Cavalry in the Modern World

On the modern battlefield, horses may seem like a strange anachronism. But although cavalry has not been used to any significant degree on the battlefield since the First World War and has not been particularly effective on the battlefield since the American Civil War, it has not disappeared. While modern armies have traded their horses for armoured vehicles and helicopters, horses have still proven useful under specific circumstances. Since the Second World War, cavalry has been employed with surprisingly good results from Angola to Afghanistan. Reviving the model of 18th century dragoons, occasionally modern forces have experimented with these forces on a small-scale.

Horses have retained their uses mostly in parts of the world that are more difficult for modern armies to fight in. Modern armies – dependent on long logistic chains and relying on vast amounts of supplies and support – are best at fighting in the open, where their superior firepower and mobility can be brought to bear. However, in rough terrain like mountains and jungles, it is much harder to move vehicles around and effectively resupply forces. Horses may be more vulnerable, slower and carry less than vehicles, but they don’t require fuel, don’t require spare parts, and handle off-road conditions considerably better. Finally, the sheer novelty of the horse on the battlefield can also be effective: soldiers who have spent time around and fighting against vehicles are accustomed to their presence, but in the modern world, the horse is an unfamiliar danger. Because of these capabilities, the horse’s niche in the modern world is in insurgencies.

The most famous uses of horses in the post-war period have been in Angola, Afghanistan, and Rhodesia by both insurgents and counterinsurgents, each in response to unique local challenges. In the case of Angola and Rhodesia, government forces used horses for long-range patrols across terrain less suited to vehicles. (Cann 2012, 177-178) Actions in the rural areas of these countries required mobility while maintaining accessibility and proximity to the local population. In the depths of the African savannah, horses could ford rivers and make their way through the tall grass more easily than trucks and were cheaper and more common than helicopters. Additionally, the height given by horseback aided in both the visibility required to avoid ambushes and protect the riders from mines. The speed of horses also aided the patrols in covering ground quickly, which allowed the Portuguese units to outmaneuver insurgents on foot, and in the broader strategic context allowed the Portuguese army to maintain and extend their control across large swathes of territory. Finally, cavalry charges were extremely frightening to insurgents and frequently forced them to retreat. (Cann, 182-183)

The use of horses in combat had some precedent in Angola, although their use was somewhat rare. Parasites such as the tsetse fly made using horses in the Angolan jungle effectively impossible, limiting their use to the southern and central plains of the country. Portuguese colonial forces introduced cavalry to Angola beginning in the late 16th century, and saw their most effective use throughout the 19th century in Angola against poorly-equipped indigenous forces. This tradition of cavalry had ended decades prior to the Angolan insurgency, meaning the practical knowledge of how to manage cavalry was absent, as were the actual horses themselves. However, the efficacy of cavalry against indigenous African forces had been proven throughout these conflicts and the wide gap between these uses also meant that the indigenous insurgents had lost any knowledge of countering cavalry. (Cann 2012, 178-179) Furthermore, modern veterinary care reduced historical obstacles such as disease and poor diet to the use of cavalry. To keep the horses healthy and well-rested, horses and their riders were shipped by rail to where they began their patrols, limiting their exposure to potential hazards. (Cann, 179-181)

In practice, the Angolan Portuguese cavalry were reasonably effective. In their usage from 1966 to 1974, cavalry units performed well on long-range patrols, where they could better integrate with indigenous peoples, surprise insurgents due to their speed and relative silence, and required little logistic support. This freed up valuable units such as helicopters for other duties, such as patrolling forested areas unsuitable for cavalry. A détente reached with one of the major rebel groups within Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) of Jonas Savimbi, aided these operations by allowing Portuguese forces to focus on rebels in the open plains of central Angola rather than the forests of the north, which were much less conducive to cavalry. (Cann, 182-183) These actions were successful to the point that the neighboring state of Rhodesia created its own cavalry formation, Grey’s Scouts, as did the apartheid South African government. While Grey’s Scouts had mixed results and a reputation for aggression, the South Africans further demonstrated the efficacy of cavalry, which proved to be superior to units using motorcycles for many of the same reasons experienced by the Portuguese: speed, endurance, and a height advantage enabling scouting. (Moorcraft and McLaughlin 1982, 49-50; Cann 2012, 184)

While cavalry has proven to be effective for modern colonial counterinsurgency forces, it’s also been used to some effect by insurgents themselves. During the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, members of the Northern Alliance – the primary group within Afghanistan fighting the Taliban – used horses directly in combat instead of acting as dragoons. The use of horses in Afghanistan was, by necessity, different than in Africa – here, the goal was mobility above all else. The geography of Afghanistan is quite rough and mountainous, making the terrain exceedingly difficult for vehicles to traverse. Access to vehicles was limited on the part of the Northern Alliance, due to economic and military conditions: the Northern Alliance was composed of various warlords who had previously fought the Soviets in the 1980s and the Taliban in the 1990s, and accordingly had exhausted their supply of vehicles and were unable to access new ones. The Taliban however, had more modern equipment left behind from the Soviet war in Afghanistan, including artillery and armoured vehicles of various types. The element of shock was also less useful, due to the familiarity of Afghans with horses. Nonetheless, the Northern Alliance was able to overcome these disadvantages with American aid. During the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, American special operations forces entered Afghanistan and made contact with sympathetic warlords. In order to defeat the Taliban, the Americans primarily brought the concentrated and devastating use of air power, as well as supplies and small vehicles adapted to the rough terrain in Afghanistan.

Although Afghanistan presented a very different set of challenges than Angola, cavalry still found their niche. The ability of horses to negotiate rough terrain and live off the land to some extent aided the rapid advance of the Northern Alliance across Afghanistan. The largest obstacles to the use of cavalry, such as armoured vehicles, fortifications and other heavy arms were quickly nullified through judicious use of American air power. (Stanton 2017, 190-194) Taliban soldiers, who fought largely on foot or in vehicles, were either outmaneuvered by Northern Alliance fighters on the battlefield, or had their vehicles and positions destroyed by precision-guided munitions, which were unfamiliar in accuracy and effect to even veteran Taliban fighters. The rapid movement of fighters on horseback outside of combat spread fear in Taliban soldiers due to poor communication within the Taliban forces. Because horsemen advanced quickly and seized territory previously thought safe or friendly, the confidence of Taliban fighters in their ability to run to safety and live to fight another day dropped dramatically. The Afghan way of war also contributed to the mounting losses in troop numbers and morale caused by horsemen: combatants frequently switch sides depending which side they perceive to be the strongest, with this being a common and accepted practice. The rapid strings of victories achieved by fast-moving cavalry forces, such as the capture of the city of Mazar-i Sharif relatively early in the war, aided in the perception of the Northern Alliance as the stronger party, causing the rout or defection of many Taliban soldiers.

The successful usage of cavalry in these cases illustrates several lessons to be more broadly applied across modern warfare. Mounted troops have a mobility advantage over infantry, even forces more familiar with the local terrain. In Angola, colonial troops without the fieldcraft of the indigenous insurgents were nonetheless able to outmaneuver their opponents in skirmishes. In the operational context, the speed of action demonstrated by Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan in open spaces show that mounted troops can be a sudden and effective surprise to enemy forces without a solid means of countering them, especially for flanking maneuvers.

Like other modern force elements, cavalry must be used as part of combined arms warfare. Horse cavalry units lack firepower, being unable to use anything other than small arms effectively (potentially, horses could be used to move artillery, but this would be slow and exceedingly vulnerable to counter-battery fire.) Additionally, they lack the protection of armoured vehicles or the speed and altitude of helicopters. The Northern Alliance mounted fighters had limited means of combating enemy armoured units or fixed positions, despite their successes against Taliban infantry and required American air power to overcome these. In Angola, cavalry were used as adjuncts to helicopter-borne forces, and rarely faced the same kinds of intense combat seen in Afghanistan. (Cann 2012, 184) Additionally, the Portuguese had a decisive advantage in firepower compared to the rebel groups thanks to airpower, and greater access to modern weaponry, although not to the same extent as in Afghanistan. Thirdly, mounted troops can prove to be a surprisingly cheap alternative to vehicles. In Angola, a troop of horses was roughly as expensive as one of the trucks employed by the Portuguese Army. (Ibid, 179) In Afghanistan, horses, although valuable, were still much more common than vehicles, and were embedded in a cultural context where equestrian skills were prized and the knowledge of horse care was common. This ability to maintain mounted forces in austere environments allows for otherwise vulnerable forces to maintain their ability to act and carry out operations. Additionally, in both insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, where on the ground presence is required to maintain the loyalty and support of local populations, the use of horses forces armies to maintain a greater footprint within local communities. While helicopters and vehicles provide much greater firepower, mobility, and protection, they are fundamentally alienating: horses place soldiers within the view of civilians and provide a human face to them. This was seen especially in Angola, where this face-to-face approach aided the Portuguese fight for the hearts and minds of the masses. (Cann 2012, 185)

Despite their disappearance from militaries around the world, cavalry still appears in the post-war period. Useful for its mobility and limited logistical demands, cavalry has proven some degree of relevance in both counterinsurgencies and insurgencies around the world. While difficult to use unsupported, as part of a combined-arms formation cavalry maintains its use. The fundamental lesson of the modern use of cavalry in these examples is that simply because a tactic or strategy is old, doesn’t mean it can’t be useful under the right circumstances.

Bibliography

Cann, John P. Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 1961-74. Solihull: Helion, 2012.

Moorcraft, Paul L., and Peter McLaughlin. Chimurenga!: The War in Rhodesia: A Military History. Sygma/Collins, 1982.

Stanton, Doug. Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of Special Forces Who Rode to Victory in Afghanistan. London: Simon & Schuster, 2017.