Drone Warfare: Difference between Israeli and American doctrine

Drones have been a deadly force in the defence community for the past two decades. In this paper, I will be comparing the American and Israeli targeted killing chain of command. First and foremost, it is imperative to define drones in general. A drone is a commonly used name for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also otherwise known as Remotely Piloted Aircraft systems (RPAS). Whether we call them drones, UAVs or RPAS, they are the latest addition to countries’ warfighting arsenal as it separates the warfighter from the on-the-ground consequences of their actions. Militaries across the globe use various types of drones for diverse purposes such as but not limited to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (also known as ISR and/or armed strike.) As mentioned above, drones are classified in different sizes and categories as outlined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Saura 2016), the types of drones range from Class I, which includes drones weighing less than 150kg. One of the sub-categories includes so-called “micro UAVs” that are less than 2 kg and cannot fly more than 200 feet above the ground and are usually carried by soldiers on foot patrols and mainly conduct ISR. On the other side of the spectrum are the Class III drones like the MQ9 Reapers, Global Hawk, Predators etc that weigh more than 600 kg and can fly up to 65000 feet high and have almost unlimited mission radius. Class III drones are used in three different ways, the first being active air support; this happens when armed UAVs are vectored in for direct air support to the troops on the ground. Secondly, when drones are utilised to fulfil their traditional ISR role; for instance, patrolling the skies of a target country as the US did in Afghanistan to surveil “the pattern of life” 24 hours a day. Finally, the third common usage of drones is the pre-planned targeted killings of suspected militants. Such targeted killings by drones are considered a flagrant violation of the Rules-Based International Order as well as the international humanitarian legal order.

As it might not come as a surprise, the US began the R&D on drones and currently has the biggest arsenal of remotely piloted aeroplanes. The US is not alone, as per a UN report in 2010, there were only 40 states with access to and effective operation of drones. As of 2020, that number ballooned to 50 states either already capable or in the process of acquiring armed drone technology with the capacity to shoot laser-guided missiles. Drones being used as a weapon by a sovereign state is one thing, because no matter how authoritarian the government is, there is always, even if minuscule, an amount of accountability either to a politburo or an elected parliament. On the contrary, ethical and legal issues regarding drone warfare become more controversial when drones or Remotely Piloted Aircraft System are used by non-state actors such as terrorist/insurgency groups or private security firms, where there is no accountability whatsoever. Many experts have predicted that autonomous systems will fight wars in the future, but the development and implementation of such systems are full of ethical and legal challenges that we will have to deal with before using those systems in warfare.

Exploring the legal principles of warfare, specifically the types of weapons used in warfare; we must look at the Geneva Conventions and the international humanitarian law outlined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As per Article 35 of the Geneva Convention, “in any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited” (ICRC 1977). Article 35 clearly states the need to have some kind of restraint during an armed conflict. The technology that is being used should not be relentless as it could have humanitarian consequences, especially after the predetermined strategic objectives have been fulfilled. In addition to the Geneva Conventions, the humanitarian legal precedence predicated by the ICRC sets a legal basis upon which the humanitarian impact of warfare is measured. ICRC states that (a) “use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited” and (b) “use of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate is prohibited” (Saura 2016). When we take into consideration the aforementioned definition of humanitarian law during a war, drone warfare seems to be in blatant violation of international humanitarian law. Overall, there are numerous treaty-based restrictions on the usage of certain weapons in a war, some of them being, poisonous, chemical, and biological weapons, expanding bullets, etc. To date, there have not been any treaties restricting the usage and/or stockpiling of drones. Not only that, there are common parameters dictating their design, manufacturing and not to mention their extent of use on the battlefield. In general, drones are considered to be very precise when it comes to hitting their predetermined target accurately without or with minimal collateral damage to other civilians or civilian infrastructure but a metric where they lag behind their manned counterparts is at the target identification stage. The following quote delves deeper into the number of successful drone strikes “according to a conservative estimate of the number of casualties in 114 reported drone strikes in Northwestern Pakistan from 2004 to 2010, that killed between 830 to 1,210 individuals, of whom 550 to 850 were described as militants in reliable press accounts.”(Saura 2016) Therefore, civilian casualties since 2004 is approximately 32 percent. Experts have noted that such lapse in target identification occurs due to subpar on-the-ground intelligence about the location and the physical attributes of the target individual and/or group. On the contrary, a manned fighter jet can co-relate the exact location and physical attributes of the target individual and can call off the strikes if the target is in a highly populated area or if there is an increased risk of collateral damage (Saura 2016).

American drone attacks' “kill chain” (Wenzl 2018) includes the surveillance assets such as fighter jets and drones and once the insurgents and/or a terrorist hideout is spotted, the US National Guard’s intel analysts stationed in Kansas conduct real-time footage analysis to determine the feasibility and possibility of collateral and/or critical infrastructure damage. US’s targeted killing apparatus mostly works by the active participation and assistance of Joint Tactical Air Command (JTAC) who is an individual usually embedded in the US military’s raiding parties and is responsible for communicating the accurate coordinates of suspected terrorist hideouts in their field of combat (Wenzl 2018). Once the requirement for an airstrike is conveyed to the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its commander approves the airstrike and initiates the “kill chain” (Wenzl 2018). Once approved, an air asset nearby is directed to the target location to single out the building or the hideout. Once the feasibility of the targeting and the target itself is identified by the intel analysts in Kansas; the CENTCOM commander gives the final green light to engage and for the ground troops to stand by/duck and cover for the impact. After the attack, the US forces on the ground provide a post-impact situational update to the CENTCOM through their unit’s JTAC.

Israel employs its aerial assets in targeted killings of suspected militants. To maintain a visual on the target, Israel uses long-range surveillance drones but to engage the target, Israel almost always uses either their manned fighter jets or helicopter gunships to have a visual confirmation of a confirmed kill. In his book “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations” (2019) author Ron Bergman highlights the differences between the American and Israeli approaches to targeted killing. Since the inception of drone technology, Israel has been using it to keep a watch on Hezbollah militants across the border in Lebanon. Drones’ ISR role was enhanced in the early 2000s when the Israeli Air Force upgraded all the drones to be fitted with a laser designator to aid the accurate targeting of moving vehicles and/or static buildings. On the command and control side of planning, the Israeli defence ministry built a Joint War Room (JWR) underneath their defence HQ in Tel Aviv. one major difference between the targeted killing chain of the US and Israel is the presence of a lawyer with expertise in international conflicts in the JWR. Contrary to common belief, the US has minimal legal advice before the killing takes place as American targeted killing missions are classified and are usually conducted by the CIA. Whereas Israeli successes are often attributed to the Air Force, Intelligence for Israeli hits is provided by Mossad (Israeli Foreign Intelligence Agency). In order to carry out the strike with all the legal considerations laid out in the Geneva Conventions, IAF has drones in the sky and eyes on the target at least 5 to 6 hours before the strike. Once the JWR gets the aerial confirmation that the target is in a building or a car, it is followed by a secondary confirmation by a source on the ground or if the target is not reachable his/her voice can also be confirmed by a vocal expert who can confirm the target individual’s voice. Once the defence experts and Intel analysts in the JWR are more than 80 percent certain that the targeted individual is the person they are looking for, commanders in the JWR check with the lawyer about the number of civilians in the area that can be injured by collateral damage and confirm the Rules of Engagement (RoEs). Commanders from the JWR then give orders to scramble jets or Apache attack helicopters. Once on the scene pilots give one final visual confirmation of the location and/or the individual. Finally, drones designate the building or vehicle with a laser and the jet or the attack helos shoot hellfire missiles to take out the target. When it comes to civilian control over these missions, the Prime Minister and defence minister are provided with a list of top militants who must be assassinated by Mossad along with the appropriate intelligence regarding their last known location and the easiest course of action to take that individual out. Once the PM is satisfied by the capabilities of Mossad and/or Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) he/she signs the “Red Page” on that specific militant. “Red Page” gives full operational authority to Mossad and/or the IDF to carry out the killing. “Red Page” does not expire meaning a “Red Page” signed by a former PM might still be in effect, and Mossad and/or IDF might still be hunting for that insurgent (Bergman 2019) The US and Israel have very similar chains of command and execution when it comes to targeted killings using drones with intel collection and implementation of drone attacks on suspected terrorists.

In conclusion, drone warfare has revolutionised the battlefield. In the war against terror, drones have saved numerous allied lives but drone strikes have often been fraught with controversy due to inaccurate identification of the target individual and/or asset. After reading the in-depth analysis of Israel’s method of targeted killing by Ron Bergman, I would say that the American method seems to have minimal regard for international humanitarian law as the American “kill chain” does not include a lawyer before the decision-making stage. CENTCOM commanders are answerable to military lawyers after each approved strike. I believe it is of utmost importance that along with any targeted killing mission, there has to be legal accountability.

Bibliography

“Article 35 - International Committee of the Red Cross.” Treaties, state parties, and commentaries - additional protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 - 35 - basic rules, 1997. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750044.

Bergman, Ronen. “Chapter 22.” Essay. In Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations. London: John Murray Publishers, 2019.

Saura, Jaume. “On the Implications of the Use of Drones in International Law.” JILIR : Journal of International Law & International Relations 12, no. 1 (2016): 120–.

Wenzl, Roy. “The Kill Chain: Inside the Unit That Tracks Targets for US Drone Wars.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, January 23, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/23/the-kill-chain-inside-the-unit-that-tracks-targets-for-us-drone-wars.