Iraq: No Way Out

Following more than a year of formidable political deadlock, Iraqi lawmakers approved the formation of a ministerial cabinet headed by Mohammed Al-Sudani, a former minister of human rights and an apparatchik of the Islamic Dawa Party. Though this long-awaited resolution can be interpreted as a positive development, in reality it is merely a stopgap for Iraq’s serial crises. One of the numerous fissure points of Iraq’s instability is the struggle within its Shia community, a contest which has reached vicious heights since the 2003 War. The two primary  factions engaged in this internecine struggle are the Sadrists and a constellation of Iran-backed groups. 

The Sadrist Movement is the foremost faction in the Iraqi opposition and has played a central role in the most recent political crisis. The movement first emerged onto stage in 2003 as the Mahdi Army under the command of Muqtada Al-Sadr, a guerrilla and cleric of high religious pedigree. The Mahdi Army proved to be one of the most potent forces of the Shia insurgency, fighting US Forces to a draw in Najaf and Sadr City (in  2004 and 2006), while managing to capture Iraq’s third-largest city of Basra in 2007. In exchange for Sadr’s incorporation into the Iraqi political system, the Mahdi Army disbanded in 2008, seemingly defanging the movement. Yet Sadr has retained the ability to muster up an army with ease, reconstituting his armed wing (now dubbed the ‘Peace Companies’) in the fight against ISIS, while more recently unleashing his fighters against enemies within the Shia community. By August 2022, the Sadrist Movement boasted an army numbering in the thousands, in addition to a parliamentary plurality (Bruno 2008; Bonseine 2022).

Seeking to gain a decisive parliamentary majority, Sadr withdrew his movement from parliament and demanded fresh elections on June 12th, 2022. When his rivals refused, even claiming the vacated seats, Sadrists stormed the Iraqi Parliament on August 22nd. Now in (literal) control of Parliament, Sadr issued an ultimatum- warning of unspecific consequences if Parliament were not dissolved by the end of the week. But a day before the arbitrary deadline, an Iran-based Shia cleric, who enjoys substantial support amongst the Sadrists, published a letter in which he accused Sadr of sedition and called for Sadr to quit politics. Despite some speculations that the cleric’s demands were extracted under duress by the Iranian authorities, Sadr complied, announcing his ‘complete withdrawal from politics’ (Ali 2011).

Immediately following his announcement, Sadr’s followers attempted nothing less than an armed seizure of the Green Zone, engaging Iraqi Security Forces in the vicinity of the Parliament and Republican Palace. Simultaneous attacks took place throughout the country as Sadrists ransacked the offices of their political rivals. Iraq seemed to be, once again, at a precipice— though the situation was salvaged by Sadr, who demanded a de-escalation on the part of his partisans in a follow-up speech while insisting that his resignation was in earnest (Bobseine 2022).

This recent outbreak of violence may have been a clumsy attempt by Sadr to break Iraq’s political deadlock, as a decisive parliamentary majority could have served as a legitimate pathway to leadership. But in spite of his widespread popularity, Sadr has failed to attain paramountcy in the Shia community— a fact which may be attributed in part to Iranian influence.

Iran views Iraq as a key component in its regional strategy: for its strategic depth, religious sites, and function as a land bridge to allies in Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, attaining influence over Iraq has been a major priority in Iranian foreign policy since the 1979 Revolution. Iran sought to destroy the Iraqi Baathist regime in an eight-year long war (which the latter provoked), proceeded to provide sanctuary to Saddam’s opponents, and has exerted considerable influence over Baghdad since the 2003 invasion. Iran has employed a divide-and-rule strategy— playing different factions off one-another, and tending to favor a weaker Iraqi state. Indeed, Sadr has frustrated his former Iranian partners in his nationalist orientation, as Tehran may believe that his objectives are mutually exclusive with the interactive web of influence it has weaved since 2003  (Ali 2011).

As of now, Sadr insists that his departure from politics is final. But his absence may be temporary. Dissatisfaction with the status quo has led to repeated episodes of mass unrest— independent of Sadrist machinations. Sadr may simply be biding his time and waiting for an angle of re-entry. Iran has defended its interests in Iraq fiercely and will not depart anytime soon, leaving a situation in which a massive undercurrent of discontent is pitted against a determined regional player. Sudani’s cabinet may implement some cosmetic changes, but as long as Iraq’s corrosive structure remains, future conflict is to be expected. 

Bibliography

Ali, Ahmed, et al. “Iran's Influence in Iraq.” The Washington Institute, Policy Analysis, 6 May 2011, 

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-influence-iraq. 

Bruno, Greg. “Muqtada Al-Sadr.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 16 May 

2008, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/muqtada-al-sadr. 

Bobseine, Haley, et al. “Iraq: A Crisis of Elite, Consensus-Based Politics Turns Deadly.” Middle East 

Institute, 26 Sept. 2022, 

https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly.