Acta, non Verba: A case for restraint in Grand Strategy

Editor's note: the writer is a student of U.S. foreign policy and offers a unique first-person perspective on changing U.S. foreign policy

Acta Non Verba

As the United States enters the twenty-third year of the new millennium, it has signed a blank check (Stohl and Yousif, 2022) to Kyiv with waning (Watson, 2022) support from a public more concerned with their material conditions (Monmouth, 2022) than the European security architecture (Hindrén, 2022), it faces challenges presented by an increasingly ambitious (Burek, 2022) China and must address the increasingly dire international security implications (Bentley, Hugh, and Schoonover, 2022) which climate change poses. These external stimuli to the status of the U.S. have increased anxiety in our domestic foreign policy circles across the political spectrum and their responses have largely been influenced by great-power competition (Ashford 2021). Moreover, solutions to this perceived crisis of American prestige have been viewed within the same frameworks that had their height in the previous century despite the rapid geopolitical change that has occurred since the new millennium started. One such school of thought which had its moment in the sun of late has been the progressive strain (Starr, 2022) of American foreign policy.

Progressive voices such as Stephen Wertheim (Wertheim, 2022) of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, note that while the Biden administration had made policy achievements within the context of a progressive framework, the project of implementing progressive prescriptions for our security challenges has stalled amidst our obsession with competition with other powers. Additionally, Wertheim further deliberates within his article upon the three different progressive perspectives within American foreign policy ranging from liberal internationalists, those championing global governance and those who prize restraint in order to arrive at their collective shortcoming in having a glaring omission of thought-out answers to competition among powers. To provide an actionable rebuttal to this, one must look toward America’s past and antiquity to inform them on how to critically reevaluate existing theory to create a progressive framework that can thrive within the contemporary international system that is fraught with tension between major powers. Restraint cannot be an intellectual counter-culture within the foreign policy community but molded into a tangible framework on which to conduct external relations with other states.

Verba Volant, Scripta Manent

With the predisposition of the unique strain of American realism to prioritize successful political action (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017) to meet the pressing security matters of the day, modern realists rarely delve into source material that would not likely produce a pragmatic outcome. Compounding this hindrance to overcoming the self-imposed limitation of the scope of statecraft has been the decline (Howe 2011) of supported scholarship of the classics within American educational institutions, constricting the lessons our policymakers can draw upon from such a consequential polity. Currently, expensive private schools (“Classics Courses - Milton Academy”, n.d.)have a monopoly on the teaching of the classics.These schools are inaccessible for a majority of Americans. The languages associated with the classics are reduced to a nod (Safran 1992) of the socioeconomic status of those who can afford instruction, with their interactions to the classics often stopping unless they pursue a major in the subject, which seldom happens.

Additionally, with initiatives to increase the diversity (Kopp, 2021) of our foreign policy institutions, there will be many who have gained admission to the nation’s top international affairs schools, but a majority will only be instructed in the necessary schools of thought (Georgetown University, 2022) to participate in a discourse concerning how we conduct foreign affairs, but without familiarity to the classics. For those within conservative foreign policy circles, the classics formed a direct lineage that inspired concepts (Holmes 2022) like governance aligned with natural law (a rarity in a time of empires)that in turn emboldened American exceptionalism (Foner, 2013) which was used as justification for contemporary foreign policy blunders that have harmed the strategic interests of the United States. Although there exists an extended canon of writings associated with what is considered to be the classics along with the works of the Enlightenment, conservative foreign policy thought has placed a higher degree of importance upon religious values (The Initiative on Faith & Public Life, 2019) compared to the classics, which historically occupied a prominent place within conservative thought. Given the difficulty of access to the classics (Cunliffe, 2022) and the attachment as apart of the canon that is defined as exceptional over works produced by other societies by conservatives, there may be an inclination amongst progressive thinkers to disregard the classics in favour of historical leftist theory, to base their policies upon.

This action however would disregard centuries of the valuable wealth of writings and history directly from societies that have had a profound impact on the ideas that would help give birth to the United States. Scholarship of the impact that the classics had on the Founding Fathers is abundant (MacKendrick 1976) and evident. Both Hamilton and Madison drew upon Greco-Roman authors for inspiration for such foundational concepts to our republic such as the separation of powers and individual liberty. It had been in the writings of the Greek historian Polybius (Ames and Montgomery 1934) in which he described how the civilisation of Carthage was lost as the faith in its institutions declined. To even have an enduring republic beyond the herculean task of winning independence from a hegemonic power, they would have to ensure that there would be institutions that would have the public having enduring faith in them. The quandary was resolved when the founding fathers took into account the issues faced by the hegemons of antiquity, that being Republican Rome and Carthage, to create the divisions of power that have become the hallmarks of the American system. When taking all of this into account, it would be a mistake to rid ourselves of the classics as they have provided the cornerstone on which our republic was constructed. Without the founding fathers creating such robust institutions, the U.S. would not have had the ability to have achieved its greatest foreign policy objectives. However, with recent actions by these institutions, faith (Jones, 2022) afforded to them by the public has diminished. There exists grave challenges that must be addressed by younger generations waiting to assume positions within our republic’s halls of power. Luckily, there are a wide array of classical literature and a long tradition of realist scholarship that are awaiting new eyes to draw upon them for innovative potential prescriptions for the debates of the day.

Patres Patriae

Few such figures in antiquity have had such a fundamental yet overlooked impact upon the United States as that of Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus (Burns, 2022). The Roman statesman was born into the influential patrician class and lived during the early Roman republic. He would come into the writings of the Roman historian Livy (Rosivach, n.d.) when in 458 B.C., the Aequi tribe captured 2 Roman armies headed by consuls. The dire circumstances forced the Roman senate to proposition him into leaving his farm located along the Tiber and undertaking the mantle of dictator (an office of last resort in Republican Rome). Although the events surrounding his ascension to the role which he would become famous for are the subject of debate for historians, the events in question elevated the former consul to a near-mythical status for being an exemplar of civic virtue. More importantly, he left the example of restraint when he acted as sovereign of the Roman republic.

This example would be followed by George Washington (Boaz, 2006) centuries later as he would also lead his republic’s army to firmly establish the American experiment. Other founding fathers would use their talents to provide the intellectual foundations of the republic through their reinterpretations of the classics and English political philosophy, but without action, the ideals of their writings would not come to fruition to create an enduring experiment. Washington did not seek a third term and the example of his character would provide the catalyst for a longstanding democratic norm of presiding over the office, not feeling entitled to the privileges afforded to the position. Much like the myth of Cincinnatus, there exists an enduring myth (Furr, 2007) of Washington being offered kingship which has reverberated within the American consciousness. In the myth, he rejects the position in favour of making a symbolic move to further the cause of tearing away the colonies from the tyranny of monarchical rule in favour of controlling their destiny through self-government.

Pollice Compresso Favor Iudicabatur

Although the founding fathers had freed themselves of the physical manifestation of the sovereign [King George III] (Williams, n.d.) described by Hobbes in the Leviathan, the international system of which their young republic occupied and that of the contemporary United States occupies currently is dominated by hegemons. In a reversal of fortunes from our humble beginnings as a confederation of colonies, we have emerged as a sovereign that has constructed the post-war liberal order, we have constructed the global social contract that many of our allies have ascribed to for their security and the conduct of international commerce. While there were historical strides made in the effort to provide restraint to the powers of a sovereign in favour of rights through such documents as the Magna Carta (Vile 2009), the hegemons of history have had free reign to pursue their interests without recourse from less powerful states. There have been attempts made at the global level to accomplish this with precedents set by conventions of international law (Gillard, 2020), but their implementation is largely voluntary. The U.S. has faced other sovereigns[hegemons] wishing to make the international system their realm and it put forth a foreign policy of zero-sum realism that extended into the 21st century as described by Mearsheimer (European University Institute, 2022) to counter their aims. While the policy provided a strategic environment for a moment of unipolarity, it has produced diminishing returns that have isolated us from our allies and potential partners.

The emerging rival (Beijing) to which our attention is directed has pursued economic reforms (Delisle and Goldstein, 2018) that have made it unique amongst its peers and lent to its rising stock as a model for domestic administration. Their disadvantage however lies within them having to impede upon a social contract that is decades old. They and the Russian federation formed harsh social contracts with a strong sovereign due to the instability they suffered in the 20th century. Our republic formed theirs over a long period of time and is in theory signed by citizens with one another. Furthermore, the posture within their foreign policy emulates historical sovereigns as that is the precedent for the attainment of international influence. Contemporary debates surrounding the decline of hegemons view the decline (Blanchette, 2021) of the hegemon preceding them as natural and attestable to the hubris of their actions. This view on the international system is akin to the Greek ouroboros (Reemes, 2015) which scholars have historically attributed its meaning to be a symbol representing eternity. Within the context of international relations, it translates as the head of the snake representing a hegemon only to be replaced by rising powers resting in the tail awaiting to reach the position of the head in order to reign in the way that they see fit according to their interests. As this order is seen as natural and recurring, states will seek relations with the hegemon that provides them the greatest degree of security and commerce. This view is one that can be challenged with the multilateral institutions that the U.S. has cultivated as they have the potential for its members to outweigh the assurances that a rising hegemon can provide.

Through the incorporation of the example of Cincinnatus showing restraint as a sovereign, the United States would further surpass opposing powers as a model for foreign relations with the highest degree of returns to the state that pursues it. Throughout history sovereigns have used justification for their rule ranging from divine right of kings (Wills, 2020) in the case of Britain and in our own case exceptionalism (Thimm, 2007) derived from the works of the nation’s founders without much contribution from successive generations. When surveying the remaining monarchies [domestic sovereigns] within the West, it becomes evident that they have survived through providence and successful political action through adding limits to their power.

The adoption of exceptionalism as an entrenched stance of the United States detracts from our ability to reassess failures in policy. The United States ought to be viewed as a state that possesses a unique character but it can be exceptional with the display of its example. For the United States to implement a restraint-based grand strategy, there first has to be agreement within the progressive space on what restraint would look like when the ability to enact it comes to be. Restraint focused organisations argue that the U.S. should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy (John Quincy Adams Society, n.d.), but we must confront the reality of the security challenges (Wright, 2019) that impede such lofty aspirations. Moreover, there are monsters going abroad (Brookings, 2022) destroying democratic states. Restraint among the left seeks to emulate the model of leftist states (Schwartz 2022) whose actions are afforded to them through their geography and long recognised neutrality.

Those within the conservative foreign policy establishment welcome their entrance into NATO but fail to recognise the value of having middle powers to delegate to. Sweden has been able to bring warring parties to the negotiation table through their impartial posture on the world stage, with their recent intent to engage in foreign entanglements for their security, it will be a much more difficult endeavour to host similar peace talks. As a result, the United States will have less alternatives to resolve burgeoning crises in international security through third parties and be left with using either its soft or hard power. Surveying the current geopolitical landscape, the economic woes of our allies and the moment of unipolarity having passed strongly stands in the prospect of unilateral action. This complication would be more suited to a non-NATO ally and such a complication provides a hindrance to our ability to have a depth of options in how the country can further American interests. On the same token, there may be instances of states who are in such dire situations that they would prefer to engage in a covenant with an authoritative sovereign in favour of stability just as Moscow and Beijing had done. This duality is best represented by chapter V and chapter VIII of Machiavelli’s The Prince. In chapter V, it describes ways in which to hold states that a prince[sovereign] acquires which have a tradition of self-administration. For the modern hegemon, the one of the three ways that Machiavelli enumerates that is most congruent with restraint is leaving their system of governance intact to hold them in their sphere of influence. Within chapter VIII, he describes how Oliverotto da Fermo plotted to take over the city of Fermo from his maternal uncle and murdered the chief magistrate only to be removed from power by Cesare Borgia. Furthermore, within the chapter he mentions that some may overdo evil acts and they should not be carried out in succession unless it is to the advantage of the subjects that they hope to have domain over. The Russian federation practices the actions described in chapter VIII as they have used their hard power to keep despotic governments in office in the Middle East (Yacoubian, 2021) and Africa (Parens, 2022). Granted, they have made strategic gains within those regions, but they risk losing their influence and strategic gains by having a prolonged presence within those regions that will most likely be sustained through force. Both the Russians and the U.S. have constructed security architectures for their strategic interests, but we have focused upon the loss of the architecture (Stoetman, 2022) rather than understand its intricacies needed for its preservation. These ecosystems have states of differing abilities and interests which can aid the mission of restraint in their own ways. Through delegation of priorities with our allies, there can exist orchestrated restraint from which we can pursue a common ambition of assuring our collective self-administration in the face of other sovereigns. Though pursuing a moral foreign policy (Nye Jr., 2019) within a state of anarchy is one that may seem as absurd as the tragic mythical character of Sisyphus (Camus, 1991) who is forced to roll a boulder up a hill. Despite the challenge, it is only when the hill becomes worn down that we may foster a more favorable environment for a moral foreign policy to be pursued. With multilateralism we can enact collective self-determination through acting as a collective hegemon of freely associated states. However, There are challenges to be overcome in the way we have formed hard-power alliances.

Contemporary literature suggests that alliances offer poor returns (Kenwick and Vasquez, 2017) for states who wish to deter their adversaries. This can be attributed to the attitudes of opposing sovereigns who view their defence institutions as mere frail tools to maintain their spheres of influence that are solely propped up and invested in by the most powerful polity. Ancient alliances such as Delian league (Rawlings III 1977) have had similar issues, the organisation was thought to have been formed for the noble purpose of defending against Persian aggression, but it became a vehicle for the aims of Athens. However, progress is being made in this regard as NATO has launched a fund (Machi, 2022) for defence innovation to provide more credible deterrence across all strategic partners. It should be noted that while the current transatlantic partnership has been augmented (Bouchet, 2022) by the crisis in Ukraine, the current youth which espouse restraint within the U.S. and the EU have very different ideas on what it means. While we have grown up under the shadow of America’s forever conflicts, they have benefitted and grown accustom to a common European community that has achieved continued relevance through the act of union. Just as this paper attempts to innovate in progressive American thought for our foreign policy, young Europeans have innovated in policy to help them achieve strategic autonomy (Oddo, 2022) in light of the decline (Whineray, 2020) of quality of American leadership in recent years. To achieve orchestrated restraint, the progressive American youth must reconcile and familiarise themselves with our transatlantic partners to devise how we will meet the challenges which we must address. With the magnitude of issues which we must confront, we have to rise to the occasion by undertaking a virtuous tenure, presiding over the degree of influence that has been inherited, to truly deserve the title of leading the free world.

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