defending its execution is impossible. This is viewed as perhaps being the motivating factor to their abstention in the UNSC vote and could indicate China wanting to play a middle ground between Russia and Ukraine. Freedman was questioned about the German and continental European reaction to the invasion in terms of defence spending. Specifically, as to whether it was a bleep or a long-term trend. Freedman stated that "crises make people think about strategic relationships. Though much had been floated during the Trump years of there being more European strategic autonomy, the Americans still hold the hard, expeditionary, power". Also pointing to how "war has reinforced the transatlantic alliance" by showing that NATO is still necessary and that solely internal factors no longer threaten democracy.

Freedman concluded by talking about a potential peace process, "The big issues are Donetsk and Luhansk. Israeli sources say that the Russians are prepared to concentrate their demilitarisation on the Donbas. You could accept a de-militarized Donbas as a price for peace. Zelensky favours identification by individuals if they want to be Russian or Ukrainian. However, the Russians are concerned that this may play into the Ukrainian's hands as Russia seems unpopular". Undoubtedly the final point rings true as the Russians continue their systematic destruction of Ukrainian urban centres, thus alienating the Ukrainian populace one Grad rocket at a time. Sir Lawrence Freedman, though mostly following traditional analysis of the conflict, shed light on underreported subjects in his speech, particularly concerning the internal politics of Russia and how they may affect the course, and the outcome, of the conflict. Though Clausewitz's famous quote is often overcited, the recent events on the global stage enforce it. War is the continuation of politics through other means.