Institutional Challenges to the U.S. Air Force’s ICBM Program in the Early Cold War Era: Pt 1

From 1944 to 1959, United States Air Force (USAF) strategic missile advocates sought to transform American strategic capabilities by developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Over that fifteen-year period, the USAF pursued an ICBM development program that was successful despite major institutional roadblocks, including interservice rivalry and internal Air Force opposition. This two-part study begins with a definition of success in that context, followed by an analysis of interservice rivalry over ICBM development. The second-part of the study will focus its attention on internal USAF opposition to the ICBM program. 

These two broad challenges were not the only barriers to the early USAF ICBM program’s success. Department of Defence (DOD) budget cuts and technological difficulties also hindered progress (Neufeld 1990, 26-27). However, interservice rivalry and opposition from some Air Force leaders were unique hurdles for the nascent ICBM program to overcome. An overview of these hurdles is important to understanding how militaries behave in times of constrained budgets and unclear missions. Fiscal austerity and USAF-industry relations occupy a part of this study and are discussed throughout the text as part of the analysis of interservice rivalry, internal Air Force opposition, and the challenges they presented to ICBM development.

When evaluating the success of the USAF ICBM program, two considerations are important. First is the overall outcome: did the program produce a weapons system that was operationally deployed? The answer is yes: from 1946 through to 1959, the program developed the Atlas and Titan I ICBMs, which became part of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (Gainor 2013; Stumpf 2000). The second consideration is more detailed: were ICBM development costs reasonable? It is difficult to calculate an exact figure. As with most new technologies, ICBMs were developed based on pre-existing research, including the research findings of American physicist Dr. Robert Goddard’s experiments with rocket propellant in the 1920’s, and wartime German V-2 missile launches (Lonnquest and Winkler 1996, 13-17).

The first Air Force ICBM development expenditures came in April 1946, when the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) awarded the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (Convair) a $1.4 million study contract to begin development of the MX-774 long-range strategic missile (Jenkins 2002, 72-73; Lonnquest and Winkler 1996, 22; Neufeld 1990, 45-48; Stumpf 2000, 1). The Air Force cancelled the project in July 1947, but Convair engineers continued the work and completed three test launches using company funds; as such, these private expenditures are difficult to estimate. In 1951, the USAF signed another contract with Convair to develop the MX-1593, later renamed to Atlas (Jenkins 2002, 73-74; Lonnquest and Winkler 1996, 23-31; Neufeld 1990, 45-68; Stumpf 2000, 1). Four years later, the Titan I project emerged as a fallback ICBM in case the Atlas project was unsuccessful (Stumpf 2000, 13).

Comparisons between 1954 USAF ICBM development cost estimates and total USAF ballistic missile expenditures are revealing. On March 11, 1954, Trevor Gardner, USAF Special Assistant for Research and Development, provided an estimate to Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott, and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan F. Twining. Gardner estimated that over five years, the financial cost of developing the Atlas ICBM would be $1.5 billion. Gardner argued that if those funding levels for Atlas development were maintained the United States would have 100 operational ICBMs by 1960 (Neufeld 1990, 105).

That level was not maintained over the following five years, as the DOD budget fluctuated and the USAF was forced to make cuts to the ICBM program in fiscal years (FY) 1956-58 (Neufeld 1990, 156-158; Progressive Management 2014, 106-107). Despite the difficulty in calculating ICBM development costs, scholars have produced an approximate estimate of $17 billion for the entire USAF ballistic missile program up to 1965 (Neufeld 1990, 242). At first glance it appears that developing ICBMs was significantly more expensive than Gardner’s original estimate of $1.5 billion. However, the $17 billion figure includes development and production expenditures for other USAF long-range ballistic missile projects such as the Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). This figure also includes construction costs for ICBM assembly plants and missile silos, both of which consumed enormous resources (Neufeld 1990, 242). Given fluctuations in funding, it is fair to use $1.5 billion as a rough estimate for Atlas development. The Titan I missile relied on similar sub-components as Atlas, and ICBM development was streamlined by 1955; taking this into account, Titan I development likely cost less than Atlas development. (Stumpf 2000, 13; Rosenberg 2012, 119-201). Using this information, it is likely that Atlas and Titan I development costs totaled less than $3 billion over thirteen years, which was a reasonable investment at the time. After considering these points, the USAF ICBM program from 1946-1959 was a success.

Some of the greatest opponents to the USAF ICBM program were other branches of the U.S. armed services. The interservice rivalry that impeded Air Force ICBM development began during the Second World War when the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), the Army Ground Forces (AGF), and the Navy became embroiled in disputes over responsibility for missile research and development. The disputes emanated from disagreements over the roles and missions for each service. The USAAF, AGF, and Navy each saw a current or future need for long-range missiles in their respective domains. The fear guiding USAAF, AGF, and Navy leaders was that if they acquiesced to rival demands for research and development responsibility, they would be forced to cede operational control once missiles had been developed (Neufeld 1990, 7-8).

There were unique disagreements between the three services that defined their disputes, although AGF and Navy leaders frequently aligned their positions to oppose the Air Force. The AGF viewed missiles as extensions of artillery, meant to be launched from the ground in support of objectives on land. In contrast, the USAAF argued that missiles were a new form of aircraft; in some instances, they may be launched from the ground, but they travelled to their targets through the air (Lonnquest and Winkler 1996, 20-21; Neufeld 1990, 17-18). Desiring greater control over future battlefields, AGF leaders were hesitant to cede responsibility for future tactical nuclear missiles to the USAAF (Stumpf 2000, 1). USAAF leaders saw the dispute with the AGF as existential: if one day missiles completely replaced piloted aircraft and the Air Force did not have claim to any development projects, the entire service could be rendered irrelevant (Progressive Management 2014, 34-35). The dispute over missile development between the USAAF and the Navy had roots in the debate over control of airpower. The Navy operated its own air wings aboard aircraft carriers, and USAAF resentment of this fact had served as a major point of conflict between the services for years. Additionally, at a time when the USAAF was developing its own theoretical framework for future strategic bombing campaigns, Air Staff leaders were threatened by the Navy’s growing claim to the strategic bombardment mission (Neufeld 1990, 21).

With rivalry threatening the services’ ability to cooperate, on October 2, 1944 the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, sent a memorandum to the Commanding General of the USAAF, Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold. McNarney’s goal was to clarify each service’s research and development responsibilities and foster interservice cooperation. In the one-page memorandum, McNarney asserted that:

“The progress in research and development of long-range guided missiles does not yet enable us to form clear-cut understanding of the ultimate tactical employment of these weapons; and therefore not yet warranted is a specific assignment in every case of such missiles to exclusive employment by any one army of service” (McNarney 1944).

Differing opinions on how missiles could be used in future battles motivated each service to view missiles from their unique perspectives and seek control over their development. The possibilities that missiles presented was not lost on McNarney, and he asserted that missile research and development should continue at a quick pace (McNarney 1944).

The McNarney Directive proved to be an inadequate solution to the fierce competition brewing between the services. The recommendations were vague, and both the USAAF and AGF interpreted the statement’s wording to suit their own purposes. Referencing interservice rivalry, the memorandum’s concluding paragraph stated: “It is expected that on the basis of the above general approach to the problem, the technical planning and development agencies of the major commands will freely coordinate and exchange information” (McNarney 1944). The McNarney Directive satisfied no one, and the lack of cooperation continued. A review of the McNarney Directive ordered by Gen. Eisenhower in early 1946 did not quiet any disagreements between the services, and the National Security Act of 1947, which established the USAF as a separate military branch under the DOD, also failed to properly designate research and development responsibilities (Neufeld 1990, 19-20).

The persistent bickering and lack of cooperation between the Air Force, Army, and Navy hindered missile development at a time when resources should have been pooled to advance a critical national security objective. As early as 1946, scientific and industrial leaders argued that the military was wasting precious time and resources on missile development through duplication of efforts across the services (Neufeld 1990, 22). Illustrative of these wasted efforts were the number of competing long-range ballistic missile projects. Frequently twisting the intended meaning of the McNarney Directive, all three services pursued development of ballistic missiles with ranges varying from 500 to 5,000 miles (Neufeld 1990, 54).

Attempts to coordinate research between the services were in vain. The National Guided Missiles Program, established in January 1945 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not prevent the rivalry and competition. Later, the 1948 interservice conferences at Key West and Newport did confirm that the USAF would be responsible for conducting strategic air warfare, but each service continued to develop their own separate projects that overlapped in terms of technical characteristics (Moody 1995, 290). At a time when the Soviet Union was aggressively pursuing a united and simplified ballistic missile program, efforts in the United States were divided and uncoordinated. As late as mid-1953, there was still no interservice agreement on long-range strategic missile development responsibilities (Neufeld 1990, 91).

As the Soviet Union hastily embarked on its ballistic missile program in the early Cold War period, the United States did not adopt a unified approach to its missile development. Meddling from the AGF and Navy consumed the attention of Air Force leaders and resulted in wasted opportunities for collaboration. As the concluding part of this study will demonstrate, interservice rivalry was only one of two major obstacles to the successful development of an American ICBM.

Bibliography

Gainor, Christopher. 2013. “The Atlas and the Air Force: Reassessing the Beginnings of America’s First Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.” Technology and Culture 54, no. 2 (April): 346-370.

Jenkins, Dennis R. 2002. “Stage-and-a-Half: The Atlas Launch Vehicle.” In To Reach the High Frontier: A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles, edited by Roger D. Launius and Dennis R. Jenkins, 70-103. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

Lonnquest, John C. and David F. Winkler. 1996. To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program. Washington, D.C: Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program, Cold War Project.

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. 1944. “Responsibility for Guided Missile Development.” Official memorandum. Washington, D.C: United States Air Force. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p124201coll2/id/517/.

Moody, Walton S. 1995. Building A Strategic Air Force. Maxwell, AB: Air Force History and Museums Program.

Neufeld, Jacob. 1990. The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force 1945-1960. Washington, D.C: Air Force Historical Studies Office.

Progressive Management Author. 2014. On Alert: An Operational History of the United States Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Program, 1945-2011 – Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Peacekeeper MX, Minuteman III, Nuclear Warhead. Colorado Springs: Progressive Management. Apple Books.

Rosenberg, Max. 2012. The Air Force and the National Guided Missile Program, 1944-1950. Newtown: Lion Publications. Apple Books.

Stumpf, David K. 2000. Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile Program. Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press.