China and India’s Invisible War of Influence in Nepal

The multi-colored buildings just sharply upward from the narrow streets are a contrast to the milky grey of the clouds covering the freezing sky. Eye-catching advertisements hang over the open doors, enticing those curious enough to come closer and browse. The Himalayan winds whip around the congested intersections and congregate in city centers and courtyards, complimented by intricate shikaras and temples with polychromatic prayer flags flapping through the gusts.

The avenues seem to lead all to one place, the buildings located in a ring-shaped formation around the Boudhanath stupa, to convey its importance and to give it the proper space it deserves. The white dome and golden top of the Boudhanath Stupa Jarung Khashor are striking, the vivid blue eyes of the Buddha painted on the grand spire pierce the soul, and the monolithic summits of the tallest mountain range on Earth carve their silhouettes into the skyline.

This is Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal. And it lies between two of the most powerful enemies in all of Asia.

China and India Build Themselves

The late 20th and early 21st centuries have been very kind to the nations of India and China in nearly every regard. In economics alone, India’s GDP as of 2019 was nine times bigger than it was 30 years earlier in 1989. Even more impressive, China’s GDP grew 24-fold in this time frame (World Bank, 2021). But these giants of Asia have improved upon themselves in more areas than just economics.

The military quality of these countries has been enhanced significantly since the 1980s and 1990s. On China’s part, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernized greatly under People’s Republic of China (PRC) president Li Xiannian and his “Orthodox Soviet-style” Ten Year Plan of 1978 (MacFarquhar, 2009). However, Xiannian’s successor, Yang Shangkun, especially hardened the armed forces after the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989, supporting the suppression of protests using military force. The effects of the Massacre on PLA tactics and strategy cannot be understated; under the command of “The Butcher of Beijing”, Li Peng, over 300,000 military personnel reported to Beijing were ordered to use lethal force if necessary. As a result, throughout early June, the 38th army division opened fire on protestors (Cheng-Zheng, 1990, 139). The overall lesson the PLA took from the Massacre was that communication between revolutionaries was the reason the protests were as well-organized and well-attended as they were. Therefore, the Chinese regime felt that it must improve its spy technologies to promote a “powerful civil deterrence that can prevent people from committing crimes” (Chansoria, 2021).

India responded to this expansion of the Chinese military accordingly, bolstering its defenses and building a more anti-Chinese domestic policy. As an answer to China’s 2015 military reforms to expand its influence, the Indian military has been collecting piecemeal swaths of land next to the Chinese border (Rajagopalan, 2022). Anonymous sources within India’s government confirm that these acres of land are being acquired for the construction of “critical military infrastructure”, especially after the incursion of 100 PLA soldiers across the Indian border at Barahoti in the state of Uttarakhand to destroy infrastructure and bridges in August 2021 (Sharma, 2021). The Indian military has also created an elite mountain strike corps called the Brahmastra Corps XVII, and the intended purpose of this special corps is to protect the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China (Statesman News Service, 2022). The Brahmastra Corps XVII works in areas of high altitude and strategic importance and is authorized by the Indian Ministry of Defense to engage if fired upon, furthering the potential for escalation. Two of the hottest areas of conflict between these great powers are their borders of Sikkim and Uttar Pradesh against Tibet, these two LACs flank Nepal on both sides.

The Invisible War

Nepal is a nation with heavy historical ties to India: it speaks a language derived from Hindi and the majority of the nation identifies itself as either Buddhist or Hindu. However, that long recorded past is getting increasingly fragile for India to rely on.

China has increased its soft power tactics in Nepal by encouraging Nepalese schools to offer courses in Mandarin, allowing Chinese work crews to establish rail lines between Kathmandu and Tibetan lines, and even confirming that Nepal will be a pivotal state to support China’s Belt and Road Initiative (InsightSIAS). Nepal had always relied heavily on India in the past, as it is a landlocked country, thus, India has taken Nepalese allyship for granted. In order to further drive a wedge between the two brother countries, Xi Jinping became the first Chinese President to visit Nepal (Panda, 2019).

India is fast losing touch with its northern neighbors, desperately holding onto Nepalese millennials' ties to Bollywood movies (The Eurasian Times, 2020) and other cultural staples. However, Indian assumptions that Nepal would always be a “loyal little brother” nation through such loose ties as culture and location have backfired immensely. Now India is risking not only losing the cultural war for Nepal’s heart but also risks losing political influence.

Nepal is becoming a new communist haven.

A New Chinese Proxy

Upon Xi Jinping’s priorly mentioned visit to Nepal, Nepali Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli (also the president of the Communist Party of Nepal) unveiled the renewed official map of Nepal, featuring the once Indian areas of Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh, and Kalapani (Katoch, 2020). Being that Indian troops have been deployed to secure the borders of Limpiyadhura and Kalapani, the Indian government has declared that these new maps are “unacceptable enlargement of territorial claims.” However, one nation that finds the new map redesign perfectly fine is China, even having the same territorial sketches on their official maps of Nepal, and even going so far as to state that Nepal owns Bangladesh (Ethirajan, 2020).

The Nepalese Communist-Maoist insurgency of 1996-2005, sponsored and endorsed by the CCP, was responsible for the deaths of over 19,000 Nepalese citizens and created an internal refugee crisis with over 100,000 people being displaced from their homes (Muni, 2010). The insurgency gave rise to the popularity of the Communist Party of Nepal (UML), a group brought together, trained, and organized under CCP orders (Bhattacharya, 2022).

Similar to how China built roads in Africa, purchased a port in Greece, and strengthened military ties with Venezuela, the Eastern Giant has sunk its teeth deep into the fabric of yet another sovereign nation; its deep culture and rich history penetrated by Maoist thought. There is indeed an invisible war being fought in Nepal between China and India. Puhpa Kumar Dahal, twice-serving former Prime Minister of Nepal and outspoken communist, once said in a 2012 interview, “Our war will finally be with the Indian army.”

In this invisible war over the snow-capped and mountainous nation of Nepal, India is losing. Badly.

Bibliography

Bhattacharya, Arindam. 2022. “An Indian Perspective on China’s Military Modernization.” The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). August 23, 2022. https://www.nbr.org/publication/an-indian-perspective-on-chinas-military-modernization/.

Chansoria, Dr Monika. 2021. “‘Sharp Eyes’: Communist China Spies on Its Citizens at Home and Abroad | JAPAN Forward.” Japan-Forward.com. August 9, 2021. https://japan-forward.com/sharp-eyes-communist-china-spies-on-its-citizens-at-home-and-abroad/.

Cheng, Chu-Yuan, and Zhuyuan Zheng. 1990. Behind the Tianmen Massacre: Social, Political, and Economic Ferment in China. New York: Avalon Publishing.

“China Factor in Indo-Nepal Relations.” n.d. INSIGHTSIAS. Accessed September 26, 2022. https://www.insightsonindia.com/international-relations/india-and-its-neighborhood/india-nepal-relations/india-nepal-china-angle/#:~:text=China%20factor%20in%20Indo-Nepal%20Relations%201%20In%20the.

“Comparing China and India by Economy - StatisticsTimes.com.” n.d. Statisticstimes.com. https://statisticstimes.com/economy/china-vs-india-economy.php.

Ethirajan, Anbarasan. 2020. “How a New Map Is Stirring Old Rivalries.” BBC News, June 10, 2020, sec. Asia. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52967452.

EurAsian Times. 2020. “How Is India Countering the Growing Chinese Influence in Nepal?” Latest Asian, Middle-East, EurAsian, Indian News. January 21, 2020. https://eurasiantimes.com/how-is-india-countering-growing-chinese-influence-in-nepal/.

MacFarquhar, Roderick. 2009. Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Muni, S. 2010. “The Maoist Insurgency Of Nepal: Origin and Evolution.”

https://www.bing.com/search?q=the+maoist+insurgency+of+nepal%3A+origin+and+evolution&qs=n&form=QBRE&sp=-1&pq=the+maoist+insurgency+of+nepal%3A+origin+and+e&sc=10-44&sk=&cvid=A4B8E028319C4782B1C7F0949CC9ECAD&ghsh=0&ghacc=0&ghpl=.

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. 2022. An Indian Perspective on China’s Military Mobilization. Edited by Bates Gill. Washington DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research.

Sharma, Nidhi. n.d. “Defence Ministry to Acquire Strategic 10 Acres in Arunachal’s Siang Border.” The Economic Times. Accessed September 26, 2022. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/defence-ministry-to-acquire-strategic-10-acres-in-arunachals-siang-border/articleshow/86856936.cms.

Panda, Ankit. n.d. “Nepal between China and India.” Thediplomat.com. Accessed September 26, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/nepal-between-china-and-india/#:~:text=In%20October%202019%2C%20President%20Xi%20Jinping.