Ghosts of the Old World: An Examination of Western Policy in Ukraine

Along with the sensitive situation between China and Taiwan, the attention of American policymakers is divided between the strategic developments of the Russo-Ukrainian War as well as the ever-expanding security assistance to Ukraine (Cancian 2022). With the Russo-Ukrainian War entering its second year, Russian forces are currently concentrating on Vuhledar and Bakhmut (Harding 2023; Wilk and Żochowski 2023). These battles could be the prelude for a Russian spring offensive or potentially even a summer offensive and, thus, be decisive to who dictates the conflict's terms (Hird et al. 2023). Moreover, there is a significant chance of escalation from the recent missile strike in Poland (Volker 2022). The event left two Polish citizens dead and provided a sobering reality to NATO that Article 5 could be invoked for the first time since the September 11th attacks (Glantz 2022; Yon Ebright 2022). This incident was not lost on the Poles, who recall Nazi Germany’s false flag attacks justifying the 1939 invasion (Zurawski 2014). To fully understand the ever-changing conflict that affects collective Western security, they must examine the current war through the context of previous Eastern European security orders and Putin’s character, as well as investigate the implications of Article 5 through a realist lens.

When security orders are in place, their principal state actors are entrenched in the political and economic affairs of their regions. Prior to the Great War, Imperial Russia sought to expand its influence in the Near East and southeastern Europe. Russia’s decision to become entrenched in Balkan affairs was based on religion as well as economics. As a self-professed defender of Orthodox Christians, Russia began the Crimean War in 1853 and furthered that aim in the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 creating empathetic states such as Bulgaria (Cavendish 2004; Gale n.d.). Russia assumed that the Ottomans were weak and on the decline. However, other great powers intervened in the Crimean War and decreased Bulgaria’s size following the Treaty of Berlin. Russia would be further isolated from Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War due to its lack of support for Bulgarian aspirations, thus leaving only Serbia as its sole ally in southeastern Europe.

To balance against Russia, Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia in 1878, later annexing it in 1908 (Peters 2017). The principal security actors in the Balkans were drawn into the First World War due to absolute commitments to their allies despite the opacity of what would constitute a red line for their involvement. This conflict would upend the security order of the day and give rise to the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918 along with the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 which was fought for land (Kościński 2018; Libera 2020). The Soviet Union was the principal security actor in Eastern and Central Europe via the Warsaw Pact until its collapse in 1991 (Wilson Center Digital Archive 2022). As it crumbled, conflicts erupted from Moldova to Georgia, and most remain unresolved in a state of uneasy peace (per Concordiam Staff, n.d.). Some, such as the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, have flared up in recent years over land disputes (Center for Preventive Action 2023). The post-Soviet peace was chipped away with the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea and is now in a state of disrepair following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Konończuk 2014; Rand Corporation 2022). Security orders are agreements that wane in effectiveness over time without a mandate which animates its participants. NATO is a prime example, as the alliance has dealt with a lack of purpose in a unipolar moment, the crisis of populism among its member nations, and the recent lack of unity concerning Afghanistan (McCalla 1996; Galston 2018). However, should the shared priority of Western powers be the restoration of European peace, the alliance must present a shared front to aid in the aim of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

Not a Tsar but a Kaiser

Over the years, Putin has cultivated an image of himself as a master strategist and a Machiavellian figure furthering Russian interests (Lo 2022). To this end, he has likened himself to Russian Tsar Peter the Great who “reclaimed Russian lands”, just as he sees himself doing (Burns 2023). This gives him prestige within Russia, as it places Putin among the pantheon of Russia’s most revered historical figures. While Putin likes to portray this image of himself, it may prove more apt to compare him to Kaiser Wilhelm II to understand his character and formulate a proper response to his actions.

The Kaiser greatly venerated Federick the Great, as Putin tries to emulate Russian Tsars (Drost 2022). Both men reduced the role of senior officials who were thought to reign them in, namely the dismissal of Bismarck by Wilhelm and the reduction of elder statesmen like Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to mere mouthpieces for Putin (Weiser 2019; Gramer and Mackinnon 2022). For years, analysts and historians have tried to explain the individual actions of both men. However, it is also worthwhile to direct attention to the states they preside over (Berger 2022).

The German Empire was a fast-rising continental power that was undergoing rapid industrialization and held promise to eventually economically outpace its rivals (Berghahn 2005). Russia, before the invasion of Ukraine, experienced a stagnating economy. It now faces a crisis of human capital, as young men leave for former Soviet republics and are sacrificed on the battlefields of Ukraine (Kolesnikov and Volkov 2021; Detsch 2022). Putin has begun his campaign from a much more precarious position than his central European counterpart and has not only weakened Russia’s stability but also America’s European allies. The Thucydides Trap comes to mind here: when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power and how they go about it (Mainardi 2021). Imperial Germany famously went about this through a naval buildup intended to rival the British fleet (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 2015).

The Russian Federation has sought out the proliferation of hypersonic missiles to deter its perceived rivals. Russia’s animating force for its foreign policy is one of anxiety while Germany’s was one of ambition (Sayler 2023). Increasing the size of one’s navy has historically been linked to expanding economic markets. It has also been a driving factor for states to become ruling powers. This reality is especially alluring to former Soviet states, who have the opportunity to shape their economies and join the global markets.

Acquiring hypersonic weapons does not provide economic value, and, when used in Ukraine, they have demonstrated limited success (Grady 2022). Such proliferation by the Russians must be an attempt to harken back to the Cold War, the height of their influence; when they were viewed as one axis of a bipolar international system. Putin’s anxiety-driven foreign policy is a pursuit of ontological security for a former great power and a matter of self-preservation (Mitzen 2006). Following the USSR’s collapse, the Russians not only witnessed NATO enlargement but the formation of a new European geoeconomic order, further shutting out their geopolitical projection. Launching an invasion was an attempt to clear the geostrategic infrastructure which has kept Russia from returning to great power status. The mindset of Russian policymakers on the Russo-Ukrainian War is one of contradictions. On one hand, before the invasion of Ukraine, they viewed its neighbour as a house of cards that would cave in at the first sign of distress. On the other hand, it has openly framed the conflict as one against NATO and the ‘collective West’. Russia’s intelligence and logistics troubles have violated two long-standing strategic precepts: knowing which enemy that you are fighting; and knowing yourself. Russia’s asymmetric position in the Thucydides Trap stems from being the junior power and not having its own defined power to rival. This type of unease within Russian foreign policy not only extends to its immediate neighbours but further abroad as well, making this construct live up to its ‘trap’ name.

While Russia's past involvement in Africa has been light, such as lending moral support to the Boers, Russia today has taken a far more active role in the continent (German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), n.d.). Driven by a fear of being toppled by colour revolutions, and following NATO’s intervention in Libya, Putin has begun assisting autocratic regimes (Cordesman 2014; Smagin 2023). Most recently, he sent troops to help stabilise friendly Kazakhstan, preventing another supposed colour revolution (Balci 2022). In the Russo-Ukrainian War, Belarus provided a blank check to Russia, allowing it an attempt to capture Kyiv. Similarly, Germany provided Austria-Hungary a blank check of support with their aims in Serbia (Edelman, Kobets, and Kramer 2023). Thus, the soundest prescription to deal with an autocrat of a Kaiser-like temperament will be to provide a united front, just as the Triple Entente did over 100 years ago, and further the isolation these regimes have brought upon themselves (Gale 2022). To break this degree of agreement among partners, Putin has tried to weaponize energy dependence on Russia, but this only goes to show the effectiveness cohesion can have on a leader of his kind (Stelzenmüller 2022).

Bella Gerant Alii, Tu Felix Europa Nube

Given their proximity to Ukraine, America’s European partners have attempted to shore up their eastern flank by providing possible ascension to countries like Ukraine and Moldova (Lokker 2023). Before the invasion, member states within the union had two options: be proponents of liberalism, which has come to define the organisation; or choose an illiberal model not in line with EU values. The EU is not the first multilateral polity in the region. The Holy Roman Empire and Austria-Hungary existed long before the Euro was adopted as a currency. Due to benefits of membership, and now with visible Russian aggression, the EU has been a clear favourite to any European state wishing to engage in multilateralism and expand its export markets. In this regard, it resembles how Habsburg Austria acquired land through dynastic marriages, rather than wage campaigns of gradual conquest like other powers. This idea is encapsulated in the now-famous phrase, “Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube” (Schönbrunn Group, n.d.), ‘Let others wage war: thou, happy Austria, marry’. This saying displays the union’s favourable position to dictate its ranks and the region’s direction. Non-EU states look to Brussels not for imperial prestige, but for a sense of modern European democracy.

When examining the other multilateral polities that preceded the EU, it is apparent they have similarities in common. The battle between liberalism and illiberal democracy is not the first issue that has disrupted continental affairs. There existed a stark ideological divide between Protestants and Catholics within the Holy Roman Empire during the Reformation. Ardour on both sides culminated in battles of both the pen along with the sword across Europe (Debggi Baranova 2020; Nexon 2009). This boiling point would culminate in the Peace of Augsburg that laid the basis for coexistence between the two groups as well as immigration for those who dissented (Gross 1948). Voltaire would famously describe the Holy Roman Empire as, “in no way holy, nor Roman, nor an empire” (Grief 2021).

Much in the same way, the European Union is riddled with contradictions in its behaviour. The EU is European — so as long your state is allowed to participate in European matters and provided that it meets a laundry list of preconditions. Moreover, the European Union is a union insomuch as any member state that leaves will be worse off economically, a natural consequence of not being in a benevolent association of freely participating states (Posen 2022). In the same way that the choice of denomination limited the movement of individuals within the Holy Roman Empire, those not signatories to the Schengen Area are restricted in movement even though their governments do not threaten their neighbour’s security (European Commission 2022). Due to the uncertainty of the European project amidst the war in Ukraine, important actors within the region have suggested a formation of a European Political Community (Rishko 2023). Although the United States does not often comment much on European affairs, it might prove prudent for the Europeans to reconcile their differences through less stipulated economics, as it is foundational in the DNA of modern Europe (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (MEAE) 2021).

Separation of Ambiguity as Realism

As the missile struck Poland, Polish authorities convened an emergency meeting to discuss the next steps and investigate the matter (Erskine 2022). These events have, however, presented a far more grave implication for the United States through its NATO obligations. There exists language and behaviour within the organisation that exacerbates the chances of enmeshing the United States in a potential conflict. The language dictated within Article 5 states that an armed attack constitutes a response of all members (Daalder 1999). Furthermore, it says that signatory parties of NATO are within their right to respond in a way that deems necessary to maintain transatlantic security. In contrast to this, by removing Russia from the global commerce infrastructure, NATO members have already taken some of the severe measures intended for an incursion (FP Analytics 2022). America’s European partners are extending the same hypothetical protection to other states such as Moldova that would most likely receive the same aid should its territorial integrity be compromised by an aggressive power (Council of the European Union 2023).

The European Union was formed by NATO members, and, thus, the organisations have always been closely associated. Despite this, the United States is not exempt from blame either, as its use of the organisation has normalised this type of behaviour. In the unipolar moment following the Soviet Union’s collapse, America had the opportunity to use NATO beyond its originally-intended capacity. The missions would be practice for Clinton's reluctant humanitarian interventions in places like Yugoslavia, as well as Obama’s Responsibility to Protect in Libya and Syria (Peceny 2000; Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). The one instance in which Article 5 was invoked using the document’s opaque language was in the aftermath of 9/11 and has been largely influential in global affairs (Sen 2018). The vague language was also a hallmark of such controversial legislation as the Patriot Act and has influenced Russia’s framing of their invasion as a special military operation (Russo 2015; Gorobets 2022).

Although the United States has had a separation of powers between declaring war, the same cannot be said for its obligations to its allies which are inflexible under the current language. While the United States does not have conscription like the Russian Federation that is sending young Russian men to Ukraine, American young men are still registered with the Selective Service System in the event of a major conflict. By defining a more concise and clear NATO mission, America can better achieve its interests and put forth an agenda of practising realism. By making a defined commitment in writing, the United States and its NATO partners can focus on endeavours related to providing a credible defence. The alliance cannot factor in and mitigate all the circumstances which emboldens antagonistic states to embark on rash decision-making. However, investment in the ability of NATO members to yield effective deterrence if they should invoke Article 5 can help to avoid such repeats of the past like that of Imperial German Chancellor Bethman Hollweg who gave Austria a broad statement of support with whatever they chose to do regarding Serbia. The rationale of the chancellor was made because he was concerned that the Russian empire was quickly acquiring the means of attaining prestige in Europe to challenge the position of Germany. Among these means were the portental movement of troops through rail, something especially salient in the mind of Germans since rail networks in Franco-Prussian War had provided them their ticket to not only unification, but also great power status (Jarausch 2012).

A mission that is undefined and that operates within a grey zone will ultimately be subject to the passion of the masses, ultimately reducing the ability of a state to forge sound policy. The battle that Ukraine faces is one of territorial defence and the ability to choose its destiny as a polity. With continued support from the West, the conflict is not only a return to its original purpose but also a true duel as described by Clausewitz (Clausewitz.com n.d.).

Just as Russia decided to shore up its existential security by invading Ukraine, and what Clausewitz would ultimately describe as its moral forces, the West must safeguard Ukraine’s moral security through the allocation of aid (Gibbs 1975; MacDonald 2023). The scope of their struggle is realised when Russia’s weaponization of religion is studied and because of this, Europe once again faces a war of the pen and the sword (Luchenko 2023). Lastly, the United States must learn from the past and not dictate terms to Ukraine when its troops are not present fighting. In addition, America must take note of the realities of a multipolar world and commit to multilateralism within foreign policy, unless it wishes to be disadvantaged by acting alone in the present global environment (Biscop 2022; Walt 2022). Special attention is to be paid to Russia as it is failing to act as the credible sole security actor within its sphere of influence and over committed itself to a nation on its doorstep.

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