Forgotten Battles of Canadian History: The Battle of Medak Pocket

From the trenches of the Western Front, to the fields of Afghanistan, and into the present day, the history of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) spans far and wide. However, as with all of history, there are always one or two things that have slipped through the cracks of time. Operation Medak Pocket, and the ensuing Battle of Medak Pocket, is one of those forgotten moments of Canadian history. In this article we will discuss the context behind the involvement of the CAF in the battle, the battle itself, and its resurgence within Canadian memory. 

The area of Medak Pocket, located in the Gospic region of Croatia, was where this forgotten battle took place. Before we get into what happened during The Battle of Medak Pocket, we must ask ourselves; why were Canadian troops even there in the first place? 

Croatia, originally apart of Yugoslavia, was one of the six republics that seceded from the central Yugoslav government that lasted from June 25, 1991 until April of 1992 (United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, n.d.). Although other states like Serbia and Montenegro would not themselves become independent nations until June 2005 (United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, n.d.), within that almost one-year period six republics; Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina either began the process of independence from Yugoslavia or became independent outright, resulting in the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. As these states became independent, some of these new nations became engulfed in brutal violence either during or after their secession from Yugoslavia. After Croatia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia in June of 1991, conflict began when Serbs in the region quickly responded in part by forming the Republic of Serbian Krajina, of which was supported by the The Yugoslavian Army (JNA). The forming of this new republic would proceed what would become that start of a bloody and lengthy civil war (Woods 2016). The conflict saw serious instances of crimes against humanity. Ethnic cleansing and violence against civilians took place on both sides, with the UN intervening as a peacekeeping force in February of 1992 to try and curb the violence and restore peace to the region (Woods 2016). Canada contributed a battalion of troops as a part of the UN peacekeeping mission (UNPROFOR) to Croatia. After more than a year in country, Canadian peacekeepers would be sent into the Gospic region of Croatia (Medak Pocket), an area of fertile farming land that reached far into Croatian territory. Which on September 9, 1993, became the staging ground of a Croatian offensive to take the Gospic region (Canada 2020). After six days of fighting a ceasefire was arranged on September 15, 1993, with all sides of the offensive being ordered to move out of the region by the ceasefire agreement. To maintain the resolutions set up in the ceasefire, UNPROFOR sent in both French and Canadian troops from the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry regiment to hold the pocket and maintain the peace (Canada 2020).

Within the joint UNPROFOR task force sent into the Medak Pocket, 875 of the peacekeepers present were Canadian (Windsor 1993, 4). Of that Canadian force only 375 of the 875 troops present came from the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry regiment with 165 troops coming from various other regular forces units (Windsor 1993, 4). Most notable was the amount of reservists used in the Canadian battle group sent into the pocket. 385 of the 875 soldiers present were reservists sent in to beef up and properly staff the roles necessary to complete the mission (Windsor 1993, 4). What made this so notable was the fact that around 70 percent of the rifle company strength during the mission were made up of reservists (Windsor 1993, 4) due to the scarcity of regular units and troops present on the mission. The Canadian operation in Medak Pocket marked “the highest concentration of reserve soldiers on an operational mission to date.” (Windsor 1993, 5 ) As the Canadian operation moved into full swing they would arrive into a situation in which the peace remained tenuous at best. 

Before even being able to fully secure Medak Pocket, this ad hoc but mission ready group of Canadian troops would be put to the test in a situation that quickly deteriorated from peacekeeping into a situation that required only “their primary war – fighting skills.” (Windsor 1993, 3) This occurred “when Croatian Army units opened fire with machine-guns, mortars, and artillery in an effort to stop the Canadian advance” (Windsor 1993, 3) into Medak Pocket. After several instances of small arms fire, mortars, artillery and even “20 mm cannon fire,” (Defence 2022) it became clear across Canadian lines that the Croatian Army had intentionally begun to “directly engage [the present] UNPROFOR soldiers” (Defence 2022) over their advancement into the pocket. However, as it was UNPROFOR’s primary objective to secure the region, once Croat troops began a direct engagement with Canadian units moving into the pocket, the UNPROFOR units present were given greenlight to retaliate back against the Croatians. Means of retaliation like the use “of deadly force against Croatian units” (Windsor 1993, 3) became an approved means of counter-engagement as well. Once the UNPROFOR’s engagement with Croatian forces began, the 875 Canadian soldiers began the daunting task of having to square off against the much larger units of the “2500 Croat troops backed by tanks and artillery” (Salter 2013) that had been present in the region since their initial invasion on September 9, 1993. Once the battle commenced Canadian units retaliated against the Croats primarily through matching the force used against them. This resulted in a sort of tit for tat style of engagement with Canadian units engaging in “small arms [fights] for small arms [fights] and so on.” (Defence 2022) Firefights between both sides were intense and fierce, with some lasting “for up to 90 minutes between Croatians and [Canadian units] over the [battles initial] 15-hour period.” (Defence 2022)

At the height of the engagement, units like “Sergeant Rod Dearing’s section of troops on Charlie Company’s left [were] forced to repel five separate Croat attacks.” (Woods 2016) What happened to Sergeant Dearing’s section became a pattern throughout the conflict, with Croatian attacks throughout the battle proving unsuccessful at budging Canadian units out of there advancement into the pocket. In light of the ever-present stalemate forming, “The Croatian Military agreed to a meeting during the evening of 15 Sep 93” (Defence 2022) to discuss an end to the fighting. From that meeting came the agreement that Canadian forces would be able to create a passing point between a road that ran through the pocket, with an eventual withdrawal of Croatian forces from the region and a Canadian occupation of Croatian positions within the pocket as well (Defence 2022). However, when the sun rose on September 16, 1993, the plan to occupy the pocket would be delayed. As Canadian forces began to move into the region as agreed upon, a “tense standoff ensued when the Canadians were prevented from entering” (Woods 2016) the villages and civilian centres within the region and just beyond. To the dismay of the Canadian forces, as Croatian negotiators continued to make excuses for the delay, Canadian units could hear “small arms firing” (Defence 2022) and “large explosions coming from the area of the villages.” (Defence 2022)

As fears mounted as to what could be happening in the village of Medak, a non-violent means of applying pressure on the Croats was taken.  Lieutenant Colonel James Calvin held an impromptu press conference with the media in the region, saying in a statement to the media that “at some stage you got to cut the bullshit and get on with the job, and all I’ve heard right now from the Croatian people at my level here is a bunch of half-baked excuses aimed [at] delaying us from getting on with the operation.” (Breakout Network 2009) Pressure applied in this manner was successful at ending the delays in moving into the civilian centers of the region. However, to the horror and shock of the Canadian troops present, once they were able to survey what had happened during the Croatian delay they found “evidence of mass executions and the removal of bodies.” (Woods 2016). With the Canadians who had moved into these civilian centers finding “no survivors.” (Woods 2016) Once Canadian troops fully moved into the region, highly scrupulous “measures [were] taken by [the] 2 PPCLI to record evidence of ethnic cleansing.” (Woods 2016)  These measures would become “standard procedure for UNPROFOR [going forward] in preparing for war crimes trials.” (Woods 2016) After the dust had settled the Canadian forces in the region stood victorious over the brutal assault taken against them by the Croatian army. The outnumbered 875 Canadian soldiers decisively holding strong against the 2500 strong Croatian army attack, walking away having only suffered four Canadian wounded (Woods 2016), while as many as 27 Croats having been reported, but not confirmed, to have been killed over the course of the battle (Woods 2016).

Almost thirty years on, this forgotten battle has been slowly resurging into the collective Canadian consciousness. Not only for its story of Canadian resilience, bravery, and heroism in the face of such daunting odds, but for its spotlighting of the traumas endured by Canadian peacekeepers in deployments like the one to Croatia (Woods 2016). With the publication of stories like Medak Pocket being crucial in providing the necessary and proper “debriefing [of what happened] and [for the providing of] ongoing support for soldiers who have witnessed extreme brutality and human suffering” (Woods 2016). Especially for a force that was made up of high amounts of “young reservists” (Woods 2016) who were thrown into the heat of battle without notice and without a prior plan.. For the actions taken that day the Canadian Armed Forces recognized “Lieutenant Tyrone Green, Gunner Scott Leblanc, and Warrant Officer William Johnson for bravery. [The CAF] also recognized Sergeant Rod Dearing for leadership, and awarded Lt. – Col. James Calvin the Meritorious Service Cross” (Woods 2016). As a unit the 2ndBattalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry were “awarded a United Nations Force Commander’s Commendation from French General Cot,” (Windsor 1993, 3) the first of its kind at the time (Windsor 1993, 3).

Bibliography

Canada, Veterans Affairs. 2020. “Forgotten Fights: Battle of Medak Pocket.” Veterans Affairs Canada. Last modified May 5, 2022. https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/art-hub/battle-of-medak-pocket.  

“Canada's Secret War.” 2009. YouTube. Breakout Network. November 23, 2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Gr1ARY8Lx4.  

Defence, National. 2021. “Report on Medak Pocket Operations.” Government of Canada. Last modified on January 11, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2021/11/report-on-medak-pocket-operations.html. 

Salter, David. 2013. “Medak Pocket: Canada's Forgotten Battle.” Thestar.com. Toronto Star. Last modified September 16, 2013. https://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2013/09/14/medak_pocket_canadas_forgotten_battle.html?rf.  

United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. “What is the former Yugoslavia?.” Accessed February 13, 2023. https://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia. 

Windsor, Lee. 1993. “Professionalism Under Fire, Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993.” Canadian Military History 9, no. 3 (2000): 3 – 5.

Woods, James. 2016. “Battle of Medak Pocket.” The Canadian Encyclopedia. Last modified January 12, 2017. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/battle-of-medak-pocket.