First Thoughts on Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy

In November 2022, Canada released its highly-anticipated Indo-Pacific Strategy. The twenty-three-page public document provides a broad outline of Canada’s future policy of engagement with the Indo-Pacific, divided into five strategic objectives. Arguably, the most important strategic objective for Canada is “[p]romoting peace, resilience, and security” (Government of Canada, 5). Upon a cursory review, Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy provides an open and honest assessment of the security situation in the region. The document properly identifies the current challenges to Canada’s security emanating from the Indo-Pacific and proposes reasonable paths forward to promoting Canadian interests while maintaining its reputation as a responsible international actor.

According to the most recent economic data, the Indo-Pacific will be a critical region for twenty-first century international relations. In 2023, the Indo-Pacific accounts for more than one-third of the global economy, and this share will rise to over one-half by the year 2040 (Government of Canada, 2). The Indo-Pacific is home to economic powerhouses – including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, and Japan. As their share of global gross domestic product (GDP) increases, the rest of the world will need to elevate the importance of the Indo-Pacific in their own foreign policies. As a result, these three enormous economies will assume greater importance on the world stage. Based on these facts, Canada’s future security and prosperity will be decided in large part by its present-day Indo-Pacific policy; actions taken today will bear fruit – or consequences – for decades to come.

Increasing Canada’s trade and economic interaction with the Indo-Pacific is not sufficient to securing and maintaining Canadian wealth and prosperity. Where there is economic activity, military power must follow to secure it. Canadian investors and economic interests will not be able to engage and develop their Indo-Pacific interests if the region’s security situation is tense, contested, or dominated by a power that is hostile to the rules-based international order that a free and open trading system depends on.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly notes this reality. Its opening pages do not shy away from pointing out that the PRC, whose meteoric rise on the world stage was facilitated by the rules-based international order, currently seeks to disrupt the status-quo and reforge regional and global international regimes to suit its own interests. Page 3 of the document states “China’s rise is reshaping the strategic outlook of every state in the region, including Canada. China has benefitted from the rules-based international order to grow and prosper, but it is now actively seeking to reinterpret those rules to gain greater advantage” (Government of Canada, 3). While this wording is strong, it is not denunciatory. Nevertheless, the Indo-Pacific Strategy also states that:

"There are also countries in the region with whom Canada fundamentally disagrees; we must be clear-eyed about the threats and risks they pose. But the collective challenges we face, such as climate change, biodiversity loss and nuclear proliferation, are too important to tackle in isolation. We must remain in dialogue with those with whom we do not see eye-to-eye (Government of Canada, 6).

These two statements regarding the PRC are far from uncompromising. They are the iterations of a responsible and reasonable policy for engagement with a critical part of the world. The PRC does pose a long-term challenge to the current world order that has contributed to both Canadian and Chinese prosperity. However, as stated in a typical Canadian fashion, this reality does not necessarily mean that tension or conflict is necessary. In fact, hostilities would be detrimental to both parties, not to mention the entire world."

Keeping this in mind, tensions between Canada and the PRC have mounted in previous years. For example, the 2018 arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver, British Columbia by Canadian authorities fulfilling a United States warrant prompted the PRC to arrest two Canadian citizens in retaliation (The Guardian 2021). They were released back to Canada in Fall 2021, but the incident sparked outrage among Canada and its allies, primarily because the arrests were clearly political in nature.

More recently, Chinese election interference was featured prominently in Canadian headlines. Media outlets reported that in 2019 Chinese intelligence agents attempted to influence Canadian politicians and political staffers to adopt more pro-Beijing leanings. Canadian media also reported that “The Chinese consulate in Toronto had funnelled – via a member of the Ontario legislature and a local businessman – $250,000 to candidates in 11 ridings [electoral districts], and to Beijing operatives working on their campaigns” (The Editorial Board 2022). Canadian parliamentarians have taken these reports seriously, and hearings have taken place in Ottawa to probe the reports, ascertain if electoral integrity was compromised, and determine what action needs to be taken to better protect Canadian democratic institutions (Gilmore 2022).

Intimidation and allegations of election interference are serious, and proper cybersecurity and intelligence measures need to be taken by Canada to protect its security and defend the integrity of its elections. From a geopolitical perspective, declining relations between Canada and the PRC complicate Canada’s new approach to the Indo-Pacific region. If Canada is to increase its engagement with the Indo-Pacific, its leadership will have to walk a fine line between seeking opportunities to cooperate with the PRC on global issues, while maintaining its own security and aligning its policy with Western allies in the region, like the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

While this path may be narrow, Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy outlines a broad strategy to walk it. Its open and honest assessment that the PRC will be a challenge to Canadian interests is important; any type of strategy needs a firm foundation in reality to match ends with means over the long-term. Canada’s new plan for engagement with the Indo-Pacific represents a positive first step for Canada and is one that all Canadians should be aware of.

Bibliography

Gilmore, Rachel. 2022. “House of Commons Committee Will Probe China’s Alleged Interference in 2019 Election.” Global News, November 14, 2022. https://globalnews.ca/news/9275944/china-foreign-interference-election-2019-committee-study/.

Government of Canada. 2022. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Ottawa, Canada: Global Affairs Canada. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng.

The Editorial Board. 2022. “On Chinese Election Interference, the Trudeau Government is Talking Loudly and Doing Nothing.” The Globe and Mail, November 18, 2022. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-on-chinese-election-interference-the-trudeau-government-is-talking/.

The Guardian. 2021. “Meng Wanzhou and the Two Michaels: A Timeline.” The Guardian, September 25, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/25/meng-wanzhou-and-the-two-michaels-a-timeline.