Conflict in the West Sahara 1 Year on: a Retrospective

With the assignment of a new United Nations (UN) Special Envoy, there appears to be renewed interest in the conflict in the Western Sahara. Almost a year from the re-initiation of hostilities, the war between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front – the armed forces of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) – looks set to repeat the same patterns observed in the years before the ceasefire. While much has changed on the ground for both parties, the inert nature of the conflict had largely rendered the international community disinterested. With mounting calls from international organizations on Morocco’s human rights abuses, and active legal, political, and military effort from the Polisario Front, the conflict has finally drawn greater interest. Whether this translates into political will to change the material conditions on the ground remains to be seen.

The war in the Western Sahara has a long and storied context. It is the product of decades of political inaction and reflexive impotence on the part of the UN. Worse still, it belies a stark gap between the discourse of Western countries dedicated to the international human rights regime, and both their policy and global action. The conflict is yet another instance of colonialisms harsh consequences, all topics which I have previously dedicated time to discussing. In short, Morocco has illegally occupied almost 80% of the Western Sahara since 1975 and has established a newfound oppressive settler-colonial province dependent on Rabat and its military for survival. Given the necessity of major resettlement programs, cultural and political repression, and a significant border wall, international commentators have not been shy in seeing significant parallels to the Israeli settlement of Palestine (William 2015; Crivelente 2018; Badarin 2021). Since 1991, a ceasefire negotiated by the UN between Morocco and the Front had been in place. It stipulated that Morocco should hold a free and open referendum on the question of independence for the 173,600 Sahrawis, fulfilling the 1963 UN Decolonization Committees assertion of Sahrawi self-determination. Subsequent talks as to how this will be accomplished have been tense and were solely useful in forestalling any substantive change on the part of Morocco. Resettlement, hostility, and political repression continued and, in fact, worsened since the 90s, with the Moroccan population comprising two-thirds of the territory’s demographic now. This chain of events highlights a recurrent theme in Western Saharan discourse: disinterest and a lack of political will. While this might be expected from Morocco, a monarchical hybrid-regime with conflicting interests in the region, it has also become a habitual issue with UN-monitored conflicts involving UN Security Council allies.

Since the 13th of November 2020, the war in the Western Sahara has continued unabated. This was the culmination of years of tensions, major protests (and subsequent crackdowns), as well as breaches of the ceasefire agreement. The Moroccan armed forces illegally crossed the armistice line to disperse protestors inside of a UN-protected demilitarized zone which is de facto SADR territory (Aljazeera, 2020). As a consequence, the Polisario Front began its military efforts once more. The primary battleground remains the Berm, a 2700 km sand wall monitored by drones, secured with sophisticated detection and surveillance systems, millions of land mines, and well-equipped rapid intervention forces (Soudan, 2021). Whether in public or private, Algeria and Russia remain primary backers of the Front, while the US and France remain staunch supporters of Morocco, a continuity of Cold War politics. Reports from Morocco and the SADR allege daily shelling of the wall with 120mm mortars and Russian-made rocket launchers. However, faced with the unyielding Berm, the Front has increasingly relied on guerrilla tactics with a fleet of Toyota 4x4s outfitted with 14mm machine guns, as well as weapons and armored vehicles seized from the Moroccan armed forces. Morocco continues to maintain both a tactical and technological edge, thanks in large part due to a sophisticated modern military supplied by allies in the War on Terror. However, the conflict has seen fewer casualties (though disproportionately SADR members) due to the distanced nature of warfare. Morocco has since extended and reinforced its border wall through the UN buffer zone into Mauritanian territory in the self-declared interest of protecting “civilian traffic and cross-border trade” (Hamann, 2020). As if to add greater complication, these events take place within a wider arms race between Morocco and Algeria, whose continuing breakdown of relations may set the stage for a much larger conflict in the region (Lovatt & Mundy, 2021). Whatever the ambitions of Algeria, the SADR – whether in public or private – knows they may not be able to overcome the obstacles which blunted their initial military efforts. As such, one can see this as a tactical return to arms to build upon popular support and frustrations to garner international attention and strengthen their diplomatic position. This is observable through legal success in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as well as the appointment of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura (Euronews, 2021; UN, 2021). That being said, we should not discount the unpredictability of war, given successive military incursions in the South beyond the Berm (Lovatt & Mundy, 2021). Interviews with multiple Sahrawi activists and active members of the Front from my experience reveals a staunch commitment to the cause, civil disobedience, and if necessary, outright political violence. As Fanon said, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon.

In spite of these developments, there exists (and has existed) a discursive gap which characterizes the apathetic and impotent nature of the international response. By this, I mean that there exists a significant chasm between the commitments of states to international regimes (of human rights, refugees, etc) which are typically identified with the “developed Western world” and their policy and action. The United States and Morocco have been close allies since September 11th, 2001. The War on Terror cemented a firm diplomatic relationship into one central to the US’s counterterrorism strategy, which in turn opened opportunities for economic investment and military support (BBC, 2004). France is similarly Morocco’s biggest trading partner and a major source of investment and stability in the counterterrorism, finance, and migration regimes (Saleh & Abboud, 2021). Unsurprisingly, this has not been conducive to a resolution of the conflict.

In 2020, one of then-President Trumps last foreign policy decisions was his choice to recognize the Western Sahara as belonging to Morocco, and to establish a consulate in the territory. With the stated goal of peace in the Middle East and the support of four Gulf countries, the US harmonized its discourse with policy and practice, however briefly. In an effort to turn course following the election of Joe Biden, spokesperson for the US State Department Ned Price asserted after the appointment of the Special Envoy that the US is committed to resuming a “UN-led political process to advance a durable and dignified solution.” (Price, 2021). However, despite repeated requests, President Biden has yet to rescind the recognition of Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara as legitimate, tacitly supporting Morocco. When pressed on the matter, Price uncomfortably responded: “We don’t have anything to announce beyond what we’ve said” (2021). The EU as a regional body remains in a similar position, displaying a willingness to “subordinate its Western Sahara policy to its desire to develop and maintain close bilateral relations with Morocco… reflect[ing] how reliant on Morocco the EU feels vis-à-vis its core interests, namely counter-terrorism cooperation, migration control, and gas transit from Algeria” (Lovatt, 2021). Given significant interests in resource extraction, regional security, and economic development, the EU remains in a double-bind as to how to reconcile their commitments to the peace process. However, as mentioned above, these agreements have been quashed by five such rulings by the ECJ in recent years (Lovatt, 2021). These rulings reinforce the claim to self-determination of the Sahrawi and require the consent of the peoples of the Western Sahara when entering into international agreements.

These legal successes do not prevent Morocco’s allies (most notably France) from functionally serving as an obstacle to resolution. Despite France’s declared neutrality on the subject, they continually campaign for Morocco’s insufficient autonomy plan, and were active belligerents in the 1st Western Saharan War during Operation Lamintin, a bombing campaign using napalm to destroy military targets. All UN peacekeeping missions since 1991 include human rights monitoring mechanisms to ensure the regimes by which countries like France claim to abide and support remain intact, and so that, should a crime be committed, we (ideally) have an unbiased narrative. Given this information, it should come as no surprise that France has opposed any expansion of the UN Mission for a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) to include these mechanisms and has used its significant clout as a permanent member of the Security Council to protect Morocco (and by extension the Polisario Front) from investigations of alleged human rights abuses (Bolopion, 2010). There is no clearer example of the discursive gap than in the policy of France towards the Western Sahara.

Resource exploitation continues unabated by European, North American, and Asian actors. The NGO Western Sahara Resource Watch has documented firms and states illegally taking advantage of the country’s fisheries, phosphates, oil, minerals, agriculture, and more recently renewable energy (WSRW, 2021). To quote a summary of the research in the field by scholars and activists thus far: “All the analyses that address this question find that the exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources – as it is currently done, has been done, or is likely to be done in the future given the scope of certain trade agreements in partnership with Morocco in the region it occupies – is outright illegal or at best legally questionable” (Allan & Ojeda-García, 2021). Though it is worth noting that legal action has increasingly provided a greater means for the Front to assert their international position and garner support. While this information might seem conducive to a pessimistic outcome over the perceived stagnant and futile nature of the conflict, it is my opinion that the SADRs tactical choice to reinitiate the war may yet provide tangible benefits.

The appointment of a new Special Envoy after two years of the position being vacant reflects a renewed interest and opportunity in the conflict. This presents a renewed opportunity for bilateral and multilateral negotiations through the UN-led peace process. Representatives for the SADR at the UN have once again demanded access to a seat at the UN (France24, 2021). While this might seem logical given their membership in the African Union, the SADR does not have the requisite two-thirds majority of states necessary to recognize them as a legitimate member-state. On the opposite side of the conflict, Morocco continues to see its international standing shrink as its relations with Europe sour. In May, Rabat recalled their ambassador to Germany over their recognition of Sahrawi self-determination and the summoning of the Security Council to resolve the matter (Deutsche Welle, 2021). While Germany’s position remains unchanged in the matter, it reflects a growing tension felt throughout Europe. Similar events in Spain following the admission of Brahim Ghali, the aging leader of the Front, for eye surgery followed, with Morocco recalling their ambassador and loosening migration controls to allow for crossings to the Spanish-controlled North African region known as Ceuta (Serrano, 2021). This is not a new phenomenon, as Morocco has been using migration diplomacy to bolster its international bonafides for some time. As Serrano notes, episodes like this have occurred since a 2016 ECJ ruling rejected Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Mohammed VI was also recently named in the Pandora Papers, the bombshell report containing 11.9m leaked files, and builds upon Wikileaks documentation of Moroccan corruption “at all levels of Moroccan society” and alleges his sister’s involvement in tax evasion schemes (MEE, 2021). Mohammed VI is Africa’s wealthiest king, with an estimated net worth of $5.7bn. Of greatest interest, France has recently been forced to reconsider their position on Morocco following documents leaked around the use of the Israeli-built Pegasus spyware program. France’s President, Emmanuel Macron, was allegedly the target of said spyware by Mohammed VI. While Morocco has denied such claims, it would certainly be within the range of possibilities given Morocco’s established use of this technology on Sahrawi activists.

These developments have brought challenges to the traditional paradigm dominant in the discourses around the Western Sahara – that of stagnancy. While none of these factors can be claimed as solely a consequence of the re-initiation of hostilities, the Polisario Front’s return to conflict has brought about significant change in the international community. However, time can only tell as to whether or not they may translate this momentum into positive action for the thousands of Sahrawi people on the ground. What certainly will condemn the movement to failure is the continued silence of the international community. In terms of actual policy prescriptions and international action, the possibilities are endless, and somewhat dependent on the willingness of both parties to negotiate in good faith. However, with that as a given, it could serve the international community to 1) multilaterally recognize the SADR as a legitimate political authority with claim over the Western; 2) to entrench a humanitarian regime in the MINURSO mandate; 3) cease trade in the occupied territories (unless otherwise agreed with the SADR) and sanction firms and states who do not do so; 4) endorse and pressure both parties to engage in good-faith negotiations on the terms of settlement i.e. genuine political and cultural autonomy or full independence; and 5) commit significant funds to MINURSO for the development, protection, and aid of the 173,600 Sahrawi refugees living in camps to this day. Irrespective of my position on the issue which I have made abundantly clear, these are policy actions which could be enacted with enough political movement from any major regional actor and could result in significant change for a population who has lived without real homes, electricity, or decent

Works Cited:

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Allan, J., & Ojeda-García, R. (2021). Natural resource exploitation in Western Sahara: New research directions. The Journal of North African Studies, 0(0), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2021.1917120

Badarin, E. (2021). Recognition of states and colonialism in the twenty-first century: Western Sahara and Palestine in Sweden’s recognition practice. Third World Quarterly, 42(6), 1276–1294. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1884064

BBC. (2004, June 4). US rewards Morocco for terror aid. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3776413.stm

Bolopion, P. (2010, December 22). Western Sahara: France against Human Rights. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/22/western-sahara-france-against-human-rights

Crivelente, M. (2018). Breaking the siege in the International Relations: International resistance from Palestine and Western Sahara. Relaciones Internacionales, 39, 183–203. https://doi.org/10.15366/relacionesinternacionales2018.39.010

Deutsche Welle. (2021, May 8). Tensions rise between Morocco and Germany. DW.COM. https://www.dw.com/en/tensions-rise-between-morocco-and-germany/a-57466437

Euronews. (2021, September 29). EU court scraps farming, fishing ties with Morocco over Western Sahara. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/2021/09/29/eu-court-scraps-farming-fishing-ties-with-morocco-over-western-sahara

France24. (2021, April 5). Western Sahara demands UN seat, blasts France and Spain. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210405-western-sahara-demands-un-seat-blasts-france-and-spain

Hamann, J. (2020). Morocco Extends Defensive Wall to Reinforce Guerguerat Border Crossing. Https://Www.Moroccoworldnews.Com/. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/11/325880/morocco-extends-defensive-wall-to-reinforce-guerguerat-border-crossing

Lovatt, H. (2021, September 30). Western Sahara, Morocco, and the EU: How good law makes good politics – European Council on Foreign Relations. ECFR. https://ecfr.eu/article/western-sahara-morocco-and-the-eu-how-good-law-makes-good-politics/

Lovatt, H., & Mundy, H. (2021, May 26). Free to choose: A new plan for peace in Western Sahara – European Council on Foreign Relations. ECFR. https://ecfr.eu/publication/free-to-choose-a-new-plan-for-peace-in-western-sahara/

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Mundy, H. L., Jacob. (2021, May 26). Free to choose: A new plan for peace in Western Sahara – European Council on Foreign Relations. ECFR. https://ecfr.eu/publication/free-to-choose-a-new-plan-for-peace-in-western-sahara/

Price, A. (2021, October 7). Department Press Briefing – October 7, 2021. https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-october-7-2021/

Saleh, H., & Abboud, L. (2021, July 25). Spying allegations strain Morocco’s ties with France. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/38d2cae9-4aa2-4da0-805e-a71b7c72ab7a

Serrano, F. (2021). Is Morocco willing to jeopardize its relationship with Europe over the Western Sahara? Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/morocco-willing-jeopardize-its-relationship-europe-over-western-sahara

Soudan, F. (2021, March 2). Morocco/Algeria: Western Sahara conflict shows signs of escalation. The Africa Report.Com. https://www.theafricareport.com/69335/morocco-algeria-western-sahara-conflict-shows-signs-of-escalation/

United Nations. (2021). Secretary-General Appoints Staffan de Mistura of Italy Personal Envoy for Western Sahara [Press Statement]. United Nations. https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sga2068.doc.htm

Williams, I. (2015). Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara parallels Israel and Palestine. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 34(8), 22–24.

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Nicholas Donaldson is a 3rd Year undergraduate at Queen's University majoring in Political Studies (specializing in Political Economy) and minoring in history. His research interests include the global political economy, migration politics, the Western Sahara conflict and crises of capitalism.