Institutional Challenges to the U.S. Air Force’s ICBM Program in the Early Cold War Era: Pt. 2

In 1959, the United States activated its first squadron of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Contemporary observers recognized that ICBMs were a core component of American nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, thus helping to maintain the security of the United States and its allies. For such an important weapons system, the United States Air Force (USAF) struggled to successfully develop an ICBM in the early Cold War period. The first part of this article analysed how rivalry between other branches of the U.S. armed services hindered the USAF ICBM program when interservice cooperation could have pooled resources and produced an operational ICBM more quickly. A second major obstacle to the USAF ICBM program was internal opposition from within the Air Force.

The first internal roadblock to a full-scale ICBM program was scepticism from Air Force leadership. The most influential wartime proponent of Air Force long-range missile development was General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold (Neufeld 1990, 8; Perry 1963, 466; Stumpf 2020, 5-6). While Arnold saw the potential for missiles to support the strategic air warfare mission, other leaders on the Air Staff did not (Lonnquest and Winkler 1996, 30). The July 1947 Air Staff development guidelines assigned long-range surface-to-surface missiles as fourth on their research and development priority list, behind surface-to-air, air-to-air, and shorter-range surface-to-surface missiles, respectively. In 1947, given that strategic bombers were the only available means to drop atomic weapons (the United States’ primary strategic deterrent against the Soviet Union), Air Staff leadership believed that the USAF’s limited resources were best invested in weapons systems that directly aided that mission, rather than on long-range ballistic missile development which did not promise near or medium-term results (Lonnquest and Winkler 1996, 30; Neufeld 1990, 27). A list of United States Army Air Force missile projects in 1946 demonstrates the lack of interest in long-range ballistic missiles among Air Force leaders at the time. Out of a total of twenty-eight projects, twelve fell under the surface-to-surface category, and only four of those had proposed ranges of 1500 to 5000 miles (Rosenberg 2012, 95).

The second factor limiting the implementation of a full-scale ICBM program was the Air Force’s institutional culture. Missiles represented a direct priority challenge and culture shift for the pilot-dominated USAF. Just as Navy leaders viewed USAF development of strategic missiles with jealousy and scepticism, Air Force pilots saw unmanned missiles as threatening to their status and careers (Johnson “Culture of Innovation,” 148). An ingrained bias in favour of piloted aircraft was rampant throughout the USAF. Even General Curtis E. LeMay, who was appointed Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development in 1945 by General Arnold, was sceptical of missiles and their place in the Air Force. Emblematic of prevailing USAF attitudes, as late as 1955 LeMay viewed long-range missiles with reservations (Neufeld 1990, 121). Once he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Air Command on October 19, 1948, LeMay emphasised the role and dominance of piloted strategic bombers for his mission, although in 1955 he did instruct his Director of Plans to prepare for Atlas ICBM deployments (Neufeld 1990, 121).

A third issue that the ICBM program encountered within the Air Force was the service’s relationship with the aircraft industry. Traditionally, when the Air Force developed new aircraft, it used a “prime contractor” approach. The Air Force welcomed bids from the aircraft industry and selected one as a prime contractor. The contractor was responsible for research, development, and production. When necessary, the contractor could sub-contract other companies to produce sub-components, but ultimate responsibility rested with the contractor. This approach granted the aircraft industry wide-ranging decision-making power and was viewed favourably by both industry leaders and the Air Force, which did not have to concern itself with day-to-day operations; the Air Force could even purchase program management services from the prime contractor (Johnson “Scientific Vision,” 34; Neufeld 2004, 39-40). This method was not suitable for ICBM development. First, it was difficult to locate one company that specialised in all ICBM components. The work required to design and produce a functional long-range missile was daunting. ICBM development and production required a variety of advanced technical expertise – after all, the missiles needed adequate propulsion to launch, enter orbit, and re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere, while maintaining accuracy. It was impractical to rely on one company to develop all the necessary components to successfully build such a complex weapons system (Johnson “Scientific Vision,” 36).

In 1950, the USAF established the Air Research Development Command, and Trevor Gardner was selected as its first commander. Gardner was a fierce advocate for ICBMs and attempted to rally support for their development from the Air Staff (Neufeld 1990, 103-104). In October 1953, Gardner established the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Group, colloquially known as the Tea Pot Committee, headed by Dr. John von Neumann, a prominent mathematician at Princeton University (Neufeld 1990, 93). In February 1954 the Committee issued a striking report covering several Air Force projects, including Atlas. The document stated that “The most urgent and immediate need in the [ICBM] program is the setting up of the above-mentioned new [ICBM] development-management agency for the entire program” (Gardner 1954). This recommendation is noteworthy considering the report also mentions Soviet advances in long-range missile technology and gives credit to Convair for its past long-range ballistic missile development achievements (Gardner 1954). Taken together, these suggest that the experts on the Tea Pot Committee were aware that the previous de-centralized USAF organisational structure overseeing the MX-774 and MX-1593 projects was inefficient considering Soviet development progress. The report also implies that greater ICBM development progress could have been made, since Convair had already made significant progress with the MX series. Gardner’s subsequent decision to establish a powerful Air Force agency, the Western Development Division (WDD), to aggressively manage the program’s progress corroborates these interpretations of the Tea Pot Committee report.

The WDD’s task was to coordinate ICBM research, development, and production (Launius and Williamson 2002, 53). USAF Brigadier General Bernard A. Schriever avidly supported ICBM development and was appointed its commander. Schriever wholeheartedly agreed with the Tea Pot Committee’s recommendations and proposed a new development methodology for the WDD’s program. In Schriever’s “systems approach,” the WDD acted as a central body with a significant staff of civilian researchers, engineers, and scientists (Johnson “Scientific Vision,” 35-36; Neufeld 2004, 39-40). For the Atlas project, Schriever contracted the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation for systems engineering and technical development, and by the end of 1955 he relied on fifty-six other independent contractors for sub-components, including Convair for Atlas’ airframe, General Electric for the guidance system, and North American for the propulsion system. The number of contractors working on the ICBM program under the WDD grew to one hundred and fifty by 1957 (Neufeld 1990, 132, 242).

In this “systems approach” arrangement, Schriever and the WDD held total authority over key decisions. This approach drew the ire of the aircraft industry, which resented a loss of influence within the new development structure. Industry leaders held significant influence and relationships with older USAF leaders and leveraged these relationships to the detriment of the WDD. This included burdening Schriever with numerous calls to change the WDD’s development structure, which forced him to expend time and energy to prevent Air Staff leaders from questioning his methods or the ICBM program (Johnson “Culture of Innovation,” 163-167; Neufeld 1990, 127-128).

One of Schriever’s greatest challenges in advancing the Atlas (and later Titan I) project(s) was excessive Air Force bureaucracy. Given the tight time frame that Schriever had to produce an operational ICBM, he understood that the existing Air Force procurement and approval system had to be streamlined. In 1954, there were no less than forty-two agencies and organisations that major ICBM program approvals had to go through, ranging from Congress at the highest level to the WDD at the lowest (Quarles 1955). Each level slowed development down and presented an opportunity for the program’s detractors to affect its progress. That year, Gardner established another committee under Air Force Deputy for Budget Hyde Gillette, with the stated aim of “[reducing] … administrative interference and delays which impede achievement of the earliest possible ICBM operational capability” (Gardner 1955). Issued in November 1955, the Gillette Procedures recommended broad changes to be made, including reducing the number of administrative levels from forty-two to ten (Quarles 1955). This represented an incredibly streamlined process that gave Schriever significant ability to oversee the ICBM program as he saw fit, thus enabling faster development progress. A significant milestone was reached when the first Atlas test-flight occurred on June 11, 1955. Development continued despite the FY 1956-1958 budget cuts, and the first Atlas D squadron was placed on alert in September 1959 (Launius 2002, 7). The progress made by the WDD after 1954 spawned successive generations of American long-range ballistic missiles. In 1965, the first-generation family of ICBMs (Atlas and Titan I variants) were decommissioned, and the second-generation Minuteman family of ICBMs took their place in America’s nuclear arsenal (Jenkins 2002, 80-84; Lonnquest and Winkler 1996, 68; Neufeld 1990, 234-235; Stumpf 2002, 8).

Part One of this study began with a definition of success to evaluate the USAF ICBM program. To be considered successful, the program had to produce a functional ICBM with a reasonable commitment of resources. By this definition, the USAF ICBM program was successful. Scholars have estimated the total cost of the USAF’s ICBM program in the early Cold War era to be approximately $17 billion. This figure includes ICBM development and missile production, IRBM development and production, and the construction of factories and missile silos throughout the United States (Neufeld 1990, 242). Keeping these costs in mind, it is likely that ICBM development from the MX-774 in 1946 to the completed Atlas and Titan I ICBMs in 1959 cost less than $3 billion. Considering this development cost in the broader historical context, the USAF’s ICBM program was a success.

This success was not easy to achieve, as the program faced many challenges. Since the Second World War, interservice rivalries prevented and frequently interrupted a coordinated Air Force long-range ballistic missile program. Meddling from the AGF and Navy consumed Air Force leaders’ attention and resulted in wasted opportunities for collaboration. Internal opposition also stood in the way; not all USAF leaders supported ICBM development or its rapid progress. ICBM advocates were viewed as disruptive to a pilot-dominated Air Force. Last, Schriever’s methods while in command of the WDD were resented by Air Force leaders and the aircraft industry, who perceived ICBMs as too theoretical and disapproved of a streamlined development process. The USAF ICBM program represented the pinnacle of human ingenuity. The program was nurtured by a handful of intuitive and resourceful individuals, including General Arnold, Trevor Gardner, and Brigadier General Schriever. Without Gardner and Schriever’s unique and unwavering commitment to produce an operational ICBM for the USAF, America’s nuclear arsenal would look much different in the twentieth and twenty-first century.

Bibliography

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