Canada-U.S. Relations and the OAS: What led to Canada Joining?

Introduction

Overshadowed by the greater role taken up by the United States, Canada’s role within the Organisation of American States (OAS) has seldom been documented. How have Canada-U.S. relations influenced Canada’s involvement with the OAS between 1962 and 1993? I argue that Canada’s involvement with the OAS has been predominantly determined by the nature of the relationship that existed between each Prime Minister and their American counterpart. Accordingly, this comes as the OAS is perceived, both by Canada and Latin American nations, as primarily guided by American values, interests, and objectives. Still, Canada depends on the OAS to pursue its strategic and economic objectives, which explains why the thought of joining the OAS was entertained by every Canadian Prime Minister under review, despite their relative dislike of the Organisation’s heavy ties to American empire. Given its small middle power status, Canada views the OAS as a vessel for its national and regional interests and as a vehicle to ensure a continent reflective of Canadian priorities.

Diefenbaker, Cuba, and American Hegemony

Canada first joined the Organisation of American States in 1962 as a temporary observer, a status that it kept for 10 years until it became a permanent observer in 1972 and then joined as a full member in 1990 under Brian Mulroney. 1962 was the year of the Cuban missile crisis, which is, in part, what prompted Canada to take part in the OAS. Under John Diefenbaker’s leadership, Canada did not follow in the United States’ footsteps regarding Cuba and the fight against global Communism. Diefenbaker believed that the Cuban people had a right to self-determination, even proposing that Cuba be included within the OAS.

Nonetheless, although perceived as meaning to appease the Americans, Diefenbaker’s decision to join the OAS was primarily rooted in his enthusiasm for increased engagement with Latin America. Initially, Diefenbaker refused to join the OAS, citing the Organisation’s use by the United States as a means to support and whitewash anti-Communist dictators. Diefenbaker saw joining the OAS as a full member to be an act of caving to U.S. pressure and hegemony, which pushed him to make Canada join solely as an observer state.

Pearson and the “Golden Age” of Canadian Diplomacy

The Organisation, still, was not only meant to advance American interests in the region, but was also to ensure peace, economic and political freedom, and prosperity through collaboration. This was certainly what Lester B. Pearson saw in the OAS and Canada's role within it. Pearson sought to bring about a "golden age" in Canadian diplomacy, in which Canada and the rest of the world, including the United States, would collaborate to bring about common economic and strategic policy objectives.

Pearson pursued increased participation in multilateral treaties, accords, and organisations, through the promotion of Canadian interests abroad. Pearson also oversaw the crafting of the liberal internationalist doctrine of international affairs, a doctrine which, still, according to Colin Robertson, dictates Canada's foreign policy approach and outlook to this day. During Pearson’s prime ministership, U.S.-Canada relations improved quite a bit, earning them the epithet of “tolerant allies”. Despite the popular notion that Pearson opposed the Vietnam War, Pearson supported it. Moreover, Pearson also signed the U.S.-Canada Automotive Products Agreement, leading to a historically low unemployment rate in both countries. Pearson also came to the aid of other U.S. strategic missions abroad through his resolution of the Suez Crisis and his increasing of Canada’s symbolic, budgetary and strategic commitments to the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and multilateralism.

Pearson was fully committed to the principle of collective security, reflected in the OAS’ founding charter. His commitment was made clear in one of Pearson speeches, in which he stated, referencing Central and South America, that “we want above all to establish the principle that if what happens within a country [...] does affect the peace of the world it becomes by general agreement the business of every nation”. Pearson had also repeatedly expressed a wish for Canada to join the OAS as a full member, although he was apparently reluctant to do so due to unshifting Canadian public opinion on the matter. In 1968, Pearson and his cabinet also embarked on several diplomatic trips to various Latin American countries and conferences to discuss the possibility of joining. This was backed by some civil society movements and public interest groups in Canada. Still, the public support in Canada for its joining of the OAS was deemed by Pearson to be insufficient for it to move forward.

Trudeau and the North American Chasm

Pierre Trudeau, who came to power in 1968 on a social democratic platform, served as an ideological paradox to Richard Nixon’s expansionist conservatism. The ideological gap between the two North American leaders felt widest in foreign policy matters, especially their approach to inter-American relations. This was also the case for Presidents Ford and Reagan, who were very hawkish on foreign policy, especially regarding the Americas. The United States put a fierce embargo on Cuba and implemented many measures to confront and dismantle the Cuban regime through both nationally covert and internationally overt means. This includes sustained attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro, the funding, propping up, and arming of Cuban dissidents, and the denunciation of the regime at the United Nations. Trudeau, however, had a different approach. Trudeau, on the other hand, struck up a personal relationship with Fidel Castro, even exclaiming “Viva Cuba! Viva Fidel Castro!”, a common revolutionary chant in Cuba. Trudeau also heavily opposed the embargo, passing the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act to ensure that repercussions of the embargo could not be felt on

Canadian businesses and to disincentivise Canada-based U.S. companies from partaking in the embargo. This schism in foreign policy approaches between the North American governments had a tremendous impact on Canada’s relationship with the OAS and Latin America during this period. As outlined by Brian J.R. Stevenson, Trudeau approached Latin America without a particular regard for U.S. hegemony in the region but instead considered it with Canadian and internationalist interests in mind. To illustrate, one of the first foreign policy decisions made by Pierre Trudeau was to visit many Latin American countries to conduct reviews and engage in diplomatic and economic negotiations. In November 1968, Trudeau, then a member of Prime Minister Pearson’s cabinet, visited 9 Latin American countries, including Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Colombia. The trips were proposed by Trudeau and garnered a lot of public support both in Canada and throughout Latin America, pushing Pierre Trudeau to contemplate Canadian full state membership within the OAS. Trudeau also created the Latin American Task Force, charged with improving Canada-Latin America relations and exploring the possibility of Canada joining the OAS. Finally, Trudeau made Canada join the OAS as a permanent observer in 1972, as opposed to a temporary one. This gave a lot of momentum to the proposal, which Brian Mulroney capitalised on.

The Mulroney Era and Full Member Status

Brian Mulroney, a Progressive Conservative elected Prime Minister in 1984 - three years after Ronald Reagan - was generally in broad agreement with Reagan’s approach to foreign policy, especially as it related to inter-American relations. In 1987, Mulroney and Reagan signed the CUSFTA, a precursor to NAFTA. Mulroney also adopted Reagan’s approach to economics, finance, and free trade, buying into Reaganite laissez-faire capitalism, trickle-down economics, financial deregulation, and free trade. These common ideals pushed Mulroney to approve Canada’s joining of the OAS, as both Mulroney and Reagan viewed the OAS as a way to input North American neo-liberal economic, political, social, and religious values into the inter-American system and individual Latin American states. Still, Mulroney disagreed with Reagan on his military approach to foreign policy and his support for anti-Communist militias, groups, and governments in Latin America. Nonetheless, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 presented an opportune moment for Mulroney to join the OAS, as the United States would, seemingly, no longer concentrate its inter-American relations and engagement on anti-Communist military action, but rather on more common, cooperative, economic, and social issues. Mulroney’s mission of rapprochement was quickly put into action. Mulroney officially signed the OAS’s charter in 1989. Canada would then remain at the centre of various inter-American developments and crisis resolutions. Mulroney pushed for the establishment of the Summits of the Heads of State and Government of the Americas, held each year and promptly in times of crisis. Mulroney, despite opposition from his predecessor John Turner and future Prime Minister

Jean Chrétien also decided to go ahead with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which now included Mexico and would help facilitate trade to and improve economic relations with the rest of Latin America. The NAFTA negotiations and consultations were heavily facilitated via the OAS and the newly-implemented Summits of the Heads of State and Government of the Americas. All of these instances of inter-American cooperation under Mulroney have paved the way for Canada to become the second biggest donor to the OAS. They serve as a testament to the reciprocal relationship between Canada and the OAS, founded on the principles of internationalism, regionalism, and multilateralism which Canada, a middle power whose foreign policy accomplishments have been dimmed by those of the world superpower to its Southern border, crucially relies on.

Canada, Middle Power Status, and the OAS

As demonstrated through an overview of Canada-U.S. relations under each major Prime Minister between 1962 and 1993, no matter how tense relations might have gotten between the two nations, Canada persisted in its engagement with the Latin American subcontinent. Canada's middle power status and geographical predicament make it reliant on multilateral cooperation and reciprocal collaboration with its neighbours and allies. Canada’s survival in the global balance of power, like that of other middle powers such as South Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Germany, and Australia, depends upon the degree to which it engages in multilateral cooperation and diplomatic efforts with great and middle powers. To illustrate, as Diefenbaker was getting consumed politically and physically by his overt antipathy for American hegemonic pursuits and the Kennedy administration, Diefenbaker still insisted upon Canada's joining the Organisation as an observer to ease tensions and increase continental engagement. Pearson, while President Johnson took personal offense to Pearson's interpreted abrogation of the American war efforts in Vietnam, helped the proposal gain momentum through several diplomatic trips, consultations, and new policy orientations towards the Americas. Pierre Trudeau, in his commanding pragmatic leftism, created animosity for his leadership in the White House, challenging the American exceptionalism of Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. Trudeau, still, wanted Canada to persist in its wish for increased inter-American collaboration and saw the subcontinent as an opportunity for progress on all fronts. Mulroney, then, capitalised on this vision and finally signed and ratified Canada's OAS membership, partly banking on the more chummy relationship he enjoyed with American President Ronald Reagan. Continuing with this past precedent, Canada now serves as one of the most involved members of the OAS, despite certain periods of challenging relations between Canada and the United States.